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COMPARATIVE RESEARCH OF THE PLEA LENIENCY SYSTEM OF CHINA
This dissertation mainly discusses the Plea Leniency System that was recently
legislated in China. Plea Leniency had completed a 2-year tryout stage,1 and was
officially legalized into the Criminal Procedure Law of China in Oct.2018.2 The
application of pleading procedures seems inevitable around the world, and operates
differently in each country. As a result, there exist both similarities and differences
between Chinese Plea Leniency and American plea bargaining.
This dissertation contains comparative research, empirical research and case
research. Chapters I to III will form the first half of my research.3 This part contains my
retrospective research of pleading procedure’s past development in China; the analysis of
China’s legislation on Plea Leniency;4 and my first stage empirical research, in
cooperation with Shanghai X District’s People’s Procuratorate.5 Chapter IV to VII will
form the second half of my research: Based on my second stage empirical research,6 also
combined with my comparative research between Chinese and American pleading
systems, these four chapters will further compare Chinese Plea Leniency and American
plea bargaining systems, in four different aspects. Chapter VIII contains my summary.

1

The tryout stage of Plea Leniency started from Oct. 2016 to Oct. 2018.
See Criminal Procedure Law of China, newest revised version of 2018.
https://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=29202&lib=law
3
Since Aug. 2019 to March 2020.
4
Supra note 2.
5
The specific names of District People’s Procuratorate and cooperating procurators are hidden, due to
information providers’ request.
6
Since Oct. 2020 to June 2021.
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Chapter I Retrospective Research

1.1 Preface
Plea bargaining has already been a relatively mature system in the United States, as a result
of more than 40 years of formal development. And if we trace back to its unofficial,
“underground” period in America, the history of plea bargaining is even longer.7 However, the
plea mechanism (Plea Leniency) is a very fresh product in China, only one year old since its
formal legislation in 2018.
Some core ideas that gave rise to the American-style plea bargaining system, such as interest
swap, consensus, adversarial criminal procedure, and judicial sports, are largely absent from the
criminal justice systems of most Civil Law countries. Hence, it took a long time to accept and
apply plea bargaining (or even any part of it) in Civil Law countries, and China was no
exception.
To understand how plea bargaining functions in China, it is important at first to learn why
China decided to build its own system, as late as beginning in 2014 – and why I choose to call
that new system “Plea Leniency”, rather than Chinese style plea bargaining.

1.2 Early Stages
Similar to other Civil Law countries, such as Germany, France, and Italy,8 Chinese criminal

Professor Joseph L. Hoffmann: “In the U.S., plea bargaining goes all the way back to the beginning of the country,
but it was done “under the table” until the Brady and Bordenkircher decisions of the Supreme Court in the 1970s,
which held that plea bargaining did not generally violate the constitutional rights of the defendant.”
8
See Shi Pengpeng, Comparative Study of Plea Bargain in Italy and France, 5 CRIMINAL SCIENCE 110 (2007); Xu
7
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procedure9 originated from an ideological point of view, based on a completely ex officio
principle. Over a period of decades, however, China’s criminal justice development began to
recognize some merits of adversarial system criminal procedures, mainly the United States’
criminal procedure, being the most representative, plea bargaining.
When the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was founded in 1949, for historical reasons,
the PRC's criminal justice system in its earliest stage featured policy-led ex officio and total
cooperative relationship between the public security department, people’s procuratorates,
Discipline Committee, and people’s courts.10
Under traditional Chinese criminal procedure, defendants were treated as procedural objects
within criminal procedure (inquisitional system). They lacked actual capability to defend
themselves against procurators, and sometimes the government got involved to guide the case,
politically, usually in influential cases/felonies.11 Therefore, by and large, China’s criminal
procedure, in its earliest stage, was operated to serve the goal of policy execution and resulted in
a one-sided (procuration-guided) justice application.
Until the late 1970s, before the Reform and Opening policy was carried out,12 China’s
criminal procedure could not discard the concept of “regarding class struggle as the guiding

Meijun, Practice and Inspiration of Plea Bargaining in Germany, 2 THE JURIST 114 (2009).
9
China uses the word “criminal litigation” in the past. But now “criminal procedure” is much more seen in the
context of Chinese criminal justice. Also, Criminal Law and Criminal Litigation/Procedure, are two separate
subjects in Chinese law schools.
10
See Wang Yin & Guo Zhiyuan, The Innovation and Development of Criminal Procedural Theories in 70 Years of
New China, 9 THEORETICAL HORIZON 17, 18 (2019).
11
There is no clear definition of “felony” in Chinese criminal justice, but a general reference for heavy offenses,
that potentially lead more than 7 or 10 years of imprisonment.
12
After the Culture Revolution, in 1978, the vice minister Deng Xiaoping proposed to reform China’s structure and
open to the world.
2

principle,”13 which, in form, manifested in an investigation-centered criminal procedure. Police
and procurators had absolutely dominance both procedurally and substantively.
This mode of criminal procedure maintained a high-pressure posture on defendants, and its
sole purpose was to push defendants plead guilty within a short period of time. From the 1950s
to 2010s, there was a famous phrase, which lasted for six decades: “Plea for leniency, resist for
harshness.”14 The first half of this phrase actually represents an accurate description of modern
Chinese practice, as reflected in the new Plea Leniency legislation; but the second half has never
been adopted in Chinese law, and at least arguably violated constitutional norms by punishing a
defendant for asserting his legal rights.
During that period, Chinese procurators, judges and legislators basically lacked concept of
procedural justice - due process; the CPC committees and government offices sometimes
intervened in adjudication; and extortion of confessions by torture was not rare to be seen. There
were many cases in which people were unjustly charged and convicted.15
In the middle of 1980s, Chinese scholars began to notice the development of plea
bargaining, but through their study of German criminal procedure, instead of American criminal
procedure.16 Because of the good relationship between China and West Germany at that time,
China learned and adopted parts of the techniques and institutions of West Germany, including
multiple aspects of the German legal system.
13

A political slogan raised in 1957 at The Third Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee.
This phrase is unable to find the original source. But it is commonly known by the Chinese people as a
description of the early stages of Chinese criminal justice.
15
About wrong convictions in China, see He Jiahong, LATE JUSTICE - TEN INFLUENTIAL FALSE CRIMINAL CASES OF
CHINA (2014).
16
Many of the current laws in China have been intersecting with German laws, to some extent. Many law
professors who studied in Germany are now teaching in Chinese universities.
14
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In Germany, plea bargaining suffered an even more difficult process in coming out of the
shadows than in the United States.17 During the period after plea bargaining was first recognized
in the form of U.S. Supreme Court case law in United States,18 around 1975, similar practice
started to be carried out secretly in Germany by some prosecutors and judges.19 This was partly
due to German adherence to certain long-lived traditional ideas. Written in 1879, German
Criminal Procedure Law stipulated that the defendant can be convicted of a crime only on the
basis of trial by evidence, and confession by torture or inducement were prohibited.20
Due to the long-held ex officio principle in Civil Law countries, the marketization of
adjudication embodied by the plea bargain, and the decision not to place as much stress on
learning the “absolute” truth, but instead reaching a consensus (plea agreement) through
consultation, were not consistent with the German concept of criminal proceedings.
Thus, for a long time, there was no space for plea bargaining’s theoretical growth in
Germany. Until the late 1990s, plea bargaining was a “forbidden topic”.21 Around that time,
judicial efficiency and cost control emerged as a major issue for West Germany to solve, which
allowed plea bargaining to be moved into the light and finally become systematized in
Germany.22
From the late 1980s to the early 1990s, China’s jurisprudence learned a lot from West
Germany. That was also the time that Chinese scholars began to know about American plea
17

See Xu, supra note 8 at 114.
See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
19
See Xu, supra note 8.
20
See Xu, supra note 8 at 114.
21
Id. at 117.
22
Id.
18
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bargaining, through researching German criminal justice. But until the twenty-first century, plea
bargaining had no opportunity to find its footing in China, which China had an even more
conservative attitude about adjudication than West Germany.23
Also, the issues of judicial efficiency and cost control, that became prominent in the 1970s’
West Germany, did not loom as a major problem in China until 2012, which further delayed the
advance of plea bargaining in China.
As another aspect, after the Reform and Opening policy was carried out in 1978, through
learning from other countries’ experiences, the approach of Chinese criminal justice witnessed
gradual change. Chinese defendants’ rights in criminal justice also began to be enforced by
several criminal law/criminal procedure law updates, as China was continuously trying to build
a modern “rule by law” country and government.24
However, prior to the twenty-first century, this enforcement of rights was still relatively
limited.25 Criminal defense lawyers gradually found their proper role in the defense of cases, but
their extents of involvement were still relatively restricted. For example, for a long time,
Chinese defense lawyers had neither the authority to go through relevant case files actively, nor
to meet with defendants in-person without procurators’ presence.
Thus, defense lawyers’ knowledge of cases was limited to only two sources: case materials
provided (sometimes in a selective manner) by procurators, after the completion of their
23

See Sun Changyong, Cherish Due Process to Refuse Plea Bargain, 6 TRIBUNE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND LAW
44 (2002).
24
The slogan “Comprehensively rule the country by law” was raised during the 15th National Congress of the CPC,
September 1997.
25
See Criminal Procedure Law of China, version 1996. Some components of adversarial criminal procedure were
added, at a limited level.
5

investigation; and the written or oral statements of the defendants.26 The materials provided by
defendants were often limited and even false statements, because the defendants may have
suffered from strict surveillance or even torture.
The effect on those defendants after a prolonged imprisonment, and the judicial personnel’s
physical torture and verbal abuse, often was a mental breakdown in which part of defendants
were sometimes making unrealistic and involuntary statements - especially a plea of “admission”
of guilt, in order to end the uncomfortable situation as quickly as possible.27 Hence, the
evidentiary and logical arguments that defense lawyers could generate were quite limited, and
the loopholes in the evidence chain, mostly provided by the accuser, trapped and constrained
defense lawyers.

1.3 The Influence from the United States
The field of Chinese criminal law and criminal procedure in the 1980s, was not proactively
absorbing any judicial experience from the United States. This inactivity continued until the
scholars born after 1950 gradually gained a major voice in the academic circle. American law
began to become more and more influential in China since late 1990s.
Historically, China had four criminal “Strike Hard against Crime Campaign” periods:
respectively, in 1983, 1996, 2002, and 2010. The initial decision to institute the first “Strike

26

About Chinese criminal justice’s history of human rights, see Chen Weidong, Forty Years’ Development of the
Rule of Law in Criminal Procedure - Review and Prospect, 6 TRIBUNE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND LAW 18 (2019).
27
About China’s previous situation, see Su Hongyuan, Extorting Confession by Torture under the Perspective of
Social Psychology, 10 LEGALITY VISION 57 (2018).
6

Hard” was made in July 1983,28 when the current substantive leader of China - Deng Xiaoping,29
proposed: “As to the current serious criminal offenses, it is necessary to crackdown, sentence
and execute heavily and quickly.” At the same time, the Reform and Opening-up policy30
brought about significant changes to Chinese society, but the policy’s negative aspects also led
to the deterioration of Chinese societal security.31
We need to realize that these four rounds of “Strike Hard” had a positive effect on China’s
societal security and stability. However, these four times “Strike Hard” actions had no
constructive impact on the rule of law of China,32 in that the criminal trial procedure was too
formalized executed, under political consideration, and criminal punishments often did not
strictly comply with current criminal law and criminal procedure law.
Also, the government continued to intervene in judicial procedures. These interventions led
to many miscarriages of justice and wrongful convictions, some of which have not been
corrected even up to now.33
In the 1990s, Chinese jurisprudence had the same attitude of resistance towards the
American system of plea bargaining, similar to West Germany’s attitude in the 1970s.34
However, unlike West Germany, whose “underground” plea bargaining was taking root during

28

http://en.volupedia.org/wiki/Strike_Hard_Against_Crime_Campaign_(1983)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deng_Xiaoping
30
http://en.volupedia.org/wiki/Chinese_economic_reform
31
See Xu Boqiang, Research on the Changes of Criminal Policy of the People’s Republic of China, dissertation of
People’s Public Security University of China, Nov. 2018.
32
Rule of Law: The authority and influence of law in society, especially when viewed as a constraint on individual
and institutional behavior; (hence) the principle whereby all members of a society (including those in government)
are considered equally subject to publicly disclosed legal codes and processes. Referring
http://en.volupedia.org/wiki/Rule_of_law
33
Research of wrong convicted cases in China, supra note 15.
34
Supra note 8.
29
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that decade, for six separate reasons Chinese criminal justice did not allow any room for plea
bargaining before 2012.
The first reason was that in Chinese criminal justice’s practice, there was no large-scale
discontent with judicial efficiency and system costs, before 2012 Criminal Procedure Law
revision. The government had no concern to keep investing in crackdown criminal offenses,
especially those important, influential cases.
Moreover, some negative manipulations, such as extorting confessions by torture, and local
governments intervening in jurisdiction, plus those four rounds of “Strike Hard”. In general, it
means that there were numerous ways to seal criminal cases in a timely manner, putting due
process to the second place. Conclusively speaking, before 2012, there was no great concern
about judicial efficiency and costs within the Chinese criminal justice circle.
The second reason was that, during the same time, China’s immature legal assistance system
also prevented the introduction of plea bargaining. In Chapter V of dissertation, we can see that
since 2018, the scale of defense lawyers/criminal legal aid lawyers are growing quickly in China,
since 2018. But it was a different situation in China before the late 2010s.
The situation in China before the 2010s was, the criminal defense attorney system was far
from complete, and legal aid was not fully implemented. Thus, there was no system and no
sufficient number of defense lawyers that may able to support a plea bargaining system, because
we all know that pleading negotiation requires professional lawyers to be always present to
provide effective legal assistance for defendants.
Furthermore, in terms of China’s criminal procedure in the past, defense lawyers can only
8

get involved after the stage of investigation, that the police and procurators have completed the
collection of evidence. The power of defense lawyers to talk with defendants, and to examine
relevant records, were relatively restricted; also, defense lawyers in China were not allowed to
self-investigate or collect evidence by their own.
In common with other Civil Law countries, Chinese lawmakers, governors, judges, and
procurators pursue substantive justice much more than procedural justice, which leads to the
third reason, that China used to have no room legally, for plea bargaining.
Since the guiding spirit of “依法治国” - “governing the nation according to the rule of law”
was raised,35 China began to encouraged judges to resolve each case justly, and try to be as
timely as possible. The concern of legal costs was still positioned at second place. This is
another way of explaining why there was no particular concern about judicial efficiency and cost
in China, before 2012.36
The fourth reason was that under traditional Civil Law criminal justice theories, defendants
are mainly being the objects of criminal procedure, which are not treated as a procedural party
nor procedural subject - which means, defendants in inquisitional criminal procedure, were not
authorized to have any opportunity to “bargain” with procurators, just like the American system.
The fifth reason why plea bargaining could not be accepted in China was, the literal
meaning of the term “bargaining” itself. The word “bargain” is translated as “交易” “jiao’yi” in
Chinese, a term which originated from commercial behavior. Literally, in Chinese - especially in

35
36

http://en.volupedia.org/wiki/Chinese_law
See Chen, supra note 26 at 22.
9

the context of criminal justice, the word “bargain” has a derogatory connotation. Such
derogatory connotation actually occurs similarly in other Civil Law countries.
In China, people generally understand that criminal justice is how the country takes action
against malicious criminal offenses. Based on this goal of executing the nation’s judicial
authority, there is great value in convicting and sentencing defendants by means of a formal
criminal procedure, mainly means criminal trials.
Thus, most Chinese people find it difficult to accept the word "trade" in the context of
criminal justice. Even till recent, the same time as promoting Plea Leniency, a certain proportion
of Chinese criminal justice scholars are still reluctant to admit any direct connection between
Chinese Plea Leniency and American plea bargaining, partly due to the fact that the Chinese
people cannot accept the use of the term “交易” within the criminal justice system.37
“Trade” is also a probably inappropriate Chinese translation of the word “bargain,” which is
better to translate as 协商 (negotiation) than 交易 (trade) in such context of Chinese criminal
justice.
As for the sixth reason, most Chinese victims have difficulty showing mercy toward
defendants, if they are not financially, sufficiently compensated.38 Not only victims, but also the
general public and the local governments, want defendants to be punished equally to their guilt,
with no room for bargaining or leniency on punishments.
In total, these six reasons impacted the Chinese judicial system, and created an atmosphere,
37

See Gu Yongzhong, Several Theoretical issues about Building China’s Plea-guilty Leniency System, 6
CONTEMPORARY LAW REVIEW 129, 133 (2016).
38
China’s situation is that in most violent/personal injury cases, the criminal does not have enough money to
compensate the victim, which increases the victims’ family members to want a heavier punishment.
10

which plea bargaining struggled in decades, to gain acceptance in Chinese criminal justice. Yet,
in 2002, for the first time, plea bargaining managed to draw substantial attention in China’s
judicial circle.

1.4 The First Plea Bargaining Case in China
In the second half of 2002, in the Hei’long’jiang province of China, a gang of people
severely injured a man by beating him up. The case was prosecuted as intentional injury, but the
police only arrested the principal criminal, Meng,39 and the rest of suspects remained at large.
According to Meng's defense counsel, it could not be ascertained which person made the
specific blows that caused the victim's serious injury; thus, the facts were unclear, and there was
a lack of sufficient evidence. However, although there was no way to confirm who caused the
injury, the opinion of the procurator was that the principal offender, Meng, should be held
responsible.
This situation took on historical significance as it brought the idea of plea bargaining into
the spotlight. The defense attorney, with the oral consent of Meng, the accused criminal,
negotiated with the procurator. Two criminal procedure parties - local procuratorate and Meng,
represented by his lawyer, reached a plea agreement. Meng admitted his guilt and showed his
willingness to compensate the victim. The defense lawyer gave up his claim that the facts were
unclear and that there was insufficient evidence; the lawyer requested the case to be dealt
leniently. The procurator proposed leniency and probation to the court.
39

His full name is Meng Guanghu.
11

After receiving the proposal, the court organized a collegial panel to examine the procedural
legitimacy of the plea negotiation and agreement, then the court decided to accept it. Meng
received a relatively light sentence, and probation was applied. In addition, through civil
mediation during the trial, an agreement was reached on the amount of the defendant's
compensation to the victim. Following the plea process, the trial only lasted 25 minutes.40
The Meng case is now regarded as “the first plea bargain case” in China. Partly similar to
the attorney general in Alaska who, in 1973, expressly prohibited the use of plea bargaining in
the state after the Brady case and several similar verdicts,41 Supreme People's Court of China
rapidly discussed Meng’s case, then acknowledged the judgment of the Meng case, but the
Supreme Court also prohibited the future use of plea bargaining in China. This decision was
similar to plea bargaining’s initial fate in other Civil Law countries.42
Although the Supreme People's Court banned the future use of the plea bargaining in China,
and indeed, there was no other plea bargaining case in the following years, Chinese academics
launched the first round of a large-scale discussion around the plea bargaining mechanism.
Many scholars aired their opinions. The main subject under discussion was: Is there any space
for the application of plea bargaining in China? If the answer is yes, how should it to be applied
properly?
As to the topic of plea bargaining’s application in China, the academic community divided
into two groups. One group argued: (1) Plea bargaining does not conform to the socialist concept
40

See Ma Mingliang. The Prospects for the Development of plea bargain in China, 2 CHINESE JOURNAL OF
CRIMINAL LAW 67, 67 (2003).
41
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
42
See Xu, supra note 8 at 117.
12

of rule of law,43 including the rejection of the word “bargain” or “trade” by the Chinese
language context; (2) in the criminal proceedings of Civil Law systems, plea bargaining does not
meet the requirements of core judicial principles, including the traditional concept of due
process,44 the principles of legality and suiting responsibility and punishment to crime; (3) under
the mode of the ex officio doctrine, the defendant, as the object of criminal procedure
(procedure), rather than the subject, is in no position to bargain with the procurator, with limited
procedural capabilities; (4) in plea bargaining, the presumption of guilt, does not accord with the
principle of suiting punishment to the crime, and it is prone to exploitation by habitual criminals
and proficient defense lawyers.45
The other group believed that the system of plea bargaining can and should be introduced
into China, but in a limited way. They supported their opinion with the following arguments: (1)
Plea bargaining can raise judicial efficiency and save the cost of judicature; (2) plea bargaining
is conducive to the protection on defendants’ human rights.46
Although plea bargaining was prohibited for 12 more years in China, after 2002, the
arguments supporting its application, were of historic significance at that time. Since 2012, the
problem of judicial efficiency turned out to be one of the most difficult issues in Chinese
criminal justice, which we will discuss later. In addition, the issue of human rights has also
become an important matter in the process of governing the nation according to the rule of law
43

Supra note 32.
Nowadays, as pleading systems are much wider spreading around the world, the definition of due process is
experiencing transformation.
45
As typical and aggressive dissenting opinions about plea bargaining’s application in China, see Sun, supra note
23.
46
In the early 2000 decade, the recognition of advantages of plea bargaining were still limited in China.
44
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in China.47
For three reasons, we cannot say that during that period (till 2012), the Chinese scholars
who are against the introduction of plea bargaining are “ill-informed”. First, they put forward
their objection according to the practical situation of criminal justice in China, and they had
already discovered several problems of plea bargaining, that remain unsolved through its
application in the United States.
Dissenting scholars found that there was a lack of substantive justice brought about by not
suiting punishment to the crime, which although was frequently criticized in the United States,
where procedural justice is stronger stressed, the issue of lacking protection of substantive
justice is not a key flaw.48 However, in the Chinese context of criminal justice, where
substantive justice is much stressed, such lacking is a key flaw that obstacles plea bargaining’s
application in China.
The second disadvantage dissenting scholars found, was that of the “competitive justice”
(judicial sport) of Common Law’s criminal procedure. That is, criminal procedure in America
has become a stage for habitual criminals and proficient defense lawyers to an extent.
This mode of criminal procedure is not friendly and helpful, for those “rookie” defendants
who committed a crime for their first time. In my opinion, there should be no disadvantage for
those first offenders, but on the contrary, harsher punishment for recidivism. However, this
dynamic was turned upside down in American criminal procedure, especially plea bargaining.
47

For human rights in Chinese criminal justice, see Chen, supra note 26; Supra note 35.
See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2464 (2003-2004).
Chinese translated version see Yang Xiande, Liao Yu: 庭审之外的辩诉交易 (2018).
48
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The third dissenting argument, was that some defendants that received lesser punishments
after plea bargaining. are actually harboring under the misconception, that harsh sentences can
be evaded. This “misconception” could be real sometimes, that harms public interests, because
this misconception may encourage more crimes, that those offenders may being confident to
take advantages from pleading rapidly to receive unreasonably lesser punishments.
In China, because the Supreme People's Court issued the prohibition in 2002, plea
bargaining gradually became evaluated as “possibly useful, but inapplicable” in Chinese
academics. The fever of the first round of debate on plea bargaining in the Chinese criminal
justice community abated in 2003.
The second round of debate in China started in 2006. The reason for this round of
discussion, was that scholars noticed that several other Civil Law countries enacted their own
plea bargaining systems.49 These countries/regions include Germany, France, Italy,50 Chinese
Taiwan, etc.51 The adoption of the plea bargain system in these Civil Law criminal justice
systems, generated the second round of large-scale discussion on plea bargaining, in China. In
this round of debate, the voices of those Chinese scholars who were totally opposed to the
introduction of plea bargaining, became less strong. More and more scholars are realizing that
plea bargaining may become inevitable in China in the future.52
Since the 2006 debate, the main topic of discussion about plea bargaining in China, shifted

49

See those early-stage Chinese research on plea bargaining systems of European Civil Law countries. Supra note 8.
Id.
51
See Ji Xiangde, The Development of Plea Bargain in Other Countries and its Teachings, 3 CONTEMPORARY LAW
REVIEW 23, 26 (2007).
52
Supra note 48, 51.
50
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from “whether to introduce it”, to “how to design it to meet China’s criminal justice’s
requirements”. However, although plea bargaining was being studied more comprehensively in
China, because of the indifference of the legislation department and Supreme People’s Court &
Procuratorate, plea bargaining was not embodied in the Chinese criminal justice practice, until
the 2012 revision of Criminal Procedure Law of China brought drastic impacts.

1.5 The 2012 Revision
In 2012, the Criminal Procedure Law of China was revised significantly, mainly improved
on procedural justice and defendants’ rights. Criminal justice in China ushered in a new
opportunity for reform, which led to a result that finally brought plea bargaining’s potential to
life in China.53
The main changes in the provisions on due process and the protection of human rights were:
(1) The exclusionary standard of illegal evidence specifically stipulated that the confession of
suspects and the testimony of witnesses obtained by illegal means, such as torture, violence or
threats, should be completely excluded as evidence in court; (2) stressed that nobody has to
prove him/herself guilty;54 (3) before a defense lawyer intervenes, the defendant may have an
on-call lawyer (in China we say duty lawyer) to assert and ensure the defendant’s rights during
the investigation and detention period; (4) during the investigation, a certified defense lawyer,
through the law office and with an official letter of attorney or of legal aid, has the right to meet
53

See Criminal Procedure Law of China Version 2012, 5th Session of the 11th National People’s Congress, Mar.
2012. https://www.loc.gov/item/global-legal-monitor/2012-04-09/china-amendment-of-criminal-procedure-law/
54
There was no strict exclusionary rule for physical or scientific evidence.
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the suspect, except in the cases of national security, terrorism, and major bribery; (5) within 24
hours of detaining or arresting the suspect, his or her family should be informed; and (6) when
the case is retried, the judgment of second instance must be final, and death penalty sentences
are to be reviewed by upper courts.55
The 2012 revision of the Criminal Procedure Law has resulted in remarkable progress in
China’s criminal justice, in terms of due process and defendants’ rights. We can also see that it
has absorbed some beneficial components from adversarial modes of criminal procedure.56
However, shortly after the dramatic revision of 2012, problems occurred in real judicial
practice.
Under the restriction of exclusionary rule of illegal evidence,57 investigation and evidence
collection by the police and the procuratorates, became more difficult and more complicated in
reality. A heavy backlog of cases from the procuratorate to the court, began to accumulate, and
the time per single case obviously increased.58
Meanwhile, with the implementation of the “judges’ lifelong responsibility mechanism”,59
the difficulty of trials, and psychological pressure on judges significantly increased, along with
55

To determine whether the death sentence is appropriate, the sentence in China needs the final review by the Death
Penalty Reviewing Office of the Supreme People's Court.
56
Independence of trial and decision is more appropriate in China than independence of judicature.
57
See 2012 version Criminal Procedure Law of China. Article 54:” Criminal suspects or defendants' confessions
gathered by the use of torture to extract confessions or other illegal methods or witness testimony or victim
statements gathered by the use of illegal methods such as violence or threats, shall be excluded.
Physical or documentary evidence gathered not in accordance with statutory procedures that might seriously
influence judicial fairness, shall either be corrected or reasonably explained; if it cannot be corrected or reasonably
explained, the evidence shall be excluded.
Where evidence that should be excluded is discovered during the investigation, review for prosecution or trial, it
shall be excluded in accordance with law, and must not be used as the bases of an indictment opinion, a decision to
indict, or a verdict.”
58
See Zhang Shuangshuang, Study on the Lifelong Responsibilities of Judges in China, dissertation of Guangxi
Normal University, 9 Apr.2017.
59
Criminal judges in China began to have “lifelong” liabilities on wrong conviction cases, since 2012.
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their workload. These factors resulted in further reduction of trial efficiency.
Since 2012, complaints from procurators and judges, about their heavy workload and
difficult trials were expressed. The heavy burden continued to increase, which strongly impacted
the operating mode of Chinese criminal justice practice, at that time.
Fortunately, these complaints were not ignored by Beijing. The Supreme People’s Court
noticed that after the 2012 Criminal Procedure Law revision, judicial efficiency is decreasing:
the abundant number of cases were harder to seal, procurators and policemen were acting
cautiously to secure legality, and Chinese judges had significant backlog cases and were facing
heavier responsibilities. The time and cost per case average increased greatly.
Because all the judicial heads were concerned and discontented about the problem of
judicial efficiency and costs, the legislation departments were pushed to take measurements.
Therefore, plea bargaining became a hot topic again in Chinese criminal justice.
In June 2014, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Committee (NPC) approved
planning to start a plea procedure. In 2016, a two-year tryout of “Plea Leniency” began in
eighteen major cities, for example, Beijing and Shanghai.
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Chapter II Plea Leniency’s Legislation

2.1 Expedited Trial
The new amended version of the Criminal Procedure Law of China was published in
October 2018, after Plea Leniency’s tryout stage was completed.60 Chinese Plea Leniency is
legislated under the new 2018 version Criminal Procedure Law of China, not a separate
chapter/section, but several articles in different chapters.
Similar as other Civil Law countries, regular criminal procedure in China follows those
traditional ex-officio, inquisitional criminal procedure principles.
As a simplification of criminal procedure, there exists summary trial in Chinese criminal
procedure, for those relatively light offenses with defendants pleaded.61
What made the difference was, under the new 2018 legislation, a new trial mode called
“expedited trial” has been founded, exclusively serving for Plea Leniency. As defendants
pleaded, while other conditions match the requirements of applying Plea Leniency as well,
procurators may propose not to apply regular trial, to save redundant judicial spend. To propose
a faster criminal procedure to replace regular trial, procurator(s) can make a selection between
expedited trial or summary trial.62
Law article translations, see https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/刑事诉讼法-（2018 年）/?lang=en, Oct.20,
2018
61
See Criminal Procedure Law of China (2018), Article 214: A case under the jurisdiction of a basic people’s court
may be heard under summary procedures, if the following conditions are met:
(1) the facts of a case are clear and evidence is sufficient;
(2) the defendant confesses his or her crime and raises no objection to the charges; and
(3) the defendant raises no objection to the application of summary procedures.
When initiating a public prosecution, a people’s procuratorate may suggest that the people’s court apply summary
procedures.
62
See Criminal Procedure Law of China (2018), Article 222 (New added in this version): The expedited procedures
60
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Here we need to clarify the procedural differences between regular trial, summary trial, and
expedited trial, in sequence, from the “most complete” procedure to the “fastest” procedure.
Through the official explanation of Supreme People’s Procuratorate in early 2018,63 several
additional conditions to activate summary procedure instead of regular procedure, can be
concluded:
First of all, defendants must plea before procurators propose to apply any rapid procedure
(summary/expedited). Pleading is fundamental - if there exists no active plea, regular trial will
be the only procedural option.64
Meanwhile, there also exists a kind of situation which is not rarely seen, that defendants are
willing to plea, but parties have disputes about certain circumstances or evidence, which will
influence sentence measuring or forfeiture. Therefore, the application of summary(expedited)
trial requires defendants having no arguments around cases’ circumstances/evidence, and at the
same time, consent to apply rapid procedures (summary/expedited).65
We can regard expedited trial as a “turbo mode” of summary trial, which is even quicker
and simplifier, but requires more conditions to be matched, at the same time:
The most prominent extra “threshold” to apply expedited trial, is relating with criminal law
– those crimes having benchmark penalties under 3 years imprisonment (misdemeanors), are

may be applied in cases within the jurisdiction of the basic level of the people's courts that might have a sentence of
up to a three-year fixed-term imprisonment, where the case facts are clear and the evidence is credible and sufficient,
the defendant admits guilt, accepts the punishment, and agrees to use the expedited procedures, and the trial will be
by a single adjudicator. When the people's procuratorate initiates a prosecution, it may suggest that the people's
court apply the expedited procedures.
63
https://www.spp.gov.cn/spp/jcbk/201802/t20180206_364947.shtml
64
Id. Section 1 clause 2.
65
Id. Section 1 clause 1, 3.
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applicable of expedited trials.66 For those non-misdemeanor cases that may lead to more than 3
years of imprisonment as results, procurators can only propose to apply summary trials, or
courts decide to apply regular trials.
We also need to notice several other procedural simplifications for expedited trials: Only
one judge is required - no panel needed;67 Plus, the new criminal procedure requires the whole
process (expedited trial) to be finished within 15 days, from the finish of material submission (to
base courts) till the finish of trial; Also, verdicts need to be announced on court, right after court
trials.
Such requirement is not difficult to understand – severer criminal offenses require better
criminal investigation, evidence’s examination, and more necessary/mandatory procedural
processes. Those light offenses (under 3 years imprisonment) are producing slight damage to the
society, easier for offenders to compensate to victims/public, and also having greater
opportunities for parties to reach criminal reconciliation.
Specific articles will be introduced in the next section (Articles 222-226).

2.2 Article Revision
Except the exclusive procedural simplification for Plea Leniency, there are also multiple
article changes to describe and regulate Plea Leniency in other aspects. Some of them are
revised articles, based on the 2012 version of Criminal Procedure Law of China; and the rest of
Usually, those crimes that benchmark penalties under 3 years of imprisonment, are firstly heard in base people’s
courts.
67
Supra note 63, clause 5. A summary trial for those crime that may lead to above 3 years of potential
imprisonment, requires a panel of at least 3 judges.
66
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these articles are newly legislated.
In the 2018 revision of the Criminal Procedure Law,68 Article 1569 provides the main
concept of Plea Leniency: voluntarily and truthfully confesses criminal conduct, admits criminal
behavior as charged (after discussion), accepts the final punishment, and (has an opportunity to)
receive legal leniency.
Articles 3670 and 17371 talk about the first specific perspective, namely, the attorneys’
(especially duty lawyers) involvement, which is a step further for China on securing defendants’
rights. Article 36 states that duty lawyers need to be dispatched to different departments
including courts, procuratorates, and detention houses. Article 173 states that duty lawyers are
able to raise opinions, either oral or literal, including things relevant to Plea Leniency, and that
the discussion needs to be recorded. More than securing defendants’ rights, such involvement
68

Supra note 2.
Criminal Procedure Law of China (2018), Article 15(New added): Where criminal suspects or defendants
voluntarily and truthfully confess their own criminal conduct, admit the facts of the crime as charged, and are
willing to accept punishment, they may be given a lenient disposition in accordance with the law.
70
Article 36 (New added): Legal aid institutions may station duty lawyers in people's courts and detention
centers. Where criminal suspects or defendants have not retained a defender, and the legal aid institutions have not
appointed a lawyer to provide them with a defense, the duty lawyer is to provide the criminal suspects or defendants
with legal assistance such as legal consultation, suggestions on procedural selection, applications for modification
of compulsory measures, and submitting opinions on the case handling.
People's courts, people's procuratorates, and detention centers shall inform criminal suspects or defendants that they
have the right to meet with duty lawyers, and facilitate criminal suspects or defendants' meetings with duty lawyers.
71
Article 173 (Partly updated): People's procuratorates reviewing cases shall interrogate criminal suspects, hear the
comments of the defender or duty lawyer, victims and their agents ad litem and record them in the case file. Written
opinions provided by defenders or duty lawyers, victims and agents ad litem shall be attached to the case file.
Where criminal suspects admit guilt and accept punishment, the people's procuratorate shall inform them of the
procedural rights they enjoy and the legal provisions on admitting guilt and accepting punishment; hear the
comments of the defender or duty lawyer, victims and their agents ad litem on the following matters, and record
them in the case file:
(1) The facts of the crime, charge, and the legal provisions to be applied;
(2) Recommendations for lenient punishment such as mitigation, commutation, or exemption from punishment;
(3) The procedures applied at trial following the admission of guilt and acceptance of punishment;
(4) Other matters on which opinions need to be heard.
Where people's procuratorates hear duty lawyers' opinions in accordance with the provisions of the two preceding
paragraphs, facilitation shall be provided in advance for the duty lawyers learning about the circumstances related
to the case.
69
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also benefits the quality of plea negotiation.
Before 2012, China did not give attorneys sufficient authorization to get involved in
criminal cases in a more reasonable timing, which made criminal procedure one-sided where
procurators attacked defendants. Article 36 is an extension of the reforming Chinese criminal
justice concept (since the 2012 revision). New legislation actions since 2012 are continuously
enhancing defendants’ rights by giving them more competitive in criminal procedure, which
helps to guarantee procedural justice and human rights. The 2018 legislation is another step
forward.
The second perspective talks about the way to start the Plea Leniency mechanism and what
the obligations are for the different departments’ involvement. The new version of criminal
procedure law defined that police/investigation departments do not have the right to start a plea
negotiation; only procuratorates have the right. Article 12072 states that procurators should tell
defendants that they have the right to plea for leniency.73 On the other hand, the investigator
should record certain kinds of behavior, for example, the suspect admitted his or her crime
before the case was sent to the procurators (Articles 81and 162).74,75 It is apparent that if the
72

Article 120 (Partly updated): When interrogating a suspect, investigators shall first ask whether the suspect has
committed a crime and let him describe the circumstances of the crime or explain that there is no crime, and then
ask him questions. Suspects shall truthfully answer investigators' questions. However, they have the right to refuse
to answer questions that are not relevant to the case.
When investigators interrogate suspects, they shall inform the suspect of the procedural rights they enjoy, legal
provisions that truthfully describing their own offense may result in leniency and the of the legal provisions on
admitting guilt and accepting punishment.
73
In Chinese criminal justice’s practice, police are now informing procurators, immediately, if the defendant
pleaded. See chapter 3 for the empirical research analysis.
74
Article 81 (Partly updated): In approval of arrest or arrest decisions, the nature and circumstances of the criminal
suspects or defendants' suspected crimes, circumstances of admitting guilt and accepting punishment shall be
factors in considering whether there is a threat to society.
75
Article 162 (Partly updated): Where criminal suspects voluntarily admit guilt, it shall be recorded in the cases,
transferred with the case, and the opinion in support of prosecution is to indicate the relevant situation.
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defendant already admitted his or her guilt to the police, there is a quite strong probability to
activate Plea Leniency through the procurator.
The third perspective of Plea Leniency is the main plea procedures. As a reminder, I
emphasize, again, that Plea Leniency is not an individual procedure, but a combination of
several subparts from the whole Criminal Procedure Law.
The first phase of the main procedure guides what procurators should prepare or pay
attention to before trial. It contains time limits (Article 172),76 records (Article 173), affidavits
(Article 174),77 and sentencing recommendations (Article 176).78 Article 172 provides time
limits to regulate the decision of prosecution under the plea leniency mechanism and to meet?
the requirements of an expedited trial; the decision needs to be made by the procurator within 10
days. This article includes another important perspective, namely, efficiency. The spirit/theory of
plea bargaining is strongly linked to judicial efficiency, and one way China improves judicial
efficiency is to build the expedited trial in addition to the summary trial, which distributes

76

Article 172 (Partly updated): People's procuratorates shall make a decision within one month on cases transferred
by the supervision organs or public security organs for prosecution, in major or complicated cases, this may be
extended by 15 days; and where the criminal suspects admit guilt and accept punishment, and meet the
requirements for applying the expedited procedures, they shall make a decision within 10 days, and where the
sentence might exceed 1 year of imprisonment, this may be extended to 15 days.
77
Article 174 (Newly added): Where criminal suspect voluntarily admits guilt, agree to the sentencing
recommendation, and to the applicable procedures, a written plea affidavit shall be signed with the defender or duty
lawyer present.
In any of the following circumstances, criminal suspects who admit guilt and accept punishment do not need to sign
a plea affidavit:
(1) Where the criminal suspect is blind, deaf or mute, or is a mentally ill person who has not yet entirely lost
their ability to recognize and control their action;
(2) Where a juvenile criminal suspect's legally-designated representative or defender objects to the juvenile's
admitting guilt and accepting punishment;
(3) Other situations where it is not necessary to sign a plea affidavit.
78
Article 176 (Partly updated): Where criminal suspect admits guilt and accept punishment, the people's
procuratorates shall submit sentencing recommendations on the primary punishment, supplementary punishments,
whether to give a suspended sentence, and so forth, and send the plea affidavit and other materials along with the
case.
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criminal cases more efficiently into different trial procedures. We can regard the expedited
procedure as a procedural extension of the Plea Leniency spirit. Article 174 discusses the
Chinese style of a one-sided plea “contract”, the plea affidavit. While the affidavit represents the
defendant, and the attorney’s work, the sentencing recommendation stands for the procurator’s
conclusion and evaluation of the case (Article 176). We can say that Articles 172 and 173 are
procedural regulations for procurators and that Articles 174 and 176 are material requirements.
The second phase of the main procedure is about the structure of the trial, addressed in
Articles 183,79 19080 and 201.81 Article 183 regulates the number of judges and adjudicators for
summary and expedited trials (only one judge appearing, and no adjudicator needed). Article
190 expresses that it is mandatory for the judge to inform the pleaded defendant about his or her
rights in the Plea Leniency court trial.82
An important point that we need to focus, is in Plea Leniency defendants still have the right

79

Article 183 (Partly updated): Basic and intermediate level people's courts hearing first-instance trial of cases,
shall have 3 trial adjudicators, or a combination of adjudicators and people's assessors totaling 3 or 7 people, form a
collegial panel for trial, but cases in which the basic level courts apply summary procedures or expedited
procedures may be heard by a single adjudicator.
80
Article 190 (Partly updated): Where defendants admit guilt and accept punishment, the chief judge shall inform
the defendant of the procedural rights they enjoy and the legal provisions on admitting guilt and accepting
punishment; and review the voluntariness of the admission of guilt and acceptance of punishment and the
truthfulness and lawfulness of the written plea affidavit.
81
Article 201 (Newly added): When the people's court lawfully makes a judgment in a plea case, the charges and
sentencing recommendation of the people's procuratorate are usually adopted, except in the following circumstances:
(1) The defendant has not constituted a crime or should not be pursued for criminal responsibility;
(2) The defendant admitted guilt and accepted punishment against his wishes;
(3) The defendant denies the alleged criminal facts;
(4) The charge in the indictment and the charge verified at trial are not the same;
(5) Other situations that might impact the fairness of trial.
Where through trial people's courts find that the sentencing recommendation is clearly improper, or where the
defendant or defender raises objections to the sentencing recommendation, people's procuratorate may adjust its
sentencing recommendation. Where the people's procuratorate does not adjust the sentencing recommendation, or
where after adjusting the sentencing recommendation it is still clearly improper, the people's court shall make a
judgment in accordance with law.
82
Usually means summary trial and expedited trial.
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to appeal, regularly. To explain this – same as American plea bargaining, to reach plea
agreements with procurators, defendants need to accept convictions and sentencing
recommendations. The difference is, Plea Leniency defendants are still free to raise appeals, if
they feel their legal rights violated during Plea Leniency processes. Thus, I am saying although
it is necessarily unwelcomed to procurators and judges in plea processes, the right of appeal is
not legally prevented. This is a marked difference from the American procedure.83 Article 201
regulates the judges’ discretion.
The final phase regulates the expedited trial (Articles 222–226). Expedited trials can be
considered as an even simplified version of summary trials. Now China has three forms of
criminal trial: regular, summary, and expedited. Article 222 regulates that a less than three-year
potential sentence can start an expedited trial by the procurator’s recommendation.84 It also
confirms that an expedited trial can only begin under the circumstances in which the defendant
has pleaded and has agreed to apply an expedited trial. Article 223 lists the situations that
eliminate an expedite trial.85 What is significant in this article is that “The case has a major
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American plea bargaining is not completely forbidding defendants to appeal, but conditions are quite limited.
Further discussion, see Chapter V.
84
Article 222 (Newly added in this version): In cases within the jurisdiction of basic level people's courts that might
have a sentence of up to 3 years fixed-term imprisonment, where the case facts are clear and the evidence is
credible and sufficient, and the defendant admits guilt and accepts punishment and agrees to use the expedited
procedures, the expedited procedures may be applied, and trial will be by a single adjudicator.
85
Article 223 (Newly added): The expedited procedures are not to be applied in any of the following circumstances:
(1) The defendant is a blind, deaf or mute person or a mentally ill person who has not completely lost his
ability to recognize and control his conduct;
(2) The defendant is a juvenile;
(3) The case has a major social impact;
(4) Where in a joint crime some of the defendants have objections to the alleged facts of the crime, charges,
sentencing recommendation, or use of the expedited procedures;
(5) Where the defendant and victims, or their legally-designated representatives, have not reached a mediation
or settlement agreement on compensation for attached civil procedure;
(6) other circumstances where the expedited procedures should not be applied at trial.
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social impact.” An expedited trial only requires one judge, but in an impactful case, more
persons are needed (and should use a summary or even a regular trial) to gain an equitable result
that takes social influence into consideration and better satisfies the public
What is significant in Article 224 is that it points to one of the major differences between
Plea Leniency and American plea bargaining, namely, the mandatory requirement of the court
trial in China: “the defenders' opinions and the defendants' final statement and opinions shall be
heard.”86 The purpose of this inclusion is to secure the defendant’s free will to plea, again, in
court. Judges need to rule out, as much as possible, the possibility of torture-confession or an
unlawful deal between lawyers and procurators. Article 225 regulates the time limit of an
expedited trial.87 Article 226 emphasizes an important point of equity: that if “the court
discovered that the defendant admitted guilt and accepted punishment against their will, a new
trial shall be held.”88 This can be understood as a sign that China is focusing more on the
defendant’s rights.
In conclusion, the legislation of Plea Leniency influences three steps in China’s criminal
procedure: investigation, pretrial, and trial. The first step instructs what investigators should do,
cannot do, and what attorneys can do; the second step informs what investigators should prepare
86

Article 224 (Newly Added): Cases applying the expedited procedures are not subject to the time limits for service
in Section 1 of this Chapter, court investigation or courtroom debate are usually not carried out; but before the
verdict is announced, the defenders' opinions and the defendants' final statement and opinions shall be heard.
Cases applying the expedited procedures at trial, shall have the verdict announced at court.
87
Article 225 (Newly Added): In cases applying expedited procedures at trial, people's courts shall complete trial
within 10 days of accepting them; an extension to 15 days may be given where a sentence of more than 1 year
imprisonment might be given.
88
Article 226 (Newly Added): Where people's courts discover in the course of trial that defendants conduct does not
constitute a crime or should not be pursued for criminal responsibility, that they admitted guilt and accepted
punishment against their will, that the defendant denies the alleged facts of the crime, or that there are other
circumstances making application of the expedited procedures inappropriate, a new trial shall be held in accordance
with Section 1 or Section 3 of this Chapter.
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for procurators, and what procurators and attorneys do during plea negotiation procedure; and,
the last step guides criminal judges how to operate expedited trials.

2.3 Theoretical Similarities and Differences
An important question to address is: Is it a correct conclusion, to say that China is
introducing American plea bargaining system into Chinese criminal justice, then made local
adjustments to turn American plea bargaining into Chinese Plea Leniency? My answer is, both
correct and incorrect.
The reason for correct: Despite China and the United States have different legal systems
(Civil Law and Common Law), the two countries are facing (China) /faced (America) similar
issues of judicial efficiency and cost; the difference is when the issue of efficiency arose for each
country (1970s in America, 2010s in China).
The United States incorporated plea bargaining into its judicial system in the 1970s, and
China legislated Plea Leniency into its judicial system in 2018. Both the Chinese and the
American plea systems operate similarly, when negotiating with defendants and their attorneys,
namely, procurators/prosecutors stopped executing “absolute substantive justice”.89 As
procurators/prosecutors submitted plea agreements to judges, judges turn to focus more on those
plea agreements, rather than case circumstances and relevant evidence.
The reason for incorrect: The two plea systems have some primary differences. The
“Justice delayed is justice denied.” Thus, a timely substantial sentencing can be called “relative substantive
justice,” in contrast to “absolute substantive justice,” which means the strict result of “nulla poena sine lege,”
meaning no bargain or compromise exists.
89
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“bargain” in Chinese Plea Leniency is not as “complete”, as in American plea bargaining: Plea
Leniency is more of a one-sided negotiation, in which procurators have the authority to activate,
and decide whether to advance the Plea Leniency process. Defendants have no authority to
actively apply Plea Leniency procedure.90
We also need to realize some other important differences. For example, in Plea Leniency,
the number of charges, and convicted crime levels of each charge, cannot be negotiated; defense
lawyers in Plea Leniency function more as assisting defendants, but in the United States,
lawyers are more “representing” defendants; defendants in China keep mostly the same right to
appeal, after Plea Leniency processes, as well as in normal criminal procedures.
And above all, a trial is still mandatory in Plea Leniency, even though a 100% appropriate
plea agreement has been reached and submitted to the court.
A. Judicial Efficiency
The Supreme People’s Court of China reached two decisions in the fall of 2016. One was to
start a tryout stage of Plea Leniency, as discussed above. The other decision was that the Court
published Opinions on Promoting the Reform of Criminal Procedure System - Centered on
Trial. 91 This document emphasized that, despite conducting plea negotiations, the plea
agreements provided by the procurators to the judges for their review, an expedited/summary
trial is still mandatory. The only exception is, when the procurator decides to execute relative
non-prosecution or conditional non-prosecution.
90

Of course, principally the procurator is going to show leniency in sentencing recommendations if the defendant is
cooperative.
91
This opinion basically requires that all the courts should maintain their main attention on trials, to confirm facts,
solve evidential issues, protect parties’ procedural rights on court, with the manner of fair trial.
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It is obvious, that if there is no further trial, after an appropriate plea agreement has been
reached, which is what American plea bargaining do, there will be a much lower judicial
expense. So, why does Chinese Plea Leniency still keep trials mandated?
It is indeed, that from the perspective of judicial efficiency and cost, the Chinese Plea
Leniency system does not save as much, as American plea bargaining does. However, on the
perspective of judicial authority distribution. Plea Leniency better restricts the power of
procurators and lowers the risk that defense lawyers will reach an agreement with prosecutors,
that would infringe the defendants’ free will.92
Meanwhile, as mentioned in front, defense lawyers in China cannot fully represent
defendants: they cannot replace defendants to consent to any plea agreements, or sign on any
plea affidavits. Those oral consents or written signings (on plea agreements/affidavits), must be
made by defendants themselves. Furthermore, as the right of appeal is not prohibited in Plea
Leniency, if after a completed Plea Leniency procedure, a defendant feels it was unfair (free will
violation), he/she can still appeal to a higher-level court that will reinvestigate the case and the
plea process, in the second trial.
In Plea Leniency procedure, Chinese judges not only need to examine plea agreements, the
same as what American judges do, but they also have to go through the whole case briefly, and
confirm major evidence. In expedited and summary procedure, it is not that necessary for
Chinese judges to review the case as thoroughly as they do in regular procedure, where all the
criminal procedural measurements must be executed, such as evidence disclosure and witness
92

The issue of defendants’ free will in pleading procedures will be further discussed in Chapter V.
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questioning. But judges in expedited/summary trials are still responsible to examine those main
criminal circumstances, major evidence, and to enquire defendants on court, for their final
opinions, that helps to confirm the pleading procedure is fully constitutional.93
As commented above, Chinese Plea Leniency does not improve judicial efficiency as much
as American plea bargaining does, given that the Chinese system has kept trials mandatory and
normally not preventing defendants’ right to appeal. Apparently, mandatory trials and appealing
trials consume quite much additional time and money. However, the relative loss of judicial
efficiency in the Chinese Plea Leniency system, is a tradeoff for a better balance of judicial
authority distribution, a reduction of the risk that procurators may inappropriately influence
individual cases that lead to wrong convictions, and a better protection of traditional substantive
justice, which Civil Law systems take into account more.
As a Civil Law country, despite China’s attempt to absorb some Common Law benefits to
solve Chinese judicial issues, which traditional Civil Laws may find difficult to solve, basic
Civil Law principles are still followed in criminal justice, mostly. Even with Plea Leniency’s
spreading application, the main focus of Chinese criminal judges in trials, is still to restore and
then legally evaluate the circumstances of offenses, rather than settle disputes (adversarial
system’s main focus) and save judicial costs.
B. Defendants’ Legal Rights
During plea procedures, both Chinese and American defendants, with the help of their
attorney, can discuss plea agreements with procurators/prosecutors. In both countries, judges
93

See Criminal Procedure Law Article 224, supra note 86.
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review agreements 94 and decide whether to approve them. That is how a plea process
approximately advances, globally. However, numerous differences are in detail.
In Chinese criminal procedure’s arrest and detain stage, suspects can plead to the police.
This plea is not part of Plea Leniency, but the police can inform the local procuratorate to
activate the Plea Leniency process. The formal plea starts when the procurator takes over the
case and begins to talk with the defendant. An appropriate plea agreement should be reached
with the defendant’s free will, and under a certified attorney’s surveillance.
However, some defendants in China are very willing to plead for leniency, because the
Chinese criminal justice’s tradition was “resist for harshness.”95 That plea is not a “bargain” of
“negotiation” in a specified plea procedure, but a consensus between defendants and procurators,
which judges would prefer to see happen. The change that Plea Leniency brings is that the
formal mode of a plea is now more legally secured, in which the plea has been written into a
procedure.
According to the revised procedure, police or procurators need to record the defendants’
actions during a plea discussion, and legal assistance for the defendants is mandatory.96 Such
legalization has filled the previous gap, where some low-level criminal cases proceeded without
an official plea record or sufficient legal assistance. China is clearly on its way to enhancing
defendants’ legal assistance, which is crucial to secure their free will to plead.
After first agreeing to plead for leniency, defendants have the right to consent to the
94

In China, the plea agreement contains a plea affidavit and a sentencing recommendation.
See Chapter I.
96
Empirical research from January to June 2019 in Shanghai shows that (during that period) 100% criminal
defendants in Shanghai had attorneys/duty lawyers’ assistance.
95
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application of procedure recommended by procurators. In Plea Leniency, defendants can state
their preference to choose between summary and expedited trial. They usually choose the
expedited trial to receive better penalty reduction. The reason for greater penalty reduction is
that choosing an expedite trial means defendants tend to have fewer arguments about the
situation and the evidence, which saves time and cost for procurators and judges. The trial mode
application still needs to be suggested formally by procurators, and approved by the judge, but
this is already an advancement, because before 2018, Chinese defendants could only accept the
trial mode that procurators/judges considered appropriate to apply.
If defendants agree to plead for leniency, they also need to give up their right to require a
regular trial. A regular trial means that the judge should go through the case much more
thoroughly, and the defendant with his or her attorney have more opportunities to take a stand in
court. That further helps to secure “absolute substantive justice,” in contrast to the “relative
substantive justice” that a plea procedure brings. However, regular trials have much higher
judicial costs.
The justice that a plea procedure brings can be referred to as “timely justice.” It arrives
much quicker than absolute substantive justice, but usually is not equal to the punishment that
matches the defendant’s malice. Thus, timely justice is a type of relative substantive justice,
which brings us to a crossroad. If a person is guilty, he or she is apparently willing to take a
summary/expedited trial rather than a regular trial, for lesser punishment. The only exception is
that he or she is a well-experienced criminal who believes that the crime is perfectly covered
from investigation. Then he or she can survive through a regular trial that results in a not guilty
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verdict.
The situation is more complex when the defendant is innocent, or his or her guilt is less
than the potential accusation. Compared with pleading, if the defendant chooses not to enter a
plea procedure and requires a regular trial, the trial period could be a much longer ordeal, and
possibly end with a harsher sentence. In the United States, to trade for a quick procedure and
lower penalties (rather than a regular trial), avoiding so-called “trial penalty,” some defendants
choose to plead guilty even though they are innocent. 97 These cases are not statistically
understood as wrong convictions, because a legal consensus was reached and every process is
constitutional.98
However, this situation actually forces defendants into a dilemma of whether to plead, if
they are innocent but facing the pressure of accusations. Preventing this dilemma from
happening requires defense lawyers who can protect their litigants through their professional
skills. But a considerable number of American attorneys are more cooperative with prosecutors,
to seal cases as quickly as possible, so that they can take on more cases.99 In this mode,
prosecutors can earn high win-rates and attorneys can defend more cases to earn more money; it
is a win-win condition for them, and according to a law that already approves of plea bargaining,
it is legal. Thus, it is no wonder that roughly 90% of American criminal cases apply plea
bargaining, because prosecutors and attorneys prefer it, and defendants have to accept it.
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Supra note 36.
From a psychological angle, if a person is innocent, but all of his/her people around are continuously telling
him/her that he/she is guilty and persuading him/her to plead, it is possible for the person’s mind to be kidnapped
and eventually collapse, if he/she does not have a relatively strong mind. What will happen at last is that these
defendants will have mind illusions, which repeatedly tell them that they are guilty, and they will plead under heavy
mind pressure. Unfortunately, not many individuals have paid enough attention to that circumstance.
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Supra note 37. See also the NACDL report, in Chapter V.
98

34

However, for the innocent or lighter offense defendants, this results in greater damage, and it
threatens substantive justice. To lower the risk of such situations happening in China, a trial,
even a twenty-five-minute-long expedited trial, is mandatory. This helps to secure the case and
the plea’s veracity.
C. Lawyers
We also need to understand the different roles that Chinese and American criminal lawyers
play in different plea procedures. In American plea bargaining, attorneys can be considered
“legal representatives” who offer legalized opinions that defendants are not capable of doing.
We may regard “bargaining” as commercial behavior. In the Chinese Plea Leniency system,
lawyers are not in as much of the spotlight as American lawyers. The formal consent to apply
Plea Leniency procedure must be stated by the defendant both orally and in writing. Chinese
defense lawyers’ priorities are to support defendants through their professional knowledge and
to supervise the police/procurators’ actions. The defense lawyer can analyze the situation for the
defendant to decide whether to plead, but the defendant must make the final decision. If the
lawyer detects illegal actions from police or procurators during the investigation and
interrogation, which the defendant cannot discern, the lawyer has the right to and should raise an
objection, request to pause or end the plea process, all of which must be recorded and displayed
in court.
The different responsibilities of Chinese and American criminal defense lawyers also
reflect different characteristics of the inquisitional and adversarial systems. American lawyers
play their role as business representatives or negotiators that sit at the table next to the
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prosecutors. Chinese lawyers play their role as secretaries that sit on one side of the table with
the defendant who faces the procurator.
D. Appealing
In my empirical research of the Shanghai X District People’s Procuratorate, of the 388 Plea
Leniency cases recorded from January to June 2019, there were four cases in which the
defendant appealed after the first trial. Although four out of 388 is not a significant number, a
significant difference on regulations is, China does not forbid defendants to appeal, in most of
situations, the restrictions that preventing defendants’ appealing are much less than American
criminal procedure.
Some individuals would assert that a defendant should give up his or her right to appeal
after a plea agreement has been reached because the concept of interest swap––the right to
appeal should be a part of swapping interests––is denied when a consensus has been reached.
The reason China maintains the right for defendants to appeal is to execute the “trialcentered” spirit,100 which was emphasized in the Supreme People’s Court’s opinion in the fall of
2014. “Trial-centered” is also relevant in China for keeping all trials mandatory, in spite of the
creation of the Chinese plea procedure. A second trial may be helpful for the upper-court judge
to review the case thoroughly, if the defendant regards the first trial unfair. To improve judicial
efficiency, every country’s plea procedure dispenses with the judges’ responsibility to examine
and question the evidence, thoroughly, which, in turn, reduces the security level of substantive
justice that Chinese legal professionals seriously consider. An appeal for a second trial, and
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See Chapter I Section 5.
36

allowing the upper-court judge to conduct a regular trial, may be a good way to remedy
evidential problems and to execute evidential procedures, such as evidence disclosure and cross
examination. Better quality of evidence certainly helps secure the veracity of a case.
Nevertheless, after the second trial of the four appealed cases in the X District procuratorate,
no changes resulted. The statistical record shows that more than 99% of the plea agreements in
Shanghai X District were approved by judges, and that 100% of the Plea Leniency cases were
assisted with the help of either duty or firm lawyers. From a practical perspective, these numbers
indicate that most of these plea agreements were dependable. The right to appeal after Plea
Leniency appears to be more of a defense to prevent illegal plea agreements. It is still under
discussion in China, about whether to cancel the defendants’ right to appeal in future legislation.
E. Application Limitation and Other Issues
To analyze the limitations in applying for Plea Leniency procedure, and the penalty
calculations of it, we need to understand more about the literal difference between the American
and Chinese plea procedures. The word “bargain” means different parties sitting together and
negotiating for “objects trading,” equitably. The word “leniency” means the more powerful side,
which has the authority, showing mercy to the side who has less power. In Civil Law systems,
the procuration side represents public authority, the execution of the ex officio doctrine, and the
application of inquisitional criminal procedure. 101 Such a legal system authorizes Chinese
procurators to show leniency to defendants in criminal procedure, instead of bargaining with
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If we skip the discussion about justice independence or separation of powers, prosecution in some Civil Law
countries (e.g., China) can be even considered as an extension of administrative power into criminal legal area.
37

them in an adversarial system.
Despite Chinese and American plea procedures that share the same main focuses, such as
judicial efficiency and defendants’ rights, the power that triggers Chinese Plea Leniency is the
judicial authority’s achievement in individual criminal cases, which is practically executed by
procurators. Consensus between procurators and defendants is, of course, a sine qua non to start
a certain plea procedure, but in China, consensus only occurs in between public authority and
Plea Leniency; it is not the direct key to activate Plea Leniency. The key is the procurators’ offer
to bring about consensus.
Two apparent factors for understanding the process of Plea Leniency can be concluded.
First, in a criminal procedure, Plea Leniency procedure is not a reflection of the defendant’s
rights that he or she can choose to apply. Rather, Plea Leniency is an execution of procuration
(prosecution) power. In Chinese criminal procedure, Plea Leniency corresponds to judicial
responsibility, instead of procedural obligation.102 The defendant’s full acceptance towards his or
her accusation and penalty is not a bargaining chip with the procurator; it is a premise for the
procurator to consider when applying Plea Leniency.
Second, Chinese Plea Leniency stresses the procurators’ predominance. The fact that the
defendant signs the affidavit is not the same as signing a criminal justice “contract”, which is
based on free will and consensus; it is a procedural requirement for Plea Leniency. By
recommending a sentence, the procurator is not fulfilling a bargain contract, but rather a
synthetic judgment about the potential sentence. The defense lawyers’ appearance and their
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See Criminal Procedure Law of China Article 15 & 176. Supra note 69, 78.
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possible announcement is a procedural setting to enact the defendants’ legal rights. The defense
lawyers are not “negotiators” who bargain with procurators. Chinese Plea Leniency is apparently
not leveling defendants to a closer capability to “compete” against procurators, like the mode of
the adversarial system. In China, defendants are still only objects in criminal procedure, but their
legal rights are better enacted and secured since the 2018 legislation.
Based on Civil Law’s inquisitional criminal procedure, it is not surprising that in China
only procurators have the right to propose a plea agreement during the pretrial period. Most
procurators will not refuse to make a plea offer, if possible. As mentioned above, defendants do
not have the right to propose a plea agreement, but they do have the right to reject the offer, and
they can plead to ask for leniency. However, should a defendant plead voluntarily, this would not
consequentially lead to a Plea Leniency procedure in certain circumstances, such as a heavy
crime that only goes to a regular trial, a socially influential crime that gets a lot of attention, or a
joint crime in which some accomplices refuse to plead.
In Civil Law countries, including Germany, France, and Italy, the quantity of charges and
the level of accused crimes cannot be negotiated or reduced. 103 China is no exception. For
example, if a defendant in the United States has three criminal charges, he or she has an
opportunity to drop the number of charges to two or even one, through plea bargaining. But in
China, the method of a penalty reduction is to calculate the concurrent punishment of all crimes
combined, as the first step. Then, based on the total term, the degree of a penalty reduction is
determined by relevant criminal law regulations.
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See Shi, supra note 8; see also Xu, supra note 8.
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In the Chinese penalty calculation method, the number of charges is not reducible because
the first step of penalty measurement is always to combine all the charges. As for the level of
charged crimes in the United States, through plea bargaining, the defendant may receive a lowerlevel criminal accusation, instead of the original one. But in China, for example, the defendant
cannot drop an organized prostitution accusation to an introducing/sheltering prostitution
accusation, through Plea Leniency. The only way for the defendant to reach his or her goal––to
receive a verdict based on the accusation of introducing/sheltering prostitution––is to request a
regular court trial, and to try to achieve the goal through regular procedure. If the defendant
chooses to plead, and the case applies Plea Leniency procedure, the best goal that he or she can
pursue is the lowest penalty within the criminal law’s range of organized prostitution. Whether
or not to plead is always a difficult choice for defendants.
In the Criminal Law of China, we can find clauses to limit the percentage of prison term
reduction. For example, a single plea (not Plea Leniency) behavior may lead to a penalty
reduction of up to 20%. For a plea with compensation, the maximum reduction is 30%. The
regulations are applicable in all criminal situations, which presents the issue that no legislation
in China’s Criminal Law exists yet to specifically regulate Plea Leniency’s penalty reduction.
Whether or not to set up special penalty reduction rules for the Plea Leniency procedure is
currently being discussed in academia. Penalty reduction of Plea Leniency continues to follow
all relevant rules, before specialized legislation, in China’s Criminal Law.
E. Summary
The similarities and differences between Chinese Plea Leniency and American plea
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bargaining are evident. Despite their different legal system’s biases though, both countries apply
a plea process to solve common issues in criminal justice, such as judicial efficiency and
defendants’ legal rights. Additionally, all Civil Law countries, including China, apply their own
characteristic plea systems, which proves that the plea system can be applied in different
countries’ criminal procedures, no matter which legal system the country has. Apparently, there
is no better legal function, thus far, to replace that of the plea system.
Nevertheless, these countries vary in their mechanism of the plea procedure. In the Chinese
Plea Leniency procedure, only the procurator can initiate the formal plea process. During the
procedure, the defense lawyer’s job is to prevent illegal plea agreements and to legally support,
rather than represent, the defendant; and, the quantity of charges and the level of accused crimes
cannot be negotiated or reduced. A trial is always mandatory in China, except in the procurator’s
decision of non-prosecution, and after a trial of Plea Leniency, defendants still have the right to
appeal.
Also, through the regulations of expedited trial in Chinese Plea Leniency, we can also see
that Chinese criminal procedure is becoming more “flexible”, that seems absorbing part of
American legal pragmatism, reflecting by expedited trials’ significant procedural simplification
than regular/summary trials. On the other hand, China’s insist on traditional Civil Law criminal
procedure is also obvious, that trials are still mandatory, even in Plea Leniency’s expedited trials.
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Chapter III First Stage (2018-19) Empirical Research

3.1 Introduction
This chapter is mainly based on data involving the application of Plea Leniency in the city
of Shanghai during a six-month period, from January to June 2019. These numbers include the
application rate of Plea Leniency (among all criminal cases) in Shanghai. and how Shanghai’s
practice compared with other China’s municipality cities and provinces.104 Additionally, this
research also reflected different crime categories’ application rates of Plea Leniency.
Before proceeding, a point of clarification is necessary regarding the Chinese
procuratorates’ administrative structure. China has four administrative levels of People’s
Procuratorates. Ranked from highest to lowest, the four administrative levels are (1) the
Supreme People’s Procuratorate of China, (2) a High-level People’s Procuratorate in each
province/direct municipality city, (3) an Intermediate-level People’s Procuratorate in each city
(of a province)/district (of a municipality city), and (4) a Basic-level People’s Procuratorate in
each county (of a province only).
Shanghai is one of the four direct municipality cities in China alongside Beijing, Tianjin,
and Chungking. These four cities have the same administrative level as all Chinese provinces,
such as Canton Province or Szechuan Province. Each direct municipality city has several
districts (e.g., Shanghai X District). In the Chinese administrative system, these districts are

Beijing, Tianjin, Chungking, and Shanghai are the four “direct municipality cities.” Hong Kong and Macau are
special administrative regions. These six cities have the same administrative level as other provinces, for example,
Szechuan or Tibet.
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equal to typical cities in other provinces. For example, Shanghai X District is equal to the city of
Soochow. But a District People’s Procuratorate in Shanghai is not on the same administrative
level as Soochow City Intermediate-level People’s Procuratorate, X District People’s
Procuratorate is a basic-level procuratorate, but doing the same intermediate-level procuratorates’
work as Soochow City Intermediate People’s Procuratorate. Direct municipality cities, like
Shanghai, do not have intermediate-level procuratorates.
A Chinese province/direct municipality city’s High-level People’s Procuratorate (e.g.,
Shanghai High-level People’s Procuratorate) can compare with an American state-level
prosecution department (e.g., Indiana Attorney General). 105 Despite doing intermediate-level
procuration work, Shanghai X District Basic-level People’s Procuratorate matches a county’s
prosecution office (e.g., Monroe County Prosecutor’s Office) in Indiana on administrative level.

3.2 Statistics
Shanghai X District People’s Procuratorate recorded all 388 criminal cases in the
procuratorate that applied Plea Leniency procedure, among all 541 cases from January to June
2019. 71.7% of criminal cases in X District Procuratorate applied Plea Leniency. This research
recorded six statuses of each case: (1) the name of the crime, (2) the procurator’s recommended
sentence, (3) the procurator’s recommended trial mode to apply, (4) the first trial’s sentence, (5)
the appeal status, and (6) the legal aid status. From this information, several conclusions can be
drawn.
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This is a rough comparison. It should be noted that not all functions are the same.
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A. Legal Assistance
All 388 Plea Leniency cases had an attorney’s assistance. In China, defendants can choose
from two types of legal assistance: legal aid (duty lawyers) and legal representation (firm
lawyers). None of the 388 defendants went into Plea Leniency procedure without any lawyer’s
help. Although Shanghai’s approach is promising for China, legal aid in China’s remote mid or
western provinces, or the small cities in eastern provinces, lack enough qualified lawyers to
serve as duty lawyers. Hence, to apply Shanghai’s achievement in other places in China, in the
near future, it is crucial to improve the number of qualified legal professionals in these remote
regions.
B. Penalties
There were 375 of the total 388 criminal cases that applied the Plea Leniency procedure
and received final sentences of under two years. Ten cases received between two- to five-year
sentences, and only three cases received more than a five-year sentence.
Plea Leniency usually applies in criminal cases with under a two-year sentence. The
Supreme People’s Procuratorate of China has established an expectation that 70% of all criminal
cases will apply Plea Leniency in the near future. Considering that regular trials are not very
likely to apply Plea Leniency, the application rate of Plea Leniency in low-level crimes in China
may rise even closer to America’s rate of more than 94%.106 Here, low-level crimes refer to
crimes with a penalty of less than two years in prison.
George Fisher, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN AMERICA (2003); see also
Erica Goode, Stronger Hand for Judges in the ‘Bazaar’ of Plea Deals, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Mar. 22, 2012) (“97
percent of federal cases and 94 percent of state cases end in plea bargains.”).
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In China, the regulation to apply an expedited trial is for a prison term potential of less than
three years, meaning that when there is less than three years, procurators and judges can choose
between the two trial modes. If the potential sentence is more than three years, Plea Leniency is
still not forbidden, and a summary trial is applicable.
Thus far, there is no exact prison term limit to regulate the application of a summary trial in
Chinese criminal procedure. The law only displays several situations that eliminate the
application of summary trial.107,108 Currently under debate in China is whether to set up a
maximum number of potential prison term to apply Plea Leniency. Some scholars contend that
to apply Plea Leniency as the defendant pleaded, there should not be year regulations.109 This
view suggests that even for heavy crimes, Plea Leniency can be applied as well, which is similar
to the American system. Other scholars suggest setting up a certain prison term limit, such as ten
or fifteen years.110
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Criminal Procedure Law of China Article 209: Summary procedures are not applicable under any of the
following circumstances:
(1) Where the defendant is visually, hearing, or speech impaired, or is a mentally challenged person who has
not lost all the capacity to discern or control his/her own behavior;
(2) Where the case has a major social impact;
(3) Where some of the co-defendants in a case of joint crimes do not plead guilty or have objections on the
application of summary procedures; or
(4) Where there are other circumstances under which summary procedures are not appropriate.
108
Article 223: The expedited procedures are not to be applied in any of the following circumstances:
(1) The defendant is a blind, deaf, or mute person, or a mentally ill person who has not completely lost his/her
ability to recognize and control his conduct;
(2) The defendant is a juvenile;
(3) The case has a major social impact;
(4) Where in a joint crime some of the defendants have objections to the alleged facts of the crime, charges,
sentencing recommendation, or use of the expedited procedures;
(5) Where the defendant and victims, or their legally-designated representatives, have not reached a mediation
or settlement agreement on compensation for attached civil procedure;
(6) Other circumstances where the expedited procedures should not be applied at trial.
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See Chen Weidong, The Research of Plea Leniency Mechanism, 2 CHINA LEGAL SCIENCE 48, 59 (2016).
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Above the penalty of fifteen years of imprisonment, only three penalty levels exist in Criminal Law of China: (1)
life imprisonment, (2) death reprieve, and (3) death penalty.
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The maximum prison term from sentencing recommendations recorded in the X District
Procuratorate was between ten to fourteen years, which reflects a “mid-heavy” crime in China.
So far, most criminal cases in China that have a potential penalty of more than five years go into
regular trials. The minimum level of sentencing recommendations was relevant/conditional nonprosecution. These cases include situations such as juvenile cases, cases in which the harm is
minimal, or cases in which the defendant had already compensated the damage for a very light
offense.111
Which three cases recorded in the X District Procuratorate that applied Plea Leniency
procedure were crimes that received more than five years? The first case involved a defendant
who was accused of selling commodities bearing counterfeit registered trademarks.112 The
defendant had a large amount of illegal income, plus other aggravating circumstances, and he
received a recommendation of five to eight years, after he pleaded guilty. The court applied a
summary trial, as the final sentence was six-and-a-half years. The defendant had a duty lawyer’s
assistance.
The second case was one of fraud, and the defendant had a legal aid lawyer.113,114 The
defendant had an “extraordinarily large” amount of fraudulence, and the recommended sentence,
China has a different understanding and legal practice of “discretion” in criminal justice, which is another
subject for a future study.
112
According to the Criminal Law of China, Article 214, “Knowingly selling merchandise under a faked trademark
with a relatively large sales volume shall be punished with imprisonment or criminal detention of less than three
years, with a fine or a separately imposed fine; in cases involving a large sales volume, with imprisonment of more
than three years but less than seven years, and with fine.”
113
According to the Criminal Law of China Article 266, “Those defrauding large amounts of money and property or
having involvement in other serious cases are to be sentenced to three to 10 years in prison, in addition to fines.
Those defrauding extraordinarily large amounts of money and property or involving in especially serious cases are
to be sentenced to 10 years or more in prison or given life sentences, in addition to fines or confiscation of property.”
114
The translated version of Criminal Law of China uses “defrauding” instead of “fraud” as translation. See
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cgvienna/eng/dbtyw/jdwt/crimelaw/t209043.htm.
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after he pleaded guilty, was ten to fourteen years. The final sentence, from the judge who applied
a summary trial, was twelve years, with political rights deprivation for the first two years. This
was the heaviest crime recorded in the X District Procuratorate that applied Plea Leniency.
The third case involved a crime of organized prostitution.115 The sentencing
recommendation was for five years, and got approved by the judge after a summary trial. The
defendant hired a lawyer.
C. Sentencing Recommendation
In most cases in Shanghai, judges review the case and approve the sentencing
recommendations of the procurators, but sometimes they make mild adjustments on final
sentences. The judges’ rate of approval in the X-district proved to be more than 99% from
January to June 2019.116
The procurators have two types of sentencing recommendations: specific recommendations
and range recommendations. The specific recommendation has a set prison term, such as two
years, whereas the range recommendation suggests a penalty zone sentence, such as from one to
two years, or under two years. For specific recommendations, which account for an average of
According to the Criminal Law of China Article 358, “Those organizing others for or forcing others into
prostitution are to be sentenced between 5 to 10 years in prison in addition to pay a fine.”
116
The Criminal Law of China Article 201: “When the people's court lawfully makes a judgment in a plea case, the
charges and sentencing recommendation of the people's procuratorate are usually adopted, except in the following
circumstances:
(1) The defendant has not constituted a crime or should not be pursued for criminal responsibility;
(2) The defendant admitted guilt and accepted punishment against his wishes;
(3) The defendant denies the alleged criminal facts;
(4) The charge in the indictment and the charge verified at trial are not the same;
(5) Other situations that might impact the fairness of trial.
Where through trial, people’s courts find that the sentencing recommendation is clearly improper, or where the
defendant or defender raises objections to the sentencing recommendation, people's procuratorate may adjust its
sentencing recommendation. Where the people's procuratorate does not adjust the sentencing recommendation, or
where after adjusting the sentencing recommendation, it is still clearly improper, the people's court shall make a
judgment in accordance with law.”
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14% of the sentencing recommendations in Shanghai, some judges directly approved the number
of years, while other judges chose to show leniency and offer a lesser penalty. For range
recommendations, which make up 86% of the sentencing recommendations, none of the final
sentences exceeded the maximum prison term recommended by the procurators. In a few cases,
final sentences were even less than the minimum prison term recommended by the procurators.
In Shanghai, the district procuratorates revealed different tendencies in making sentencing
recommendations. In ten of the thirteen district procuratorates, more than 80% of the sentencing
recommendations were range recommendations. Of the three remaining districts, more than 90%
of the Plea Leniency cases in P-district had specific recommendations. In Q and JD districts, the
rates were roughly 45%, which are significantly lower than P-district, but still high enough to
rank second and third among the thirteen district procuratorates. The remaining ten districts’ rate
of specific recommendations were all below 20%. Different procedural application tendencies
(summary or expedited trial) were also apparent between each district’s procuratorate and court.
D. Appealing
In China, defendants are not legally forbidden to appeal after the first trial. The meaning
between “not able to appeal” and “able but give up the right to appeal” is different, as there is a
legal distinction between whether or not to allow defendants to appeal after the first trial.
From a practical perspective, the influence of allowing an appeal on the second trial is not
obvious in China. Because only four of the recorded 388 Plea Leniency cases appealed, the rate
was only 1.1%. Additionally, the procurators or police likely made mistakes or showed
inappropriate behavior in these four cases. To reveal potential problems, and to fight for the
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defendants’ own rights, the opportunity to appeal is an approach open to defendants and their
attorney.
E. Application Rates’ Differential
Another report from Shanghai C District shows that from January to June 2019, the
application rate of Plea Leniency among all the cases for the C District Procuratorate was 79%.
This rate reveals a wide gap between the city’s thirteen district procuratorates, whose average
application rate was only 46.8%. The rate of the C district was the highest in Shanghai, and the
rate of the JA district, at only 20%, was the lowest.
Throughout China, the application rate of Plea Leniency cases, for all criminal cases,
during the first half of 2019, was 24.8%. Shanghai’s rate of 46.8% ranked fifth among all the
provinces/direct municipality cities in China, whereas the city of Chungking’s rate was 78.5%,
the city of Tianjin’s rate was 65.2%, the province of Jiangsu’s rate was 52.7%, and the city of
Beijing’s rate was 50.3%, which ranged from first to fourth, respectively, in the country’s rank.
Supreme People’s Procuratorates expects that in a few years the average application rate of Plea
Leniency for all of China can rise to around 70%.
F. Time Saving
The average time period per Plea Leniency case in Shanghai was 19.5 days, from January
to June 2019. The average time period for all criminal cases in 2018, before Plea Leniency’s
legislation, was 27.7 days. As a result, Plea Leniency reduced the duration of cases by 31.7% in
Shanghai.
Compared to the American trajectory toward plea bargaining, Plea Leniency in China has
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not yet made a “huge” impact on efficiency for two reasons. First, trials are still mandatory,
regardless of the kind of trial applied. Second, Chinese regular trial periods are considerably
shorter than American regular trial periods. In China, there is no grand jury trial mode, and
Chinese adjudicators do not play as significant of a role as in America. If Chinese regular trials
took as much time as an average American trial, it would consume much more time in China,
considering the much lower plea (leniency) procedure application rate. Still, the 31.7% (nearly
one-third) of time saved during the first year of formal legislation of Plea Leniency in China is
significant, which reflects a relatively appropriate plea procedure’s instant benefit on judicial
efficiency.
G. Major Criminal Offense Categories
The four major crime categories in Shanghai were Theft, Dangerous Driving and Causing
Traffic Accidents, Fraud, and Public-order Nuisance. The application rates of Plea Leniency for
these categories were 60.9%, 74.9%, 22.5%, and 45.1%, respectively.
Further research is necessary to determine why different crime categories vary so much on
the application rates of Plea Leniency. To briefly analyze this issue, defrauding in China is a
mid-level crime at the least. There is almost zero possibility for a fraud case to apply an
expedited trial, and procurators are extremely cautious to even consider recommending to apply
a summary procedure. Sometimes, this is because the illegal income is incredibly large, or there
are many victims, which means the case is socially influential, and influential cases are legally
forbidden to leave regular trials.
For the crime of dangerous driving (e.g., drunk driving), those drivers know what they have
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done to cause the situation, and it is easy for policemen to get evidence from, for example,
alcohol testers or medical tests, which cannot be denied. Therefore, those defendants are more
willing to plea for a lesser punishment. On the other hand, public-order nuisance defendants
sometimes do not realize that their behavior is illegal, which makes them less likely to plea.
Thus, the difference of application rates on different crimes is an inevitable result of the different
“nature” of the crimes.

3.3 Further Analysis
The judicial practice of Plea Leniency in China till current (late 2019), taking Shanghai as a
representative example, is a promising sign of China’s ongoing legal reform. Several
conclusions can be drawn from Shanghai’s practice, about what China is trying to do to secure
and improve the quality of the Plea Leniency process.
A. The Scope of Defendants’ Legal Rights
In Civil Law countries’ inquisitional criminal justice, it is always a relatively difficult task
to balance the government’s authority and the rights of defendants. This balance tends to lean
more toward the government’s authority and the prosecution. That improves judicial efficiency
to a certain extent, but it also harms defendants’ due process rights. At least in China, the
imbalance of power historically created a significant number of wrongful convictions.117
Starting from the 2012 revision of criminal procedure, China has tended to put much more
effort into securing and improving defendants’ legal rights. Shanghai’s local procuratorates are
117

See He, supra note 15.
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trying to broaden the scope of defendants’ legal rights in Plea Leniency cases, by multiple
methods:
The first method is “informing of rights”. Chinese procurators used to get involved in cases
only after the police finished their job of arrest and interrogation. But since Plea Leniency’s
legalization, Shanghai’s procurators are trying to get involved and evaluate low-level criminal
cases, mainly by analyzing the possibility of applying the Plea Leniency procedure, during the
arrest and interrogation stages.
To better analyze these cases, Shanghai’s procurators seek to talk to defendants directly, as
soon as possible. This does not involve any formal plea discussion, but rather more like an
informal oral communication. It actually involves two things: (1) Procuratorates telling the
defendants what their rights are, such as the right to be assisted by a duty lawyer, and the right to
request for leniency by pleading his crime118; and (2) Defendants being able to request a lawyer
from the procurator, or alternatively to plead and ask the procurator to consider applying Plea
Leniency.
(China does not follow any criminal procedural rule similar to Miranda. The right of
silence for defendants is not recognized in China.)
The second method is to engage in “free-will examination”. At the present time, this
examination is not specifically required. But China is in the process of formulating an
operational guidance under Plea Leniency that would instruct judges to examine the Plea
Leniency process using a specific procedure. This guidance is aimed at preventing any illegal
118

May also include defendants’ agreement of compensation.
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activity during the Plea Leniency process, for example, in violation of criminal procedure Article
54 119 and 56. 120 Subjects that can be examined include police/procuration records, lawyers’
opinions, and defendants’ testimony.
An important point is that in China, criminal procedure does not strictly exclude all
illegally obtained oral evidence. But in Plea Leniency cases, judges are required to try their best
to exclude inappropriate plea agreements, which are made by defendants’ oral consent. “Not
strictly excluded” versus “try their best to exclude” – this may sound contradictory. But it can
be explained this way: Oral evidence has completely different importance in a Plea Leniency
case as compared with other criminal cases, especially regular trials. Article 56 regulates all
criminal cases, including regular trial cases and also summary trial cases which do not apply the
Plea Leniency procedure. In these cases, even illegal oral evidence may have a certain value. 121
But in Plea Leniency cases, the whole case relies upon the defendant’s oral consent, apparently.
The crucial role of oral expression makes free will so important in Plea Leniency. If the oral

119

Criminal Procedure Law of China, Article 54: Confessions extorted from a criminal suspect or defendant by
illegal means such as torture, testimony of witnesses and statements of victims collected by violent means, threat or
other unlawful means shall be excluded. Physical evidence or documentary evidence that is not collected according
to statutory procedures and is therefore likely to materially damage judicial justice shall be subject to correction or
reasonable explanations, and shall be excluded if correction or reasonable explanations are not made.
Evidence that shall be excluded as found during investigation, examination before prosecution and trial shall be
excluded in accordance with the law, and shall not serve as the basis for making prosecution opinions, prosecution
decisions and judgments.
120
Criminal Procedure Law of China, Article 56: “Confessions extorted from a criminal suspect or defendant by
illegal means such as torture, testimony of witnesses and statements of victims collected by violent means, threat or
other unlawful means shall be excluded. Physical evidence or documentary evidence that is not collected according
to statutory procedures and is therefore likely to materially damage judicial justice shall be subject to correction or
reasonable explanations, and shall be excluded if correction or reasonable explanations are not made. Evidence that
shall be excluded as found during investigation, examination before prosecution and trial shall be excluded in
accordance with the law, and shall not serve as the basis for making prosecution opinions, prosecution decisions and
judgments.”
121
China is not adopting the evidence exclusion theory of “fruit of the poisonous tree”, which means relatively
more evidence may be adopted during trials.
53

evidence in a Plea Leniency case is illegal, then free will is absent, and thus there is no
possibility to advance such case. And if a defendant in China is illegally treated to induce an
unfair plea agreement, but this is somehow ignored by the judge, the defendant can still appeal
to the higher court. This is another way to ensure the defendant’s exercise of free will in Plea
Leniency.
The third method is to make full use of duty lawyers. Shanghai X District Procuratorate
cooperates with the district’s legal aid center, consisting of a list of criminal duty lawyers. The
number of criminal duty lawyers is around 80, which is sufficient for a single district of
Shanghai. The working method is that the procurators contact the duty lawyers, once the case
appears to be a candidate for the Plea Leniency procedure, even if the defendant has not
requested a lawyer.122
Shanghai has already achieved a 100% criminal legal assistance rate in Plea Leniency cases.
What is a greater matter of my concern is not Shanghai, but the legal assistance situation in
remote provinces. The reality in China is that all legal elites tend to gravitate towards a few
major cities, like Beijing and Shanghai, but remain reluctant to pursue jobs in remote places like
Guizhou Province or Tibet Autonomous Region. We can say that the entire system of criminal
legal assistance in China has achieved an outstanding effort, only after even these remote
regions have achieved a sufficient number of duty lawyers.
B. Cases’ Quality Improving
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See Chapter I. In the past, for historical reason, Chinese defendants are not as aware of defense lawyers’
importance as American defendants.
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The second aspect of reform is aimed mainly at procuratorates’ self-improvement when
executing Plea Leniency procedure.
As introduced previously, one of the goals for China to set up Plea Leniency was to achieve
better case distribution, separating different cases into three different kinds of trials: expedited
trial, summary trial, and regular trial. Shanghai’s procuratorates are speeding up the distribution
process, to decide and execute each case’s trial application as quick as possible.
The way that Shanghai’s procuratorates have improved the speed of trial distribution can be
described as “procuration preposition”. Procurators maintain contact with police departments, as
early as just after the defendant gets detained. Procurators and police work together, sharing
information about crimes and defendants. Also, procurators need to unify their evidential
standards with the police, and must make sure that all of the evidence is legal.
What if a defendant in Shanghai pleads to the police, before the police transfer the
defendant to the prosecution stage? In Shanghai’s current operation method, the police may call
the procuratorate immediately. The traditional Chinese operation was that the police would
submit the case to the procuratorate after the officers finished the investigation and evidence
collection. Now, however, Shanghai’s procurators allow the police office to transfer all of the
relevant information as soon as the procurators receive notice from the police; the procurators
get the duty lawyer ready, and evaluate the case, deciding whether to apply the Plea Leniency
procedure. This method of “prosecution preposition” has improved the efficiency of executing
the Plea Leniency procedure, which means that judicial resources get better distributed to handle
potential Plea Leniency cases.
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A matter of concern is that, through observing Shanghai’s practice, one can see the
tendency toward granting too much authority to procuratorates in China. In the Plea Leniency
procedure, procuratorates do most of the work, and they are in a dominant position during the
whole Plea Leniency process, despite the fact that the process ultimately needs to be approved
by the judges. The procurators are now intervening in the police operation, and based on the
results, the judges approve of the plea agreements most of the time. Thus, the procurators are
taking power into their hands, and away from police and judges. This may do less harm to police,
for they are also representing the same public authority. But for Chinese judges, their room to
exercise discretion is facing a potential threat, because they can neither investigate, nor
completely examine the case, in the Plea Leniency procedure. What the judge sees is only what
the procurators offer. China needs to be cautious about this situation, lest it devolve into
something like the American situation, in which more than 94% of cases are resolved through
plea bargaining, and prosecutors have almost complete dominance in these cases.
Whenever a plea procedure newly arises in a country – especially in China, as a Civil Law
country, because the concept of mutual interest presents a stronger shock to the inquisitional
criminal procedure which strengthens the public authority’s absolute punishing of all crimes – it
alters the previous balance between all of the parties in criminal procedure. We need to measure
the redistribution of power in Chinese criminal justice. One potential kind of measurement could
be prosecution supervision. But this raises the following question: Who is responsible to execute
this supervision? This question has no appropriate answer for now, in China, because the only
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possible answers may be the government’s discipline department (SCC), 123 or another office
within the people’s procuratorate. This may not be a satisfactory approach, however, because
both of these are on the same side of the public authority.124
In addition to improving the case distribution process, Shanghai’s procuratorates are also
optimizing probation evaluation. Many Plea Leniency cases in China may apply probation (or
end up with non-prosecution), because most of the Plea Leniency cases involve low level crimes.
Shanghai X District’s 388 recorded Plea Leniency cases, among which 102 of them had
probation in the verdict, or ended up with non-prosecution. The rate is 26.3%. Most Plea
Leniency cases have potential prison terms of less than two years, and many of them are eligible
for probation. Probation needs to be evaluated by procurators, and approved by judges in
addition to the plea agreements. The evaluation of probation also consumes judicial resources as
well as the crime evaluation, because procurators need to work together with the local
Department of Justice, to gather defendants’ information from their communities, to check their
criminal records, and to hold discussions. Then the procurators can finally decide whether to
apply probation (or non-prosecution). To save time on this probation evaluation, Shanghai’s
procurators are simplifying document transfers and curtailing unnecessary discussions.
C. Sentencing Recommendations: Range or Specific?
Different Shanghai districts’ procuratorates vary widely in their practice of making
sentencing recommendations. Some procurators make specific sentencing recommendations,
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Supervision Committee of China.
This discussion will bring the further debate of judicial independence, which will be another academic
discussion.
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while others prefer to recommend a range of possible sentences.
A sentencing recommendation can be considered as a legal “promise”, by the procurator, on
behalf of the defendant. A specific recommendation, reduced to a precise number, can make this
“promise” look clearer and more convincing to the defendant. In Fall 2019, there was an
academic conference in China at which the topic of sentencing recommendation was discussed.
According to the conference record, there was a kind of prevailing opinion: A specific
recommendation makes the procurator’s expectation clearer to the defendant and his lawyer, and
creates a better possibility for the defendant to plea. Specific sentencing recommendations also
better benefit trial distribution and judicial efficiency, compared to recommendations of a
sentencing range, because the judges will take less time to reach a final decision if they are
given specific sentencing recommendations.
Another argument in support of specific sentencing recommendations is that the major
tasks that defense attorneys must perform during the Plea Leniency procedure are not
negotiating with the procurators about reaching an agreement, but rather securing defendants’
procedural rights, plus demonstrating the defendants’ attitude of repentance, sincerity of plea,
and commutation circumstances. A specific recommendation with a precise number provides a
better basis for the defense lawyer to communicate with the procurators, to strive for a clearer
expectation of penalty reduction.
There are also arguments that can be made against specific sentencing recommendations.
The authority of a “substantial trial” cannot be stripped from judges. The plea procedure is
already removing power from the judges. Specific sentencing recommendations invade the
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space of discretion for the judges even more, as compared with range recommendations. There
will be also less room for defendants and their lawyers to argue, which puts inappropriate
pressure on defendants and may force them to accept the procurators’ recommendation.
In my view, the tendency to apply either a range or a specific sentencing recommendation
depends on – or is at least relevant to – the category of trial to which the Plea Leniency
procedure is applied. In a case of expedited trial, the procurators can use a specific sentencing
recommendation with no problem. The burden on the judges to review the circumstances and
evidence are the lowest among all three possible modes of trial. The specific recommendation
saves time for the judge. Judges can spend more time on other cases that are worthy of more
attention.
For summary trials that apply Plea Leniency, the major factual circumstances should be
clear and confessed by the defendants, or else the case should go to a regular trial. But summary
trial cases may involve disputes on secondary factual issues, usually about some specific aspect
of the defendants’ conduct that may affect the penalty to a modest extent. These are actually
battlegrounds that defense lawyers may try to seize, in Plea Leniency. During these cases with
disputes, the procurators should recommend ranges of penalty terms, paying due respect to the
judges’ discretion, and leaving enough room for the judges to review these cases and make their
final verdicts individually.
(One category of Plea Leniency trials, is the category which the defendant pleads, but the
judge regards the case as one that can only go to a regular trial for law prevention. This kind of
case is still a Plea Leniency case, because there are formal pleadings, affidavits and sentencing
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recommendations.)

3.4 Problem finding
A. Reflection from Judicial Professionals
After several months of legal practice, has Plea Leniency improved the efficiency of the
Chinese criminal justice system? What are the reflections of the three departments (police,
procurators, judges) in criminal justice to Plea Leniency’s application, respectively?
The feedbacks vary.
For Chinese criminal judges, they are having a much easier time since Plea Leniency’s
legalization. After the approved trial application requests from procurators, Chinese judges no
longer need to go through all of the circumstances, documents, and evidence. Their major tasks
in the Plea Leniency process are reviewing plea agreements, considering probation conditions,
and making final verdicts.
In the traditional criminal justice mode, Chinese judges are doing both jobs: determining
guilt or innocence, and determining the penalty for guilty defendants.125 In Plea Leniency, the
job of determining guilt or innocence has been transferred from the judges to the procurators,
because procurators are reaching the plea agreements with the defendants. If there is an
agreement, the judicial process of guilt determination is no longer needed.
Chinese judges still need to do the main job of determining guilt thoroughly in regular trials.
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China has no grand jury but only adjudicators. The function of adjudicators is not obvious, which judges have to
convict by their own, in traditional Chinese criminal procedure.
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But if the rate of Plea Leniency among all trials is raised to 70 percent, as the Supreme People’s
Procuratorate expects, there will be very few “complete” regular trials for judges – because even
within the remaining 30 percent of non-Plea Leniency cases, there will exist cases in which the
defendants pleaded. In Shanghai, the rate of cases in which defendants pleaded but the case still
went through a regular trial was 19.5 percent from January to June 2019, among all pleaded
cases. So as Plea Leniency’s application increases, the workload for Chinese judges will keep
decreasing.
Procurators’ trial distribution process also benefits the judges a lot, which makes the judges’
workload much more targeted, saving time from the Plea Leniency cases to focus more on heavy
and complicated cases. And there is no longer a “lifetime responsibility” for Chinese judges in
Plea Leniency cases.
Most of the work of guilt determination in Plea Leniency cases has been shifted onto
Chinese procurators. From the perspective of efficiency, the procurators spend less time to
gather evidence in Plea Leniency cases, but this time saving is partly neutralized by the added
work of determining guilt.
Before we take deeper look at procurators, let us consider what has happened to Chinese
police instead. The connection between police and procurators has become much closer. In the
traditional mode of criminal procedure, Chinese police transfer the defendants, materials, and
evidence to procuratorates, after the police have finished all of their jobs – including
investigation, interrogation, and evidence collection. Procurators can only start their procuration
work after the police have finished their work.
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Under the Plea Leniency procedure, procurators intervene as early as the stage of
investigation, which occurs just after the defendants are arrested or detained. If the defendant
pleads in the police office, for example, the Plea Leniency procedure becomes activated
immediately – procurators join the case, and the police no longer need to do further work
gathering substantial evidence. This saves a lot of resources for the Chinese police. Now the
police can save their strength for heavy or complicated crimes, just like the Chinese judges.
There is one aspect that requires the Chinese police to improve their performance, which is
oral evidence. As previously explained, Criminal Procedure Article 56 does not strictly exclude
illegal oral evidence, but in the Plea Leniency procedure, the situation becomes different. The
whole Plea Leniency case relies on the defendant’s oral pleading, which is the key to activating
the Plea Leniency process. So “polluted” or” poisonous” oral evidence in a Plea Leniency case
can destroy all of the previous work from the police and procurators. That is why Chinese police
now have to do a better job of collecting oral evidence, and then submitting such evidence by
following strict operation guides.
Let us now analyze the situation of Chinese procurators, which is the most complicated, as
compared with judges and police. Chinese procurators need to determine the defendant’s guilt
and also reach plea agreements, in the Plea Leniency procedure. They also need to cooperate
with the police at an earlier stage of the case. Because of these added burdens, Chinese
procurators’ actual workloads are not significantly lightened as a result of Plea Leniency.
As an internal report from Shanghai X District procuratorate states:” ... Since Plea
Leniency being legislated, we do not feel remarkable saving on judicial resources (as
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procurators). On the contrary, more works are added for adjusting new categories of
documentation work and advancing the process to form plea agreements. ... Procurators are
required to create more precise procuration suggestions and sentencing recommendations.”126
And since the China Supreme People’s Procuratorate declared an expectation of reaching an
average 70% rate of Plea Leniency cases, among all Chinese criminal cases, the procurators are
under even greater pressure to persuade defendants to plead, in order to reach more plea
agreements. This expectation affects the practice of Plea Leniency, making it not so much of a
one-sided process in which only the procurators are able to activate the Plea Leniency procedure,
and the defendants are only able to consent to plea. The emerging situation deviates from the
original intention of Plea Leniency’s legalization by the Supreme People’s Court.
There is a habitual word in China that refers to the three departments in criminal justice,
collectively, as “公(police)检(procuratorate)法(court)”. Again, the overall efficiency of “PPC”
has been improved remarkably. But meanwhile, the procurators reflect that one of the goals of
refining Plea Leniency, still needs to better reduce procurators’ burden.
As mentioned before, with their expanding obligations, the power of Chinese procurators is
expanding as well. We have to understand that the redistribution of powers and duties brought
by Plea Leniency has caused such a situation - “With greater responsibility comes greater
authority”. But still, the situation of granting so much authority to procurators deserves vigilance.

The title of this inner report is Restricting Problems Analyze and Basic Solution Finding of Base Procuratorates’
Plea Leniency Procedure Advancing, Shanghai X District People’s Procuratorate, Nov. 2019.
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B. Heavy Offenses (Felonies)
As introduced, most criminal cases that applied Plea Leniency, have potential prison terms
below two years, and very few are above 5 years. There are Chinese scholars who have
suggested making the Plea Leniency procedure applicable to heavy crimes as well.127
As a Civil Law country, Italy clearly regulates that the maximum potential penalty to apply
plea bargaining is 7 years and 6 months. The maximum penalty reduction is 1/3 of basic prison
term. 128 But unlike Italy, China has so far remained ambiguous about whether to set up a
maximum prison term of applying Plea Leniency procedure.
The Supreme People’s Procuratorate is encouraging procurators to execute the Plea
Leniency procedure on any occasion, in order to reach the expectation of a 70 percent rate of
Plea Leniency cases among all criminal cases. But Chinese criminal justice, in actual practice,
seems to have spontaneously drawn an implicit limit of 5 years maximum penalty for Plea
Leniency cases. The situation has become: the Ministry of Justice and the Supreme People’s
Procuratorate wanting procurators to use Plea Leniency more broadly, with no restriction on
heavy crimes; but the Procurators spontaneously deciding not to apply Plea Leniency to heavy
crimes almost at all.
Should China legislate, or advance Plea Leniency’s application to all crimes including
heavy crimes, just like American Plea Bargaining? In my view, and given current conditions, it
would be impossible for China to apply Plea Leniency to heavy crimes.
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See Chen, supra note 109 at 59.
See Codice di Procedura Penale (Italian Code of Penal Procedure), Article 444, Clause 1. It regulates plea
bargaining only applies on crimes below 5 years of imprisonment, after a maximum 1/3 penalty discount has been
calculated,
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The first reason is that the 2018 legislation has already restricted the use of Plea Leniency
in heavy crimes, albeit indirectly. Criminal Procedure Law of China, Article 223: “The
expedited procedures are not to be applied in any of the following circumstances: ... (3) The case
has a major social impact;”. The reality of China is that every heavy crime is a socially
influential case. No judge in China is going to accept any Plea Leniency agreement in such an
impactful case – because the case involves social influence, the people’s support, and in the
Chinese administrative court system, the judge’s career. The judge has to execute the full trial
thoroughly and carefully. Chinese procurators are extremely cautious as well, in these influential
cases.
The second reason is that the Chinese people will insist that the trials of influential cases
must be executed in a traditional Civil Law mode, by a cautious and comprehensive manner.
Plea bargaining avoids “absolute substantive justice” and traditional procedural justice, at the
same time. But ordinary people only care about “absolute” justice, which stresses the punitive
and retributive functions of Criminal Law, as well as the principle of crime-punishment
adaptation.129 What is more, the word “bargain” is extremely sensitive in traditional Chinese
doctrine, as previously mentioned in Chapter 2.
Based on the two reasons above, China cannot presently achieve the general Plea Leniency
application to heavy crimes, despite the Supreme People’s Procuratorate’s desire to see that
happen. It is unrealistic to expect a 70 percent rate of Plea Leniency after only 6 months of
129

Not only Chinese carrying such kind of thinking. Famous Japanese Criminal Law scholar Minoru Otani says:
“To maintain social order, and to satisfy the motion of revenge, it is extremely important to preserve people’s trust
towards (criminal)law.” Similar to China, Japan also shares a criminal justice theoretical background, which based
on Retribution more than Prevention.
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formal legalization, which imposes heavy pressure on all Chinese “PPC” professionals.
To improve the application ratio of Plea Leniency procedure, or to accelerate the average
closing time per case, the more realistic approach for China would be not to keep advancing Plea
Leniency’s application to heavy offenses, but instead to create a better encouragement
mechanism for defendants to choose pleading for leniency, and also to reduce the workload on
procurators. There are still some processes in criminal procedure that can be simplified.
C. Legislative Omissions
Even though the Chinese Criminal Procedure Law was revised in 2018,130 there is still no
relevant revision of the Criminal Law, nor is there a comprehensive Evidence Code.131 In fact, it
is meaningful to update these relevant articles after the Criminal Procedure Law’s revision, and
it is necessary to define and clarify the relationship between Plea Leniency and traditional
regulation of confession, especially in the stage of penalty measurement.
There are two key questions that still need to be answered: (1) What is the criminal law
relationship between Plea Leniency and confession? (2) What percentage of penalty reduction
should Plea Leniency produce?
The 2018 version of the Criminal Procedure Law added Article 15 132 to describe Plea
Leniency in general. Previous to that, there are Article 67 and 68 of Criminal Law talking about
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Supra note 2.
China does not have an individual “Rules of Evidence”. Evidential regulations are separated into Criminal Law
and Criminal Procedure Law. Plus, there also has several official judicial interpretations/ruling cases that are
regulating evidence as well.
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Criminal Procedure Law Article 15: “Where criminal suspects or defendants voluntarily and truthfully confess
their own criminal conduct, admit the facts of the crime as charged, and are willing to accept punishment, they may
be given a lenient disposition in accordance with law.”
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confession,133,134 and there is a judicial interpretation talking about specific calculation methods
of penalty reduction.135.136 The difference has been pointed out already: “We cannot mix up Plea
Leniency procedure with criminal law’s mercy or criminal procedure’s simplified process, on
pleaded defendants. What we need to think more about, is the right supply of defendants,
especially on substantial rights, specifically in Plea Leniency procedure.”137
There are two main perspectives in China about the evaluation of Plea Leniency’s position
in Chinese criminal procedure and the regulation of Plea Leniency’s penalty measuring in
current Criminal Law. One perspective supports Plea Leniency procedure to be a new part of
current Criminal Procedure Law of China, namely, that Plea Leniency reflects a very distinct
operation mode – a whole new individual process, compared to traditional Civil Law criminal
procedure. Therefore, there needs to be a new evaluation mechanism of Plea Leniency in
Criminal Law of China as well.
Criminal Law of China Article 67: “(1) The act of voluntarily giving oneself up to the police and giving a true
account of one's crime after committing it is an act of voluntary surrender. Criminal elements who voluntarily
surrender may be given a lesser punishment or a mitigated punishment. Those among them whose crimes are
relatively minor may be exempted from punishment.
(2) Where criminal suspects, defendants, and criminals serving sentences give a true account of their other crimes
which are not known to the judicial organ, their actions are regarded as an act of voluntary surrender.
(3) A criminal suspect who truthfully confesses to his crime may be given a lighter penalty although there is no
voluntary surrender as mentioned in the preceding two paragraphs; and may be given a mitigated penalty if any
especially serious consequence is avoided for his truthful confession.”
134
Criminal Law of China Article 68: “Criminal elements who perform meritorious service by exposing other
people's crimes that can be verified or who provide important clues leading the cracking of other cases may be
given a lesser punishment or a mitigated punishment. Those who performed major meritorious service may be given
a mitigated punishment or may be exempted from punishment. Those who surrender themselves voluntarily and
perform major meritorious service after committing a crime shall be given a mitigated punishment or exempted
from punishment.”
135
The 2010 Guiding Opinions of Sentencing for People’s Court, Supreme People’s Court of China, 2010 (Tryout),
Section III, Clause 6: “... depend on the situation of confession or repentance, the maximum penalty discount is 20%
of benchmark penalty.”
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Id. Clause 7: “Despite legal recognized voluntarily surrender and confession, for those who plea their guilt on
court, the maximum penalty discount is 10% of standard, depend on situations of crime characteristics, severeness
of consequence, levels of plea and repentance.”
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See Zuo Weimin, Why Lenient Treatment for Admission of Guilt and Acceptance of Punishment, 3 CHINESE
JOURNAL OF LAW, 160, 164 (2017).
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The other opinion maintains that Plea Leniency should be an additional part of current
Chinese criminal procedure, but despite the fact that the operation mode is different, Plea
Leniency still resides within the trial-focused criminal procedure. Thus, there is no need for a
newly-designed penalty measuring system in Criminal Law, but more appropriately, a
supplementary penalty measuring method, supplementing the current Criminal Law regulations
on confession and compensation, based on Criminal Law of China 138 and Supreme People’s
Court’s sentencing guidelines.139
Actually, the first perspective essentially regards Plea Leniency as a “Chinese style” of plea
bargaining. The evaluation of “individual process” moves Plea Leniency outside the supervision
of traditional due process, which is exactly the same as the American way, in the 1970s, of
forming American plea bargaining. The second perspective is more consistent with the scope of
Civil Law – considering, but in a modern way, Plea Leniency as a category of procedural
simplification that cannot conflict with procedural justice.
I personally support the second perspective, because this way of thinking better explains
why China has not eliminated or reduced the right of appeal in Plea Leniency procedure. This
consideration minimizes the American origin or “plea bargaining” characteristic of Plea
Leniency procedure, instead describing Plea Leniency more like a Civil Law’s “rewarding”
mechanism, which better matches my own analysis of Plea Leniency.
The difference of Criminal Law of China’s perspective between normal confession and
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Supra note 135, 136.
See Guiding Opinions on Sentencing of Common Criminal Cases, Supreme People’s Court of China (tryout ver.,
2010, 1st formal ver., 2014, 2nd ver. 2017, the latest).
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Plea Leniency, can be expanded as an individual article. But no matter how scholars argue, Plea
Leniency’s legal status needs to be clarified in Criminal Law of China, or at least, in a judicial
interpretation.

3.5 Interim Conclusion
Chinese Plea Leniency procedure, is the answer of China for the issues of judicial
efficiency, and defendants’ legal rights. As a periodical summary to conclude my first stage
research (Chapter I to III), we can conclude that Chinese Plea Leniency system has multiple
similarities with American plea bargaining system.
Meanwhile, because of different legal backgrounds, these two pleading systems also have a
lot of differences, on legislation, actual operation, criminal justice positioning, etc. Theoretical
differences also reflected on the results of judicial practice.
The setup of Plea Leniency procedure is a sign of which Chinese criminal procedure has
entered its new stage. The forming of Plea Leniency system indicates that China is willing to
absorb concepts and mechanisms from other legal systems, even from Civil Law countries.
To evaluate Plea Leniency’s first stage real practice in China (till the first half of 2019),
Plea Leniency has proved itself promising in China, which Chinese procuration system has
achieved a remarkable 31.7 percent judicial efficiency (time per criminal case) improvement
than the past, after only 6 months of official legislation. Defendants’ legal rights are secured and
enhanced by law. Defendants are also receiving more effective legal assistance from defense
lawyers.
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As a special issue, we should realize the functional difference in reality, that American
criminal lawyers are mainly “representing” defendants in plea bargaining, while Chinese
lawyers are “supporting” defendants legally, which Chinese lawyers have no right to replace
defendants. to negotiate and reach plea agreements with procurators. In China the formal
consent to plea (plea affidavit) has to be made by the defendant him/herself.
Notwithstanding China’s promising start, there exist problems as well. The first issue is that,
despite Plea Leniency relieving the prior heavy burden on Chinese criminal judges, Chinese
procurators are not reflecting that their workloads are decreasing significantly. Meanwhile,
procurators’ expanding obligation may bring over-expanded procuration authority, which
represents a threat to the judge’s discretion, and specially threatens Chinese judges’ legal
responsibility of executing “substantive trials”.
Procurators/prosecutors’ authority problem will be a major element of discussion in
upcoming chapters, when we specifically analyze defendants and victims’ situations in pleading
procedures.
How to re-balance Chinese criminal justice system’s distribution of power and workloads
for the three parties participating (police, procurators, judges), while promoting Plea Leniency,
is a difficult task for China to solve.
Another issue is, at legislation level, there was no timely revision of the Criminal Law of
China, after the 2018 legislation of Criminal Procedure Law. The omission of legislation to
better define, position and regulate Plea Leniency in Criminal Law of China, is preventing Plea
Leniency’s broader application, and also affects the quality of real Plea Leniency cases.
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This briefly concludes the first three chapters, which mainly contains the retrospective
research of pleading procedure in China, the legislation of Plea Leniency, Plea Leniency’s
similarities and differences with American plea bargaining, and my first stage empirical research
that was mainly accomplished at Shanghai. The following four chapters will reflect my second
stage empirical/comparative research.
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Chapter IV Second Stage Empirical Research

4.1 Introduction
This Chapter continues by discussing Plea Leniency’s practice in China from 2020 until
recent times (first half of 2021), following my first stage of empirical research. The following
three chapters (Chapter V, VI and VII) will specifically discuss Chinese and American pleading
systems’ common points and differences from three different angles—defendants, victims, and
penalty measuring.
Since plea bargaining was created in the United States, there are, of course, American
scholars researching American plea bargaining, and scholars worldwide are doing similar
research as well, including Chinese scholars. Plenty of academic resources are available for
reference, which can be found in legal databases, books, Chinese and American publications,
and other sources.
But there are two major problems when it comes to the comparative research on Chinese
Plea Leniency and American plea bargaining.
The first one is that it is difficult to find almost any systematic research on Chinese Plea
Leniency by American scholars to date, as there has quite sufficient Chinese research on
American plea bargaining. One possible reason for the lack of American research is that Chinese
Plea Leniency is still in a very early, premature stage. (Therefore, this dissertation may provide
some useful information for American scholars about Chinese Plea Leniency practice.)
The other issue is that occasionally Chinese scholars hold “cautious” attitudes when
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presenting their research findings about the Chinese judicial system to the public, especially
when empirical/theoretical conclusions are negative. Also, scholars in China tend to avoid being
critical or aggressive when pointing out existing problems to other people.
This issue is being magnified, especially when we are discussing Plea Leniency. The Plea
Leniency system is currently one of most important parts of Chinese criminal justice’s reform.
Plea Leniency is the main “merchandise” that Chinese legislators are “promoting,” which is
somewhat similar to the early-stage situation surrounding plea bargaining in the United States.140
In China, scholars and judicial professionals are more willing to report those discovered
issues to China’s Ministry of Justice, or to the Supreme People’s Court/Procuratorate, instead of
directly publishing those issues to the public. As result, this conservative mode of researching
and operating makes the Chinese criminal justice system appear relatively “refined” to outsiders.
But this situation also raises the difficulty for objective observers who wish to analyze and
help solve those existing problems in Chinese Plea Leniency. Those difficulties mainly reflect on
two issues: few typical cases are available to indicate the direction of judicial practice, and parts
of practice reflection are not transparent enough for the public.
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Early-stage discussion in The US about plea bargaining, for supporting examples, see Douglas A. Smith. The
Plea Bargaining Controversy, 77 JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW AND CRIMINOLOGY 950 (1986). See also Frank
Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 289 (1983).
Dissenting/Criticizing examples, see Albert Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant’s Right to Trial:
Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW 932 (1983); John H.
Langbein, Understanding the Short History of Plea Bargaining, 13 LAW & SOCIETY REVIEW 262 (1979).
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4.2 China’s Recent Practice
A. SPP’s Official Report
On October 15th, 2020, the Chief Procurator of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, Zhang
Jun (张军), presented a report during the 22nd conference of the 13th Standing Committee of the
National People’s Congress (NPCSC).141 The main part of the report can be considered an
official summary from the Supreme People’s Procuratorate of Plea Leniency. The report spans
pages introducing the practical result of Chinese Plea Leniency, from its October 2018 official
legislation until August 2020.142
Numbers have shown that, in total, 1,416,417 criminal cases filed in these 20 months
applied the Plea Leniency procedure, and the number of total defendants was 1,851,113.143 In
the 8 months of 2020 for which data is available (Jan. 2020 to Aug. 2020), the application rate
for Plea Leniency among all Chinese criminal cases was 85.6%. The application rate for 2019
was 77.0%.144,145
Chief Procuratorate Zhang (Chang, in English pronunciation for Chinese names)
emphasized that the application of Plea Leniency has four major benefits/achievements for
Chinese criminal justice.
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See https://www.spp.gov.cn/spp/zdgz/202010/t20201017_482200.shtml, Oct.17 2020.
Some of the research studies started recording from January 2019.
143
Supra note 2.
144
The officially revised application rate for 2018 was 57%. But in the first 3 seasons of 2018, plea leniency was
only applied in 18 major cities of China. The report also provided more specific numbers for 2019. Within plea
leniency, 27.6% of cases applied an expedited trial procedure, and the rest (49.4%) applied a summary trial
procedure.
145
When I was discussing plea leniency with Chinese judicial professionals, they mentioned that Chinese legislators’
expectation for the plea leniency application rate is between 80% and 85%, and the United States has a plea
bargaining application rate of 94% to 97%, varies by the year. The Chinese rate for 2020—85.6%, not only reached
Chinese legislators’ expectation, but had already surpassed that.
142
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The first aspect is that Plea Leniency helps the Chinese society to be more harmonious
and stable.
This can be referred to as one of the beginning purposes for Plea Leniency.
As introduced in the first chapter, since 2012, the reforming of Chinese criminal justice has
remained devoted to changing the style of Chinese criminal procedure. Transitioning from the
completely traditional Civil Law’s inquisitional criminal procedure, Chinese criminal justice is
currently absorbing parts of advantages from adversarial criminal procedure.
The evolution of the criminal procedure also influenced the relationship between different
criminal procedural parties.146 Now procurators are widely cooperating with defendants to reach
plea agreements, just like in the US.147
A pair of numbers supports this opinion that there exists wide cooperation between
procurators and defendants. From January 2019 to August 2020, the appeal rate (after the first
trial) of Plea Leniency cases was 3.9%.148 The rest of criminal cases that did not apply Plea
Leniency had an appeal rate of 15.4%, much more than the Plea Leniency cases. These numbers
reflect that disagreement between procurators and defendants are much lesser if they apply Plea
Leniency. Defendants are more willing to accept sentences as they have received lesser penalties.
Meanwhile, victims are taken into better consideration and this forges a more cooperative
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In following documents about this report, Chinese legislators confirmed that police IS a part of plea leniency
system, once they started a plea discussion with defendants, despite they are not taking part in trials. Nowadays
Chinese scholars are discussing the special relationship between police and defendants in plea leniency procedure.
Further discussion about Chinese police’s playing role in plea leniency, can be found in following sections.
147
In China some scholars are even discussing the possibility for police departments to start early-stage pleading
process if defendants rapidly pleaded.
148
As mentioned in the first chapter, it is clarified that Chinese plea leniency does allow defendants to appeal.
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relationship in Plea Leniency. By expressing this first aspect,149 Chinese Plea Leniency takes the
victim into the legislation of Plea Leniency (if the victims are individuals) such that the
compensation from the suspect to the victim and the criminal reconciliation between the
defendant and the victim are regulated as important referencing factors in calculating the Plea
Leniency’s penalty discount.150,151
This cooperative relationship between procurators and defendants, plus a better
consideration of victims, helps Plea Leniency contribute more to Chinese society’s harmony and
stability.152
The second aspect is that Plea Leniency helps punish crimes in a much timelier
manner.
The Supreme People’s Procuratorate claims that in recent years, crime behaviors (except
light malice offenses) are more “professional, intelligent and covert.” The difficulty for
investigators to fight against crimes is increasing, especially for elaborately designed criminal
cases. In group/joint crimes, suspects often unite together, destroy evidence, and wipe traces
clean for partners. If some of them are under arrest, they are willing to cover for each other
during interrogation to hinder investigation and evidence discovery.
Under such circumstances, if investigators are able to detain one of the suspects, by offering

Supra note 141. The report says: “…have taken two more factors into consideration of leniency at the same time:
if the victim has reached criminal reconciliation with the suspect, or if the victim has forgiven the suspect”
150
For more on the United States’ criminal victims’ legal rights in plea bargaining, see Crime Victims’ Right Act
(CVRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3771. See also Victims’ Rights and Restitution Act (VRRA), 34 U.S.C.§20141.
151
For the specific discussion of penalty measuring in plea leniency, see Chapter V.
152
There exist arguments about victims’ positions in plea bargaining/Plea Leniency. Further discussion can be found
in Chapter V.
149
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plea agreements, they are more likely to get the suspect to agree to a plea. Once the suspect
pleads, the “crime fortress” will be easier to break through from the inside, for the suspect may
provide more information than investigators had gained, or he will be able to confirm
investigators’ assumptions.
Plea Leniency helps suspects to confess and provide information/evidence to the
investigators, and that helps investigators stop crime in a timelier way.
The third aspect is that the efficiency of Chinese criminal procedure has been
significantly improved.
This aspect is another way in which Plea Leniency’s wide application reflects on judicial
efficiency, similar to aspect 2. Aspects 2 and 3 meet the basic expectation of forming a plea
system, which was mentioned in the previous chapter.153
The fourth aspect is that defendants and victims’ rights are better taken care of in the
Plea Leniency procedure.
This part of the report firstly emphasizes the importance of procurators’ effort of guiding
defendants to plea. Procurators should strive for all parties’ support on plea agreements,
including defendants, defense lawyers, victims, etc.154
On the defendants’ side, the report shows that there were 1,246,000 defendants being
assisted by duty lawyers. This number means that 67.3% of all Plea Leniency defendants are

See Chapter III and IV’s empirical research.
Numbers have shown that from January 2019 to August 2020, the Chinese judicial reparation system helped
33,040 criminal victims financially. The total expenditure was around $75,000,000 (489,000,000CNY), averaging
$2,270 per person, roughly.
153
154
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assisted by duty lawyers, not taking firm (hired) lawyers into account. 155 For the past three years,
Chinese procuratorates have placed a greater focus on constructing a larger team of legal
aid/duty lawyers to help defendants gain “effective assistance of counsel,” for no recent
supplement has been enacted to adjust defendants’ legal rights in criminal procedure.156
B. SPP’s Guiding Opinions on Plea Leniency Practice
A month after the report was made, on December 1st, 2020, the Supreme Procuratorate
published an operation guide to more accurately apply Plea Leniency.157
This guide has 10 aspects and contains total 28 clauses to regulate and encourage
procurators’ Plea Leniency practice:
From now on (Dec. 2020), people’s procuratorates should focus more on improving
Plea Leniency case quality instead of pursuing higher application rates.158
When I was staying in China during the second half of 2020, I was told that the Supreme
People’s Procuratorate hoped that the application rate for Plea Leniency could reach a number of
more than 80% for the whole year. The rate turned out to be 85.6%.
For this number—on one hand, compared to the US’s average of more than a 94% plea
155

Supra note 141.
The issue of the right of “effective assistance of counsel” will be discussed in Chapter V.
157
Official document, see http://www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=708197
158
Brief translation of 28 Guiding Opinions on the Practice of Plea Leniency Mechanism, Supreme People’s
Procuratorate of China, Dec. 2020 (repetitions and political requirements are partly removed from translating or
expressed in a simplified way):
Part I People’s Procuratorates need to put more effort into improving plea leniency case qualities and improve the
application rate within the scope of legality.
(1) Procurators should not unilaterally pursue increasing the application rate for plea leniency. Higher-level
procuratorates should not increase working burdens for base procuratorates. Procurators should neither coerce or
induce defendants to wrongfully plea under the guise of pursuing application rates, nor over-accommodate
defendants with no legal reasons, to guarantee penalty legality and ensure criminal justice’s authority.
(2) Higher-level procuratorates’ evaluation of base procuratorates’ plea leniency cases should focus on: judicial
behaviors’ legality, legal explanations’ theoretical sufficiency, plea negotiation quality, sentencing recommendations’
legal precision and social conflict reconciliation.
156
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bargaining application rate each year, China’s 80% expectation was not looking very high; on
the other hand, for a whole new criminal procedure that has only 2 years of legislation and only
4 years since its pilot application, this 80% application rate expectation appears to be excessive.
Therefore, when I saw this number in October 2020, my concern was: are there any (how many)
cases that procurators were mainly pursuing judicial efficiency, but completely or partly ignored
those cases’ factual basis?
It is difficult to count how many cases were executed like that. However, I am glad to see
that, as shown in this part of the guidelines, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate is already aware
of the situation that local people’s procuratorates sometimes mechanically execute the Supreme
Procuratorates’ policies to match Beijing’s expectation on Plea Leniency’s nationwide
application rate.
Sentencing recommendations need to be more precise and appropriate.159
The Supreme People’s Procuratorate has encouraged procuratorates to propose more
specific recommendations over range recommendations. The reasons are that specific sentencing
recommendations better reduce judges’ burdens on conviction and penalty measurement, and

Part II Procurators should clearly separate each case’s individual characteristics, should not show similar
leniency or harshness for all criminal cases, with no difference. Sentencing recommendations should legally match
with defendants’ offenses.
(3) For benchmark penalties under 3 years of imprisonment (misdemeanor) plea leniency cases, procurators may
regularly give leniency to defendants within the scope of legality. Submit probation sentencing recommendations
and expedite/summary trial procedural recommendations if legally appropriate. For those cases showing minimal
malice, caused minimal damage to the society, or already reconciliated between defendants and victims, procurators
may show leniency as much as legally possible. For those few cases showing severing malice, the extent of leniency
should be restricted.
(4) Cases that severely threat nation’s security, damage public safety, reflecting serious violence, should be
evaluated strictly. Even already applied plea leniency, the extent of leniency should be strictly limited. For those
extremely malicious offenses, suspects should be harshly punished, to care about peoples’ expectations of criminal
justice.
159
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specific sentencing recommendations also provide criminal defense lawyers and their clients a
precise expectation of the penalty discount.
There exist numbers to support this perspective, and specific recommendations are easier to
get approved in court. From January 2019 to August 2020, the acceptance rate (total average
87.7%)160 of specific sentencing recommendations was 89%, and the rate of range
recommendations was 84.7%. Also, defendants are less willing to appeal under specific
recommendations. The appeal rate of specific recommendations was 2.56%; meanwhile, the rate
of range recommendations was close to 5.7%, more than two times of the rate of specific
recommendations. As a conclusion, specific sentencing recommendations do save more judicial
resources than range sentencing recommendations.
Some may question the idea that under such guidance, Chinese criminal judges’ discretion is
even more compressed, as their authority to measure penalties is already being taken away from
procurators. That is the true situation in China. As I conclude, only two benefits remain for
criminal judges: they can spend less energy on Plea Leniency cases and disputes are much fewer
in number than regular procedure criminal cases, so they can focus more on regular trials that
require better effort to restore the true facts and level appropriate sentences; criminal trials are
still mandatory in China, so criminal judges have the authority to review, confirm, and possibly
overturn plea agreements, if it is regarded as necessary.
Here I will provide another group of numbers: 76% of sentencing recommendations are
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This rate also indicates that in 12.3% of plea leniency cases, judges adjusted the penalty or directly rejected the
plea agreements.
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specific recommendations as of the 8 months in 2020 for which I have data. The percentage for
the year of 2019 was 27.3%, and from a statistical angle, it was a huge improvement from the
first half of 2019 to the second half, then to the first 8 months of 2020. In my first-stage
empirical research, I found that in the first half of 2019, only 14.2% of cases had specific
sentencing recommendations submitted among all sentencing recommendations in the city of
Shanghai.
As another clause under this aspect, the Supreme Procuratorate also pointed out that in some
Plea Leniency cases, procurators compromised too much with suspects in plea negotiation. This
also connected with the first aspect, that some procurators ignored the basic requirements of
Civil Law criminal procedure, but tried their best to reach plea agreements with defendants and
their attorneys.
Keep making efforts to ensure the litigating parties’ legal rights.161
Criminal procedure parties here included both defendants and victims, as presented in the

Part III Making efforts to ensure defendants and victims’ rights and interests, to guarantee justice in plea
leniency cases.
(5) Plea leniency cases reduce the difficulties of proving cases, but the standards of evidence cannot be lowered. If
defendants plead, but evidence is still insufficient, defendants cannot be judged guilty through plea leniency.
(6) Enhance the examination of how legal and free will-motivated the defendants’ pleas are. Procurators need to
check if any illegal behaviors are occurring, such as violence, coercion, or induction. They should confirm that
defendants are pleading under normal conditions of recognition and mentality. They should confirm defendants
understand the characteristics of plea leniency and the legal consequence after pleading to prevent a free-will
violation from happening.
(7) Ensure defendants’ ability to gain prompt, effective legal assistance. If defendants have attorneys, the attorneys
must be on site when defendants sign their plea affidavits. For those defendants who only have duty lawyers, they
must promptly inform duty lawyers, to ensure duty lawyers who can provide effective legal assistance for
defendants.
(8) Legally ensure victims’ rights and interests. Procurators should cooperate with investigation departments to
investigate defendants’ financial conditions, since the issue of compensation is an important factor when
considering the extent of leniency. For those defendants who are capable of paying compensation but refuse to
compensate, the application of plea leniency should be considered prudently or abandoned. Procurators should
guide victims to raise appropriate compensation requests, based on facts, evidence and legal provisions. For those
victims or their close family members, procurators should actively apply the procedure of legal aid.
161
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fourth aspect of the October report. Based on that report, this December guide additionally
mentioned the need to improve the revision of defendants’ free will to plea, and the revision of
the plea agreements’ legitimacy, to better ensure defendants’ rights.
Improve the process of educating suspects to plea and show repentance;162
Improve negotiation with attorneys and improve the quality of criminal defense in
Plea Leniency;163
Improve the quality of trial distribution;164
Form individual procuratorates’ procedure and rules of penalty measurement;165
162

Part IV Procurators should devote efforts to educating defendants to plead guilty and show repentance.
(9) Procurators should take the education work of pleading and repentance seriously in plea leniency application.
Also, procurators should devote efforts to gaining defense attorneys’ support and victims’ understanding.
(10) Procurators should pay attention to propagating plea leniency policies to make sure defendants understand the
characteristics of plea leniency, and the legal consequences after they plead, to help defendants make their decisions
rationally. Procurators should distinguish whether defendants are pleading sincerely or wishfully pleading so they
may face less punishment.
163
Part V Procurators should improve the communication and negotiation with defense attorneys. It was
discovered while applying plea leniency that some procurators are disrespecting defense attorneys’ opinions and
effective communication with attorneys is lacking.
(11) Procurators should pay sufficient attention to defense attorneys’ important functions in ensuring defendants’
rights, improving plea leniency’s healthy application. Procurators should execute the legal responsibility of hearing
defense attorneys’ opinions, pay enough respect and undertake sufficient negotiation of defense attorneys’ opinions.
Written recordings and feedback are required in every single case.
(12) Improve procurators’ skills in communication and negotiation. Procurators should be conscientious, rational,
gentle and sincere during communication and negotiation. Avoid being overly tough during plea leniency processes.
(13) Record when negotiating and improve the transparency and public credibility within the negotiation.
164
Part VI Enhance the quality of procurators’ execution for the authority of conviction measurement. Also
enhance people’s procuratorates’ function in trial distribution. For light offense cases (misdemeanors), prosecutors
may legally apply non-procuration procedures when possible.
(14) Advance the research on plea leniency’s penalty measuring mechanism.
(15) Construct the connecting mechanism from light offenses (misdemeanors) to administrative punishment
procedures and civil procedure. Also, construct the transferring mechanism from non-prosecution to administrative
punishment procedures.
165
Part VII Improve the proportion of specific sentencing recommendations (over range sentencing
recommendations), as well as advance the standardization/normalization of penalty measurement.
(16) Cooperate with peoples’ courts to form standardized, specific sentencing guidelines, and improve plea
leniency’s application rate on crimes having benchmark penalties above 3 years.
(17) Further normalize the process of forming sentencing recommendations. Ensure that the penalty measuring
mechanism is fairly and transparently applied on each plea leniency case.
(18) Improve the quality of documented explanations of sentencing.
(19) Improve the quality of plea affidavits and sentencing recommendations. Procurators may include flexible
suggestions on sentencing, within plea affidavits and sentencing recommendations, for judges to decide during trials.
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Enhance the cooperation with police departments, people’s courts and supervision
committees;166
Being cautious on judicial corruption that Plea Leniency may bring;167
Improve the professionalism of procurators.168
This Supreme Procuratorate’s Guide of Practice contains China’s highest prosecution
department summary and expectations for Plea Leniency practice. The next step in my research
is to draw conclusions based on Chinese and US scholars’ critiques on Chinese and US plea
systems, then cross-reference these with Chinese Plea Leniency practice, to see what problems
Plea Leniency truly has.

Part VIII Enhance the cooperation with other relevant departments, including but not limited to people’s courts.
(20) Enhance the cooperation between people’s procuratorates and supervision committees, as well as improve plea
leniency’s function on official/administrative/duty crimes. (In China this category of crimes is being investigated by
supervision committees instead of procuratorates)
(21) Enhance the cooperation between people’s procuratorates and police departments. Construct the quick pleading
mechanism during investigation period. Push police departments to ensure the quality of evidence not only for
conviction, but also for penalty measuring, to ensure plea leniency cases’ quality since the investigations’ origins.
(22) Enhance the adjustments to sentencing recommendations if people’s courts decide that it is necessary, as well
as enhance procuratorates’ function of trial supervision during plea leniency trials.
(23) Enhance the cooperation with local administrative departments relevant to criminal justice. Procuratorates
should push to ensure duty lawyers’ sufficiency of numbers, and should also ensure the sufficiency of duty lawyers’
payments. Also enhance the cooperation to ensure local administrative departments’ function of evaluating
community corrections.
167
Part IX Procuratorates should pay attention to preventing judicial corruption to ensure plea leniency is applied
under the manner of clean hands.
(24) Enhance the inner supervision mechanism of people’s procuratorates and the mechanism of liability
investigation. Devote effort to preventing plea leniency from creating legal violations, authority trading, and
authority rent-seeking.
(25) For those people illegally involved in plea leniency cases, illegal contact with parties in procedure, attorneys,
closely connected third parties, etc., procurators should record truthfully and report promptly.
168
Supra note 157. Part X Improve the professionalism of procurators.
(26) Enhance the professional training and practice of procurators, including the aspects of: examining evidence,
applying legal provisions, grasping judicial policies, measuring penalties, explaining sentences, communicating and
negotiating with attorneys, and solving social contradictions.
(27) Strengthen the guiding function of typical plea leniency cases. Construct a plea leniency cases database to
provide reference for people’s procuratorates.
(28) Enhance procuratorates’ effort to propagate plea leniency to the public, to gain the society’s understanding and
support of plea leniency procedures.
166
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4.3 Procurators’ Transforming Functions
These two official reports above were all based on the perspective of people’s procuratorates,
which are basically reporting two issues: what procurators have done and what procurators
should pay attention to in following Plea Leniency practice.
Exactly as predicted, three years of formally applying Plea Leniency has brought profound,
dramatic changes to the profession of Chinese procurators. For an individual, three years is not a
short period, but for the whole Chinese criminal justice system, from 18 major cities’ application
to a more than 85% nationwide application rate (of Plea Leniency),169 we must say these three
years has produced an immediate and drastic effect.
Generally speaking, the Chinese procuration system has been resolutely advancing the
application of Plea Leniency and has undertaken a remarkable effort. Multiple aspects have been
improved, including criminal justice’s efficiency, defendants’ legal rights (mainly effective legal
assistance), victims’ compensation, judges’ burden relief, etc. Meanwhile, through these official
reports and my two stages of empirical research, I have uncovered several aspects that remain to
be improved.
A. New Operation Mode
The center of the transformation is the new role Chinese procurators are now playing and
the new way procurators operate. In other words, Chinese procurators are similarly experiencing
what American prosecutors experienced in the 1970s through the 1990s, to a certain extent, and
at a much faster speed.
169

Supra note 141. Nationwide overall 85.6% application rate in the year 2020.
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As we know, in traditional criminal justice, procurators/prosecutors are playing a similar
role as “chefs.” Investigation departments (mainly police) provide ingredients (materials).
Procurators first do the cooking, then bring dishes (convictions) to the table of customers (court
trials), for them to taste and remark upon (judgements).
However, we can no longer use the common mode of dining to describe pleading
procedures. In the mode of Plea Leniency, Chinese procurators not only have to be capable of
cooking, but also have to submit “Michelin remarks.” Judges have turned into “chief editors” of
the “Michelin website” to review these remarks instead of feasting.
It should be emphasized here, again, that with mandatory trials kept for all convictions,
Chinese judges still theoretically possess relatively more authority and responsibility to review
substantive contents of Plea Leniency cases, compared to American plea bargaining.
Such a profound change raised the professional requirements of Chinese procurators, and
the Supreme People’s Procuratorate demands all Chinese procurators to strengthen their personal
studying to improve their professional abilities and advance by adapting new type of procedure
for Plea Leniency.170
The legislation and application of Plea Leniency brings benefits and new challenges to
Chinese procurators at the same time. On one hand, the average time procurators spend per case
has significantly decreased, and that does prove that Plea Leniency is beneficial for judicial
efficiency. On the other hand, the situation procurators are facing is getting more and more
complicated. As it is now both the procedural and substantive core of Chinese criminal
170

Supra note 162, 168, Part IV and Part X of Guiding Opinions.
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procedure, procurators have to execute multiple functions and shoulder new responsibilities.
Sometimes, responsibilities may turn into liabilities—new potential risks are emerging from the
water.
For example, Chinese procurators’ functional transformation has turned procurators’
relationship with defendants from a mainly opposing mode into a new mode that contains much
more cooperation. Defendants’ much more active involvement, prompt pleading, and much
better compensation to victims reflects the benefits that such a functional transformation has
brought to Chinese procurators and Chinese criminal justice.
But if we only focus on Chinese criminal procedure itself, the new and biggest role that Plea
Leniency demands Chinese procurators to play is the role of sentencing measuring, which has
been taken over mostly from Chinese judges. Or, we can say, the procurators’ authority of
sentencing recommendation has been magnified to its maximum, such that this authority has
become the core power to determine final penalties, despite Chinese criminal judges still
maintain the authority of approving sentencing recommendations.
It is definitely not the case that Chinese procurators were not taking part in sentencing
measuring in the past. In the traditional mode of Chinese criminal procedure, procurators always
had to submit procuration recommendations to courts. However, in Plea Leniency, procurators
are now being pushed to submit specific sentencing recommendations (or range
recommendations that inhabit as narrow a range as possible), and they have to include legal
explanations in the indictments. Traditional criminal procedure only requires a procuration
recommendation that is similar to range sentencing recommendations in Plea Leniency, to
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provide judge(s) a penalty area in which he (they) can execute legal discretion.
Therefore, we can say that except for the fundamental plea negotiation duty of Plea
Leniency, the ability to measure penalty is the greatest responsibility that this policy adds for
Chinese procurators. They need to calculate precisely and submit sentencing recommendations
with sufficient legal explanation. This new responsibility immediately raised procurators’
working precision.171
In reality, the general situation of Chinese criminal justice is that procurators were operating
under high intensity. The burden brought forth by criminal offenses was heavier than the
capability of procurators (and police) at the current scale. Plea Leniency’s introduction has
considerably relieved the pressure, but procurators are still facing pressure to an extent. This is
one of the reasons why the Supreme People’s Court has noticed that some procurators are overpursuing the side of efficiency in plea bargaining processes instead of ensuring cases’ overall
quality.172
(One truth is that no matter what mode of criminal justice is being operated, sufficient
budgets and more manpower never go wrong.)
B. Penalty Measuring
Not only does Plea Leniency shift the authority of penalty measuring onto Chinese
procurators, it also has an impact on the methods of penalty measuring, as reflected in Part II of

It seems like American plea bargaining does not have that strong requirement for prosecutors’ sentencing
recommendations to be precise.
172
Supra note 158, Part I of Guiding Opinions.
171
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Guiding Opinions.173
The procurators’ new authority of penalty measuring is not as simple as that: procurators are
required to submit more detailed sentencing recommendations in Plea Leniency. Penalty
measuring (conviction suggestions, in the traditional mode) is no longer only subject to
procurators’ one-sided authority. In Plea Leniency, the process of penalty measuring contains a
new part, where procurators have to negotiate with defense lawyers who are representing those
defendants willing to plea. Sentencing recommendations in Plea Leniency are a product of two
parties—procurators with defendants and their attorneys’ consensus.
This new method of penalty measuring can be also considered a symbol representing
Chinese criminal justice’s improvement in ensuring defendants’ rights by advancing lawyers’
function in Plea Leniency. We can also use the American constitutional right of “effective
assistance of counsel” as a reference, which emphasizes the right of defendants the Supreme
People’s Procuratorate is trying to ensure and improve.174
In the traditional mode, Chinese defense lawyers have relatively limited access to case
materials, and they are not able to discuss things with procurators before trial. Additionally,
lawyers can only strive for defendants to receive lesser punishments during court debates. In
other words, the point at which defense lawyers are finally able to take part in penalty measuring
is the trial stage. This has made defense lawyers significantly passive in traditional criminal
173

Supra note 159 and 165, Part II and Part VII of Guiding Opinions.
Sixth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.”
174
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procedure, as procuration opinions were already formed and submitted, and these opinions are
not frequently overturned by judges. Therefore, the effects that lawyers had been able to
contribute to the traditional mode of criminal procedure were relatively limited.
Plea Leniency’s introduction is improving the situation above. I conclude that the Supreme
People’s Procuratorate mainly requests Chinese procurators to realize three points:
understanding defense lawyers’ importance in Plea Leniency; sufficiently negotiating and
cooperating with lawyers during Plea Leniency processes;175 and (for local procuratorates)
broaden the scale of duty lawyers and legal aid lawyers.176
For defendants and their attorneys, Plea Leniency is offering defense lawyers a much earlier
point at which to join the process of penalty measuring, which is the most important measure to
improve the right to effective assistance. Professional opinions can be heard in a promptly
manner. Meanwhile, as sentencing recommendations will be formed based on both parties’
(procurators and defendants with their attorneys) consensus, the penalty measuring will be much
more understandable and acceptable to defendants. Also, these submitted sentencing
recommendations will be more likely to get approved by judges, as there will be much fewer
dissenting opinions from defendants and defense lawyers in court.
More than above, the more cooperative relationship between procurators and defendants
(with their attorneys) helps defendants become more willing to plea, compensate and return to
the society, which better realizes criminal law’s function of educating defendants and improving
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social harmony.
We can easily see that procuratorates’ effort on improving defendants’ position in Plea
Leniency, through providing defense lawyers who take part in the process of plea negotiation
and penalty measuring in a timely manner. However, such improvement also brings a problem in
Plea Leniency’s penalty measuring as well. In Part II of Guiding Opinions, the original Chinese
expression is conservative and complicated, but if we summarize it briefly with nothing
obscured, SPP was actually pointing out that procurators are being over-lenient on penalty
reduction in a part of Plea Leniency cases.177
We should not blame this situation of over-leniency entirely on Chinese procurators. After
all, Plea Leniency only has three years of formal application and procurators are still trying to
find the balancing point between substantive justice and interest swap. Considering that Plea
Leniency has brought new penalty measuring authority and a new factor (pleading +
compensation) additional to current criminal law, a criminal law revision that specifically
regulates Plea Leniency’s penalty discount calculation methods, or new sentencing guidelines
that have a similar function, appears to be necessary.178
In the next chapter, I devote one subsection to discussing pleading procedure’s appropriate
position in criminal justice. One of the most important facts is that in contrast to American plea
bargaining, China does not position Plea Leniency as an individual procedure of criminal justice,
but as a sub-procedure that procurators have the authority to choose to apply, during which they
177

Supra note 159,163. Part II mentioned the situation of over-lenient penalty reduction. Part VII raised the idea to
reduce the discretion on Chinese procurators’ penalty discount recommendation under Plea Leniency procedure.
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For a detailed discussion see Chapter VII.
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still have to follow parts of traditional, basic rules that the current Criminal Procedure Law of
China requires (the reasons will be explained in that subsection). Based on the fact that China
does not want to position Plea Leniency as something extremely important—just like American
plea bargaining, especially on the aspect of China’s criminal law179—a targeted guiding opinions
of sentencing (Chinese expression, equal to sentencing guidelines) for procurators is more likely
to be formulated in the near future, rather than a criminal law supplement.
C. Defense Lawyers
It is quite easy for us to find out that Chinese procurators are increasing their authority and
responsibilities, at the same time, since the 2018 Criminal Procedure Law revision. However,
those Chinese procurators are now making room for a new demographic—Chinese criminal
defense lawyers.
As mentioned before, the 2018 revision of Criminal Procedure Law of China re-regulated
and advanced defense lawyers’ timing of involvement (Article 36).180 More than this general
revision, Article 173 and Article 174 specifically regulated defense lawyers’ specific functions in
Plea Leniency.181 These three article changes reflect one thing, that criminal defense lawyers are
being more seriously treated nowadays in China’s criminal justice system.
Actually, I contend that the work modes of Chinese criminal defense lawyers are moving
closer to American defense lawyers’ modes: getting involved quite early, discussing with
defendants, talking to procurators/prosecutors, and assisting/representing defendants in reaching
After all, pleading procedures conflict with some of Civil Law systems’ basic criminal law principles, which are
unchangeable.
180
Supra note 70.
181
Supra note 71, 77.
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plea agreements. Despite that the difference between legal assisting and representing is still
significant, defense lawyers in China and the US are working in more similar ways.
The good side of such a change in China is that defendants and their attorneys are gaining
procedural capabilities in Chinese criminal procedure, a situation that is significantly better than
before. With earlier involvement and easier access to case materials, defense lawyers are “finally”
able to arm wrestle with procurators to a certain extent, instead of simply passively “defending,”
just like center backs on soccer fields.
I still contend that procurators in Chinese criminal justice are standing in a beneficial
position because the 2018 Criminal Procedure Law revision not only enhanced defense lawyers’
procedural capabilities, but it strengthened procurators’ authority as well (Chinese criminal
judges are the group that has lost the largest territory in Chinese criminal justice after the 2018
revision); also, there is still no legal allowance for criminal defense lawyers to selfinvestigate.182 However, defense lawyers in China are indeed better treated in criminal procedure
than before (2018).
Such improvement on defense lawyers’ procedural capabilities actually benefits defendants
as result, because defendants’ legal rights and interests are better ensured. At the same time,
defense lawyers themselves are taking profits as well. Plea Leniency has brought much faster
case turnover rates into Chinese criminal justice, which means that, if defense lawyers are hired
by defendants (not for duty lawyers), they can take part in many more cases than before—and
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earn much better income.183
However, there also exists a downside of such a transformation that Chinese criminal justice
needs to keep in mind. In some plea bargaining cases (in the US), defense lawyers turn to focus
more on finishing cases (reaching plea agreements) promptly instead of ensuring defendants’
actual legal rights and interests. Such a problem could happen in Chinese Plea Leniency as well.
In my opinion, this properly reflects the importance of the American constitutional right to
effective legal assistance,184 and the importance of examining each case’s factual basis in court.
Another issue worth focusing on is the inner proportion of criminal defense lawyers. In the
simplest way, we can divide defense lawyers into two groups: firm lawyers (hired by defendants)
and assigned lawyers (duty lawyers, public defenders). In China, not only are firm lawyers
spontaneously passionate about taking part in Plea Leniency cases, China’s duty lawyer system’s
imperfection is another reason, because it gives firm lawyers quite a large stake in the criminal
defense market.
The “October Report”185 also indicated that 55% of Chinese base people’s procuratorates
have established Duty Lawyer Offices. However, taking into account that not all defendants in
China are willing to choose duty lawyers instead of firm lawyers, the actual proportion of
criminal cases that duty lawyers work should be even lower.
Generally, in China, better trained, highly experienced lawyers are joining law firms rather

When I was working together with Shanghai X District People’s Procuratorate on my empirical research, an
anonymous (required) procurator told that he can feel that those defense lawyers who are working in firms are quite
passionate about taking part in plea leniency cases nowadays.
184
Supra note 174.
185
Supra note 141.
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than duty lawyer offices to make better profits. Actually, those duty lawyer offices in
procuratorates do not always hire full-time duty lawyers, but they choose to assign defense
lawyers from cooperating local law firms. Overall, full-time duty lawyers are much lesser paid.
Also, defendants in China may question duty lawyers’ standings, for duty lawyers are
always assigned by procuratorates. Those defendants who have financial problems have no other
options rather than accept duty lawyers’ legal assistance, because they are not able to afford
hiring firm lawyers. However, a large group of defendants in China, especially those defendants
living in cities, can afford to hire firm lawyers, because those defendants may have trust issues
with duty lawyers.
Therefore, for these two main reasons, duty lawyers in China are not occupying as large a
proportion as public defenders in America. If we take Chinese procurators’ point of view, raising
the proportion of duty lawyers (among all criminal defense lawyers) is beneficial to them: they
result in relatively lesser overall judicial spending and duty lawyers are more willing to reach
plea agreements promptly. That is why the Supreme People’s Procuratorate is devoting itself to
broadening the network of duty lawyers in China.
Generally speaking, despite some detailed differences—for example, the different
proportion between duty lawyers (public defenders) and firm lawyers, as well as different
working modes among defense lawyers—we can still say that the relationship between
procurators and criminal defense lawyers in China is becoming more similar to the same
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relationship in the US.186
D. Victims
As introduced, Plea Leniency’s main factors to consider in evaluating penalty discounts
contain two parts: 认罪(pleading) and 认罚(punishment acceptance). The legislation of
punishment acceptance has raised the factor of defendants’ compensation to the highest ever
level of importance in Chinese criminal procedure.
This importance requires procurators to devote themselves much more to ensuring victims’
reasonable interests in Plea Leniency, compared to traditional Chinese criminal procedure, so
they can verify that the issue of defendants’ compensation does not fundamentally affect final
sentence and procurators will not be blamed too much if they do not sufficiently respect victims’
rights and interests. In fact, Part III of Guiding Opinions emphasizes the importance of
defendants’ compensation and victims’ forgiveness in Plea Leniency.187
As will be mentioned in Chapter VI, the US is ahead on legally regulating defendants’ rights
in plea bargaining. On the level of federal cases, acts such as the CVRA188 and VRRA189 define
and ensure defendants’ legal rights. Since the legal regulation of Plea Leniency on victims’
rights still leaves blank space (only existing in guidelines so far), these American special acts are
valuable for the Supreme Procuratorate as references. Meanwhile, multiple plea bargaining cases
have also happened in the US in which prosecutors ignored/violated victims’ legal rights, and it
Professor Joseph L. Hoffmann: “In the U.S., many criminal defense lawyers, maybe most we may say, are not
paid by the case. For example, most public defenders get a regular salary and are not paid by the case. However,
even in such situations, it is true that public defenders don’t want to waste their time researching and litigating a
case if the defendant is only going to accept a plea bargain and plead guilty anyway.”
187
Supra note 161, Part III.
188
Crime Victims’ Right Act (CVRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3771.
189
Victims’ Rights and Restitution Act (VRRA), 34 U.S.C.§20141.
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is worthwhile for Chinese procurators to pay attention to these cases.
Despite that the Supreme People’s Procuratorate is continuing to emphasize victims’
importance in Plea Leniency, especially the issue of defendants’ compensation to victims, as one
of two main factors of Plea Leniency’s penalty measuring, I must point out that over-considering
compensation appears undesirable as well. If the factor of finance (mainly meaning
compensation) plays an over-important role in penalty measuring, especially in pleading
procedure—which is “marketized”—an inevitable outcome will be that rich defendants gain
much more benefits than poor defendants, for victims usually give much more positive feedback
to procurators/prosecutors when sufficiently compensated. Victims’ opinions will strongly favor
rich defendants, ignoring the malice in the offenses.
This potential circumstance, over-evaluation of defendants’ compensation, will lead Chinese
criminal justice to focus on how much defendants compensate, but reduce the consideration of
defendants’ individual malice and individual characteristics of each individual offense, at the
same time. As Chinese Plea Leniency is already evaluating the issue of compensation at (almost)
the highest position among pleading systems worldwide, such a circumstance as described
above is a threat to substantive justice, so it is worthwhile for the Supreme Procuratorate to take
precautions. To limit the factor of defendants’ compensation proportions in the regulation of Plea
Leniency’s penalty measuring will be a beneficial precaution.190
E. Judicial Corruption
Not only do we need to be relatively prudent to the influence that the factor of compensation
190

The discussion of penalty measuring, see Chapter VII.
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(finance) potentially brings to Plea Leniency, but we need to note other types of interests that are
involved in pleading procedures as well. As the concept of “interest swap” exists strongly in
pleading procedures, it needs to be noted that procurators trade penalty discounts (substantive
justice) for other interests.
There are American cases for reference. In several plea bargaining cases in which
prosecutors violated victims/defendants’ rights, prosecutors chose to ignore/violate certain legal
rights for advancing their plea negotiation progress. Some of their final purposes are the same, to
win individual cases by reaching plea agreements, improving their overall win rates and
reputations—to strive for their continued professional development.
If we summarize all prosecutors/procurators’ behaviors that contain “illegally trading justice
for other types of interests” as generalized judicial corruption, the main characteristics of
American and Chinese prosecutors/procurators’ judicial corruption are different. Despite that
there exists no case for research so far that relates to Chinese procurators’ judicial corruption
during Plea Leniency processes,191 still, based on previous research on wrong convictions and
exoneration in China, it is still a way to draw predictions.
Cases’ “win rates” are not a main factor in Chinese procurators’ judicial corruption and
wrong convictions. The main factor in China is “pressure” that comes from influential sources,
including rich defendants, local/nationwide wealthy corporations, local government offices,
upper-level courts/procuratorates, etc. These units necessarily have interest connections with
On one hand, it is still a short period for plea leniency’s development; on the other hand, it needs more time for
procuratorates to reveal, correct and publicize those wrong convictions/sentences in which judicial corruption
occurred.
191
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those cases, defendants and victims. Such “pressure” or “influence,” as we say, will still
inevitably apply in some Plea Leniency cases.
It will get more complicated if we discuss deeply the reasons causing judicial corruption and
wrong convictions, which will be a whole new research study. However, from the angle of
problem solving, it is extremely necessary to take precautions against different interests’
negative effects in Plea Leniency.192
F. Summary
Similar to American prosecutors in 1970s and 1980s, Chinese procurators are working hard
nowadays to adapt the significant effect that Plea Leniency has brought to Chinese criminal
justice. However, unlike American plea bargaining, which required decades for prosecutors to
feel basically comfortable in applying it, the popularization speed of Plea Leniency in China is
unbelievably quick, such that Chinese procurators are facing multiple types of difficulties on
adapting the drastic change that Plea Leniency has brought to Chinese criminal justice. Despite
these difficulties, procurators still have to adapt to such a profound transformation with no other
option.
There are several aspects to consider in briefly summarizing what is new to Chinese
procurators in applying Plea Leniency.
First and the most important, Chinese procurators are in a dominant position in Plea
Leniency’s process of penalty measuring. This not only reflects the functional transformation of
penalty measuring authority, but also demands Chinese procurators to provide better capabilities
192
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in criminal law, for they are required to submit more detailed, specified, well-explained
sentencing recommendations to people’s courts.
Second, Plea Leniency has forged new types of relationships—between procurators and
defendants, and also between procurators and defense lawyers. To better ensure that lawyers
provide effective assistance for defendants, procurators have lots of work ahead, including
improving the quality of plea negotiation, enlarging the scale of duty lawyers and legal aid
lawyers, etc. Meanwhile, as victims’ compensation and defendants’ compensation (to victims)
are considered one of two main factors to determine defendants’ penalty reduction in Plea
Leniency, Chinese procurators have to regard victims as a more important part, which demands
procurators to devote much more energy to it.
Finally, several problems have already been exposed through these three years of practice.
Besides some of those issues that have been mentioned, such as lawyers’ sufficiency, procurators’
adaptation to new modes, etc., two problems are most crucial, in my view: procurators’ overleniency on penalty measuring and the potential threat of procurators’ judicial corruption, or
legal right violation.
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Chapter V Comparative Research – Defendants in Pleading Procedures

5.1 Introduction
The most important relationship in criminal procedure, especially in pleading procedures
which judges’ influence has been weakened, is apparently the relationship between prosecutors
(procurators) and defendants. As judges’ authorities have been weakened, the process of finding
a “factual basis” has been weakened in pleading procedures as well, compared to regular
criminal procedure. Thus, in some pleading conditions, defendants’ legal rights and interests
face serious threats, including ineffective assistance of counsel, free will violation, not having
the right to appeal, etc.
We can ask several questions about what pleading procedures have brought for defendants,
especially those defendants that are actually innocent, or whose original desire was not to plead.
For example, is plea bargaining (Plea Leniency) truly forcing some innocent, not guilty
defendants to plea? If this is a real circumstance, how do we prove it, and how do we prevent
that from happening?
On the other hand, some guilty defendants are receiving much lower penalties after pleading
procedures than what they deserve through regular court trials. Is there a mechanism that
effectively prevents this situation from occurring?
In my opinion, three main factors can effectively support defendants’ legal rights and
interests in pleading procedures: free will protection, effective assistance of counsel, and a
usable right to appeal.
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Previously, we have discussed the difference between Chinese and American criminal
defense lawyers—how Chinese defense lawyers operate under Plea Leniency.193 It is also being
stated that Chinese Plea Leniency (almost) does not ban defendants from appealing—in
American plea bargaining, a defendant is quite likely to give up his/her right of appeal if a plea
agreement has been reached. The legal conditions of appealing after pleading in American plea
bargaining are quite limited.194 When we talk about defendants’ free will protection in plea
bargaining, the main purpose is to protect innocent defendants from being forced/pressured to
reach plea agreements. Also, we shall guarantee that guilty defendants can reach appropriate
plea agreements with prosecutors and clearly recognize what they are doing.
This chapter’s further discussion will center on these three factors.

5.2 Defendants’ Mindsets
American scholars and judicial professionals have debated whether plea bargaining brings
more justice to defendants than normal trials.
Supporters have claimed that plea bargaining better applies “individualized” justice, better
distributes judicial resources, and better coordinates the relationship between public authority
and defendants— “a well-functioning market system,” as described by Judge Frank H.
Easterbrook.195 Also, in Frye case’s (most recent) debate in 2012, there were strong voices
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supporting that plea bargaining is relatively righteous and appropriate for the United States’
criminal justice.196
Dissenting opinions have said that plea bargaining creates a huge differential in sentencing
between plea bargaining and regular trials. This situation is (psychologically) forcing defendants
to give up their rights to apply for a jury trial. Furthermore, this damages the trust between
defendants and their attorneys, since more attorneys are encouraging defendants to plead. That
also negatively affects the credibility of criminal procedure.197 We can also refer to the Frye
case’s dissenting opinions, in which Judge Scalia raised strong questions about plea
bargaining.198
We may say that the most objective standard to determine whether plea bargaining brings
more substantive justice than jury trial is this: do fewer suspects escape from punishment? Are
innocent defendants less likely to be wrongfully accused?199
A core factor that influences defendants’ mindsets in pleading procedures is the additional
penalty discount that pleading procedures offer over regular criminal procedures. We can also
describe this as a “sentencing differential,” or “trial penalty.” Because of those most criminal
cases in the US (in China as well nowadays) are applying plea bargaining/Plea Leniency, and
defendants are actually regarding plea bargaining’s penalty reduction as normal, while taking
regular trials may result in harsher sentences—a “trial penalty.”
196
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A 2018 formal report by the NACDL (National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers),
has provided numbers that supports this viewpoint: plea bargaining is influencing innocent
defendants to plead, and the proportion (among all defendants) is not so minimal that we cannot
consider that to be an “error rate.”200 The report shows that “Of the 354 individuals exonerated
by DNA analysis, 11% had pled guilty to crimes they did not commit, and the National Registry
of Exonerations has identified 359 exonerees who pled guilty.”201
Wrong conviction(s) is a strong blow to criminal justice, even if parts of defendants are
exonerated later. More than that, a lot of wrong convictions cannot be detected promptly. It takes
a long time to thoroughly examine all the materials of a wrongly convicted case and overturn the
previous verdict after a new court trial. Just as in the United States, exoneration in China is a
difficult task. Wrong convictions are difficult to identify and exonerate promptly, because it is
hard for investigators to discover new evidence soon after verdicts, that can overturn judges’
decisions. Also, in China lawyers have no right to self-investigate, which was also mentioned in
the first chapter.
And we cannot ignore the high-pressure criminal justice policies’ effect on Chinese criminal
procedure in the past. Such pressure on innocent defendants has forced some of them to plead
wrongfully.202 Nowadays Chinese scholars and judicial professionals are admitting that Chinese
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policemen have been using violence to force defendants to plead. “Freezing, hunger, tan, [and]
burn” were included but tactics were not limited to these. Certainly, we all believe that major
criminal defendants are guilty. But innocent defendants do exist who have pleaded and been
punished.203
So, are conditions changing for defendants in China under Plea Leniency?
I propose separating defendants in China into four categories, to compare the change in their
mindsets and potential penalties that Plea Leniency has brought: Category I, not guilty in reality,
and refusing to plead (apply court trial); Category II, not guilty but potentially forced/pressured
to plead;204 Category III, guilty but reluctant to plead;205 and Category IV, guilty and willing to
plead.
I am leaving Category II aside to briefly analyze the remaining three categories. For
Category I, these defendants have faith in their innocence. If they refuse to plead in traditional
criminal procedure, they will refuse Plea Leniency as well. As China has been abandoning the
high-pressure criminal policies in the past decades, just like the phrase “plea for leniency, resist
for harshness,”206 a reluctance to plead no longer reliably results in a harsher sentence. This
means that in current Chinese criminal procedure, innocent defendants that refuse to plead,
receive equal or even lesser penalties than in previous periods.
However, I do not consider this circumstance a benefit that Plea Leniency brings to innocent
203
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defendants in China. This fact of the lesser penalty is an outcome of Chinese criminal justice
reform, just like the advent of Plea Leniency.
Category III includes those defendants that are habitual offenders, or defendants carrying
fluke minds.207 This also institutes one of the main arguments against Plea Leniency (also plea
bargaining), that these suspects are not receiving their deserved punishments.
Chinese Plea Leniency has only existed for five years since the start of its tryout stage in
2016. Thus, not many habitual offenders have had the chance to consistently earn a penalty
discount by rapidly pleading.208
However, for those fluke-minded defendants, Plea Leniency provides them a wider stage on
which to perform, and it leaves the system without sanction methods, unless judges or
procurators have discovered new crucial evidence/clues that overturn these cases. But this is not
common in pleading procedures. The wide application of Plea Leniency requires procurators to
adopt a passive mode of receiving evidence. This means procurators are spending more time on
reaching agreements, that on the evidential side they can only focus on those evidence related to
factual basis (in their subjective perspectives).
Therefore, generally speaking, the setup of Plea Leniency benefits Category III defendants
in reality.
The situation of Category IV is obvious: defendants in this category are quite positive and
willing to gain reduced penalties through Plea Leniency.
This “fluke minds” means that defendants are expecting to gain punishments less severe than what they deserve
according to the law.
208
For the discussion of experienced defendants in plea leniency, see Subsection B of Section 2, Chapter 1.
207

105

A large number of Category IV defendants are minor offending defendants, whose typical
crime categories include (but are not limited to) theft, drunk driving, public order nuisance, and
minor intentional injury.209 These defendants are usually caught immediately after the offense or
during the offending process. The evidence is usually sufficient, including video surveillance,
victims/witnesses’ testimony, dash camera videos, alcohol test results, bloodstains/fresh
scars/medical reports, etc. The chains of evidence are usually clear, so much less room is
available for these defendants to argue. If they apply Plea Leniency, they receive lesser
punishments without effort. Why not?
For those crimes with accomplices or organized crimes, American (in the federal system,
and in many of the states) prosecutors offer more generous conditions to encourage defendants
to provide information about other crimes and other criminals— “substantial assistance.”210,211
Actually, substantial assistance is similar to a legal condition of the penalty discount in
Criminal Law of China - “Meritorious Service.”212 Substantial assistance and Meritorious
Service are quite similar in that they all push guilty defendants to contribute more information
for procurators/prosecutors as a trade for more leniency.
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The significant thing is that Chinese and American professionals have different attitudes.
When I was in the United States doing the American portion of my research, I discovered that
some scholars are critical of substantial assistance discounts in plea bargaining. This is because
substantial assistance encourages defendants to betray or sell out their accomplices or partners,
and it also may push defendants into the “Prisoner’s Dilemma.” The one who first “sells out”
his/her accomplice usually receives the most generous penalty discount. This, of course, seems
unjust. Nevertheless, prosecutors gain a huge advantage from substantial assistance discounts,
and routinely use this prosecutorial leverage to force information from defendants.213
However, in China, possibly because Chinese criminal justice professionals are already used
to the inquisitional system, there does not exist very hard feelings about “Meritorious Service,”
and actually, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate emphasized that procurators should encourage
defendants to provide information.214 In Chinese criminal justice’s way of thinking, public
interest is the greatest substantive justice to be ensured, and individual relationships come
secondarily.
I personally do not think there is any superior or inferior approach, but this difference
properly reflects the diversity of legislation thoughts between adversarial and inquisitional
criminal justice.
In China, Plea Leniency is mostly for misdemeanors that are eligible to receive summary or
Supra note 200, at 42: “Prosecutors are incentivized to be extremely lenient with cooperators because the
information cooperators provide allows the government to secure more convictions with fewer resources. And,
although prosecutors merely make recommendations at sentencing, judges are generally inclined to accept their
recommendations because they believe the prosecutors are in the best position to quantify the signiﬁcance of the
cooperators’ assistance. Where prosecutors are authorized to cut defendants’ sentences by half — or more — there
is a powerful inducement for defendants to plead guilty.”
214
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expedited trials. There are also non-misdemeanor defendants (potentially facing more than 3
years of imprisonment) that are willing to plead, and some of them are eligible for a summary
trial.215 It is quite apparent that if they match the conditions to apply for Plea Leniency, they are
predicting a lower penalty compared to applying a traditional court trial. For these nonmisdemeanor defendants, no matter whether their motivation of pleading is repentance or acting
under a solid chain of evidence, they will receive lesser punishments as readily as misdemeanor
defendants.
But most times, Chinese procurators are responsible to collect evidence to establish a
“factual basis.” For non-misdemeanor crimes, procurators also need to prepare for a potential
regular court trial, because in some cases, those crimes have relatively large social influences or
are being considered inappropriate for Plea Leniency.
Here we need to notice a special kind of defendant, the defendant who refuses to admit any
factual guilt; however, they may still choose to plead to avoid the risk of a trial conviction.216 Is
this tricky situation, “avoiding the greater risk,” a kind of pressure for these defendants’ free will?
In my opinion, in most situations, the Alford plea represents a kind of pressure that forces
innocent defendant to plead. This is because, if we put these “Alford” defendants into a criminal

215
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justice system in which a regular court trial is the only procedural option and no plea bargaining
or penalty discount is available, these defendants are very likely to be reluctant to plead.
The only exception will be that, if a substantively guilty defendant truly believes that he is
able to “survive” through a court trial, he will choose not to plead if there is no plea bargaining
available. Therefore, he may take the Alford plea, in which he legally pleads guilty but refuses to
admit factual guilt. In this situation, this defendant is taking advantage of plea bargaining. It is a
win-win situation for both defendants and prosecutors, but a blow to substantive justice.

5.3 The Innocent Defendant’s Dilemma
Category II denotes the most complicated situation and advances the discussion.217
As we already have the term “Prisoner’s Dilemma,”218 we can name it the “Innocent
Defendant’s Dilemma” to describe this situation: if an innocent defendant has pleaded through
plea bargaining, he/she will receive a sentence of (e.g.) 3 years in jail; if he refuses to plead,
there exists (e.g.) an 80% opportunity to be judged not guilty; and he has another 20%
opportunity to be sentenced (e.g.) 10 years in prison.219 This could be a strong test of innocent
defendants’ mindsets. That “Alford plea” mentioned previously represents one of the most
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extreme conditions.220
The NACDL report proved that 11% of exonerated innocent defendants had wrongfully
pled.221 The report provided another pair of numbers showing that “Anywhere from 1.6% to 27%
of defendants who plead guilty may be factually innocent.”222 Not only calculating numbers
using empirical research, American criminal justice scholars have also been trying to figure out
the “Innocent Defendant’s Dilemma’s” real influence in theory.
One of the earliest systematic research studies was conducted by Prof. Larry Gregory, Prof.
John C. Mowen and Prof. Darwyn Linder in 1978.223 Students assumed themselves innocent or
guilty and tried to make a choice between whether to plead or not, facing disadvantageous
evidence. This research supported the opinion, that “assumed innocent” students are far less
willing to plead than “assumed guilty” students.224
However, Prof. Lucian E. Dervan and Prof. Vanessa A. Edkins pointed out the weakest point
of this experiment. This research placed innocent experiment participants into a situation where
their guilt was assumed, but participants all knew that they were innocent in reality. This cannot
replace the mindsets of defendants facing real court trials.225
Prof. Samuel Gross published another remarkable research study relevant to the “Innocent
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Defendant’s Dilemma” in 2005.226 His research on exoneration in America reflected that 20
innocent defendants applied plea bargaining to plead, among all 340 exoneration cases that he
researched.227 Despite that this research could not analyze the proportion and tendency of
innocent defendants’ willingness to plead more precisely, Prof. Gross proved that there are
innocent defendants who are forced/pressured to plead, at least.
Dervan and Edkins pointed out the weakness in Prof. Gross’ research as well as Prof.
Gregory’s.228 The range of “exoneration cases” is actually narrower than the scope of wrong
convictions that includes unjust plea agreements, which means there is potentially a bigger
percentage of wrongful pleas among all pleas.229
However, proving the idea that innocent defendants have been coerced to plead was already
a huge step forward, because a number of people have argued that very few innocent defendants
have wrongfully pleaded in plea bargaining. They think that innocent defendants are not going
to submit false pleas for an offense he/she has never committed. Some scholars have claimed
that innocent defendants can expect a positive result out of a court trial, and that pushes innocent
defendants to refuse plea bargaining, usually.230 The Supreme Court carried a similar attitude in
the famous Brady case as well.231 Therefore, we can say Prof. Gross’ research strongly refutes

226

See Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through 2003. 95 JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL
LAW AND CRIMINOLOGY 523 (2005).
227
15 of them were defendants in murder cases, 4 were accused of rape, and 1 was accused illegal weapons
possession (habitual).
228
Supra note 217, Chinese translated version at 97.
229
Supra note 217, see also Kenneth S. Bordens, The Effects of Likelihood of Conviction, Threatened Punishment,
and Assumed Role on Mock Plea Bargaining Decisions, 5 BASIC AND APPLIED SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 59. 63-65
(1984).
230
Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW 1117, 1165 (2008).
231
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
111

the opinions above from the empirical aspect, showing that we cannot ignore the number of
those defendants who are innocent but still pleaded guilty.
In the same year, 2005, Prof. Melissa Russano, Prof. Christian Meissner, Prof. Fadia
Narchet and Prof. Saul Kassin conducted another research study,232 which also inspired Dervan
and Edkins to start their research in 2011.233
Dervan & Edkins’ experiment had 82 students as participants. These participants were
divided into two groups. In the “guilty” group, lab staff members sitting next to them were
trying to push participants to violate the rule of a test, while lab staff members sitting with the
“innocent” group participants remained silent during the test.
After the test was finished, the research assistant announced that some students had shared
same answers to certain questions, and the probability that this situation would have happened
was less than 4%. The chief professor was suspicious about this situation.234
For the half of experiment participants being divided into the group of “harsh
punishment,”235 the research assistant told them that if they did not agree to apply a kind of
“academic plea bargaining,” they might be judged guilty of academic misconduct, after a “court
trial” containing 10 to 12 administrative staff members/teachers. If students were judged “guilty,”
they would have to face relatively severe penalties. The research assistant also told them that
based on past records, 80% to 90% of them may have been considered guilty of academic
232
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misconduct.
For the other half participants, called the “leniency group,” the research assistant gave them
information similar to that given to the first group. But the difference was that this group of
students were offered lighter potential penalties.236
The result was that for the “guilty group,” 4 people refused “academic plea bargaining and
33 people accepted; for the “innocent group,” 17 people refused “academic plea bargaining” and
22 people accepted.237 In this experiment, 56.4% of innocent participants applied “academic plea
bargaining.” Another research study conducted by Prof. Russell Covey provided an even higher
percentage, 77%.238
To be prudent, I adopt the lower number of 56.4% as the reflection of criminal justice—the
percentage of innocent defendants that wrongfully pleaded. The number 56.4% indicates that
roughly 4 of every 7 innocent defendants finally applied plea bargaining, or we can say, if an
innocent person was detained and facing potential criminal punishment, he has a more than 50%
chance to wrongfully plea under pressure.239
I contend that this number closely reflects the situation of plea bargaining in reality, that
innocent defendants have pleaded under pressure. If we assume this experiment’s mechanism
was the closest emulation of real plea bargaining among experiments conducted to date, one
issue still remains unaddressed in the experiment compared to reality. A normal person will
236
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usually consider a criminal offense much more severe than academic misconduct, which is noncriminal. Thus, some innocent defendants may fear a harsher penalty, so they feel pressure to
plead. That means the percentage could be even higher than 56.4% in real plea bargaining.
Dervan and Edkins also named another typical case of the “dilemmas.” In the case of
Fastow,240 the potential penalty after a jury trial for Lea W. Fastow could have been 10 years in
prison,241 “charging her with conspiracy to commit wire fraud and defraud the United States,
money laundering conspiracy, and four counts of filing a false income tax return.”242 The plea
bargaining offer’s recommended penalty was only 5 months, if Mrs. Fastow accepted the offer
to apply the pleading procedure. Considering that Mrs. Fastow had two young children, and her
husband (also involved in this case) would serve a long term in prison, Mrs. Fastow accepted
that offer to plead guilty.243 Professor Dervan’s doubt was whether Mrs. Fastow had really
committed any criminal behavior or she was actually innocent, but forced to plead because of
the great sentencing differential that plea bargaining offered (and also for the situation her
family faced).244
I do not want to judge if Mrs. Fastow was guilty in reality or not. But for the first possibility,
Mrs. Fastow was getting a 95% penalty discount, which was surprising to imagine in civil law
countries—that a more than 1/3 penalty discount may already be considered “overgenerous.”245
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Such an exaggerated sentencing differential (95%) reflects prosecutors’ less restricted conviction
discretion, and it also makes me suspicious about prosecutors’ motivations, which appeared
more likely to be a threat to the defendant, Mrs. Fastow. If we check Mr. Stephanos Bibas’
work,246 a 95% penalty discount might mean another thing, that prosecutors only had 5%
confidence that they could successfully convince the judge to sentence Mrs. Fastow to 10 years
in prison.247
If Mrs. Fastow was innocent and forced to plead, then this case is a typical example and
proof that proved plea bargaining is forcing innocent defendants to plead. If we proceed with
this assumption, we may conclude that the huge sentencing differential may be a main factor
that has forced innocent defendants to plead. If defendants have some other disadvantages
simultaneously (e. g. Mrs. Fastow’s young children), the opportunity for innocent defendants to
plead may even be magnified.
The violation of defendants’ free will does not only include the situation of innocent
defendants. Sometimes guilty defendants’ legal rights are violated as well. For guilty defendants,
the evaluation standard of “violation” is more subjective and harder to prove. If an innocent
defendant has pleaded, that is definitely a free will violation—no normal people will voluntarily
plead guilty if no external factors are involved. But for guilty defendants, it is harder, to a certain
extent, to prove that their free will has been violated.
Thus, we need to turn to the aspect of judicial remedy for defendants, mainly discussing two
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legal rights—the right to effective assistance of counsel and the right to appeal.248

5.4 Effective Assistance of Counsel
Defense lawyers may join together to improve the situation of free will violations, since
they can help defendants better understand their possibilities in criminal processes— “effective
assistance of counsel.”249 This brings us to the next step in our discussion, the need to find
methods to improve innocent defendants’ situation in plea bargaining (Plea Leniency), after it
was indirectly proven that innocent defendants may sometimes wrongfully plea in plea
bargaining/Plea Leniency.250
Ensuring defendants’ right to effective assistance of counsel will not only reduce the risk
that innocent defendants will wrongfully plea, but it will also ensure guilty defendants’ free will
in plea bargaining (Plea Leniency).
As we are discussing American “effective assistance of counsel” in plea bargaining, the
earliest “McMann Standard” in the 1970s—which helped to judge whether lawyers provided
appropriate assistance to defendants— focused on lawyers’ competence in plea bargaining cases,
but did not focus on whether lawyers’ faults substantially affected defendants’ pleading.251 In the
McMann case, one of the defendants that pleaded guilty previously appealed, saying that his
lawyer provided a wrong prediction that pushed him to plead guilty. Another defendant claimed
248

Supra note 174.
Chinese research on lawyers’ functions in American plea bargaining, see Qi Jianjian, The Right to Effective
Assistance of Counsel in U.S. Plea Bargaining, 6 JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW (China) 126 (2015).
250
The following discussion may also be relevant to substantially guilty defendants, because these improving
methods may improve their rights in plea bargaining (plea leniency), at the same time.
251
See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
249

116

that he was beaten during detainment, plus his lawyer provided ineffective assistance, and these
two factors had jointly forced him to plead.252
The McMann standard was formed in the Supreme Court’s decision for this case. Briefly
stated, the McMann standard meant that if a lawyer is reasonable and competent, in a plea
bargaining case, even if he made a wrong judgement that helped the defendant to make a wrong
decision to plead guilty, the lawyer should not be queried.
In that period (the 1970s, the very earliest stage of plea bargaining), the protections of
procedural rights were quite limited, and federal judges were not connecting effective assistance
of counsel with defendants’ free will in plea bargaining. Federal courts considered effective
assistance to be a reflection of lawyers’ competence, which split the issue of lawyers’ mistakes
from lawyers’ competence. That led to the “McMann Standard” not providing much help for
defendants needing to remedy their procedural rights.253
The newer standard came in the 1980s. In 1981, it was legally required that lawyers be
responsible to advise defendants whether to accept a plea bargain.254 In 1984, the standard of
“ineffective assistance of counsel” was established in the Strickland case. 255 The “Two-Part Test”
or “Strickland Test” standard, as this standard is called, contains two steps. Briefly stated, the
first step is that the defendant is able to prove that his lawyer’s assistance had defects and failed
to meet the profession’s objective standard; the second step is for the defendant to reasonably
252
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prove that the result of lawsuit may have changed if his lawyer had not failed to provide
effective assistance of counsel.
As defendants carrying this standard, they have opportunities to petition and overturn
wrongful plea agreements for the reason of lawyers’ fault. However, it is quite difficult for
defendants to complete these two steps, because evidence to prove that lawyers failed to
accomplish responsibilities is often lacking.256 If we take a look at the Hill case,257 we can see
that even when it is proven that a defense lawyer made an important mistake during the plea
bargaining process, the plea agreement still may not be overturned.
In the Hill case, the defendant William L. Hill appealed on the grounds that his lawyer failed
to inform him of the difference in parole release between first offense prisoners and second
offense prisoners (parole release is more restricted in Arkansas for second offenses, and Hill was
on his second offense). Hill claimed that his free will was affected because he failed to realize
the difference in penalty, which was his lawyer’s fault.
The East Arkansas District Court rejected Hill’s appeal. The reason was that parole release
is not a direct consequence of guilty plea bargaining. Defendants’ right to understand the
difference in parole release’s regulations is not protected by the constitution.258 Arkansas law did
not require lawyers to inform defendants about guilty pleading’s effect on parole release. The
Supreme Court supported this opinion.259
This case (the Hill case) was a typical example in that even the lawyer made a notable
256
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mistake—we cannot deny this mistake did affect the defendant’s mindset—but in reality, the
defendant might still fail to match the “Two-Part Test” standard to raise an effective appeal.
After two decades of practice, in 2010, the Supreme Court set higher requirements on
lawyers in the Padilla case, which indicated that American judges are turning from focusing
more on lawyers’ competence to focusing more on defendants’ rights and substantial interests.260
In the Padilla case, the Kentucky Appellate Court followed the “Two-Step Test” that
rejected Padilla’s appeal for a similar reason as in the Hill case. The only major difference was
that Hill’s lawyer did not inform Hill about parole release, and Padilla’s lawyer did not inform
Padilla about his crime’s consequence on the Immigration and Nationality Act.261 Principally
speaking, the Kentucky Court did nothing legally wrong.
However, the Supreme Court overturned this case in the final trial. To briefly summarize the
Supreme Court’s opinion, they contended that plea bargaining negotiation is a crucial part of
American criminal procedure. To ensure the defendant is informed of the consequence on the
Immigration and Nationality Act is executing the right of “effective assistance of counsel” under
the 6th Amendment.262
This opinion helps reduce defendants’ burden of proof if they consider that their lawyers
provided ineffective legal assistance. We can say that the Supreme Court helped secure
defendants’ free will in plea bargaining by reducing defendants’ burden of proof and increasing
the requirements of defense lawyers.
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The preceding discussion mainly analyzes the situation in which defendants wrongfully
pleaded guilty, even when some of them are innocent defendants and some of them are guilty,
but claimed that their lawyers’ fault pushed them to make wrong plea decisions. Another
category of situation is when defendants have missed or rejected prosecutors’ plea bargaining
offers due to defense lawyers’ mistakes.
In March 2012, the Supreme Court overturned the Frye case and the Cooper case for
retrial.263 In the Frye case, his lawyer did not inform him that prosecutors were offering a plea
bargaining opportunity, and that made Frye plead without any plea agreement (so he received a
harsher penalty). In the Cooper case, his lawyer told him that prosecutors were not likely to
prove Cooper’s intent to murder, so that made Cooper reject the plea agreement offer. Cooper
was judged guilty after a court trial.264
In these two cases, plea bargaining was actually beneficial to Frye and Cooper, based on the
aspect of the penalty (result). Briefly stated, the Supreme Court’s (majority of) judges’ ruling
standard was based on the “Two-Step Test,” but it gave additional consideration to the effect of
lawyers’ mistakes on defendants’ penalties.265 The basic mindsets for the Supreme Court to
overturn the Frye case, and the Cooper case are similar to the mindset that the Supreme Court
carried in the Padilla case.266
The “Two-Step Test” plus additional consideration on defendants’ legal rights and
substantial interests is the standard for American judges to value “effective assistance of counsel”
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in plea bargaining, which has been the case since the Padilla case in 2010. This standard is also
applicable in Chinese Plea Leniency. China’s recent working focus on “effective legal assistance”
in Plea Leniency is intended to broaden the scale of defense lawyers/duty lawyers, in turn, to
provide sufficient and effective legal assistance for defendants.
Here are some empirical results. Duty lawyer stations have been built in 55% of base
people’s procuratorates in China. In some municipalities/provinces, including Tianjin City,
Chungking City and Yunnan Province, 100% of their base procuratorates are covered by duty
lawyers.267
To fully utilize legal sources, some Chinese procuratorates are cooperating with local law
firms. Law firms can provide their defense lawyers for procuratorates to form a list of part-time
duty lawyers. When available, these defense lawyers take turns sitting in procuratorates’ duty
lawyer offices.
China’s practice is also helpful to consider regarding the issue of “effective assistance of
counsel,” to help defendants gain better legal assistance. This is because ensuring duty lawyers’
quantity, quality and payments is helpful for monitoring lawyers’ quality of legal assistance in
Plea Leniency. If procuratorates are short of defense lawyers, their working burdens are sure to
increase. As each lawyer is working on more cases, the time and professionalism that they can
spend on each case decreases. This reduces the quality of legal assistance or pushes lawyers to
pressure defendants to reach plea agreements, just like the problem of “ineffective assistance of
counsel” in the US.
267
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The legal education that lawyers have completed (quality) and the payments procuratorates
offer for duty lawyers correlate with the quality of legal assistance as well.
To summarize this part of the discussion—the method to help defendants in plea
bargaining/Plea Leniency to get effective legal assistance from lawyers—both Chinese and
American methods are useful benchmarks. The Chinese way is to improve lawyers’ quality of
legal assistance by constructing a larger team of duty lawyers. The American way is to keep
refining the courts’ standard of “effective assistance of counsel” that the 6th Amendment requires,
which helps defendants to remedy their rights or interests in court trials.

5.5 The Right to Appeal
Despite the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel, it is not very easy for plea
bargaining defendants to prove that they have had ineffective assistance. This constitutional right
is powerful, bur difficult to activate in court in reality. If the legal circumstance of “ineffective
assistance of counsel” does not stand, appealing is another, possibly the last, major way for
defendants to seek judicial remedy.
In fact, the United States has regulated several conditions for plea bargaining defendants to
appeal. Effective assistance of counsel and free will violation (voluntariness) are two of them.
The other four kinds of legal situations are a lack of factual basis of plea; any procedural issues
on which the defendant entered a “conditional” plea; any legal issues that would have made a
criminal prosecution unlawful in the first place (such as double jeopardy); and errors in sentence
calculations.
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Through these six legal conditions listed above, we can see situations that allow appeals to
be raised by defendants in American plea bargaining. However, those six situations are the only
conditions that may “survive” because the grounds for appealing a guilty plea in the US are
limited. That brings up the difference between appealing regulations in the Chinese and
American pleading systems. Through Chapter III, we can conclude that there was no significant
change in the regulations of appealing beyond traditional Chinese criminal procedure in the
2018 Criminal Procedure Law revision. This means defendants in Plea Leniency still possess
almost the same right to appeal as non-pleading defendants (2018).
Let us return to the situation of the United States. Though “ineffective assistance of counsel”
is a constitutional matter specifically for American plea bargaining defendants to legally
appeal,268 and there are five other legal conditions for defendants to appeal; two additional
factors actually prevent many defendants from appealing after plea bargaining, in reality: one of
them is that other legal restrictions exist; the other one is that defendants have often voluntarily
given up their right to appeal, according to those plea agreements that they reached with
prosecutors.269 Even being likely the strongest legal condition among these six situations to
appeal, “ineffective assistance of counsel” faces strong obstacles in court.
To refer to specific articles, 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (a) regulates four conditions of appealing for
defendants on their initiative.270 But if clause (a) is combined with clause (c) (1) under the same
268
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section,271 only three circumstances are left in which defendants can actively appeal: if a law
violation has happened; incorrect sentencing; or a harsher sentence than the maximum penalty
that was agreed to in the plea agreement.
It needs to be specified that one special circumstance can lead to an appeal—coercion
during plea bargaining. We may consider this circumstance a certain kind of law violation, or an
individual, additional circumstance, that constitutes another particular legal matter for which
defendants gain the right to appeal.272
Based on the principle of due process, American plea bargaining allows a person to appeal a
conviction based on a guilty plea, if the person can show that the guilty plea was “involuntary”
or coerced. However, this circumstance is relatively difficult to prove, since it must be proven to
the judge that the plea was induced by illegal threats—for example, by using physical violence.
This proving process is quite hard for defendants. Thus, this category of claim does not succeed
very often.273

(2) was imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines; or
(3) is greater than the sentence specified in the applicable guideline range to the extent that the sentence includes a
greater fine or term of imprisonment, probation, or supervised release than the maximum established in the
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Therefore, generally speaking, it is still quite difficult for defendants to raise effective
appeals in plea bargaining.
Not only do defendants face legal restrictions, one fact is that in lots of plea bargaining
cases, defendants have agreed and signed away the right to appeal in order to trade for better
penalty discounts.274 This actually puts defendants under the restriction of a firmer “contract.” In
most of these cases, defendants’ appeals will be rejected, and some “surviving” appeals are still
likely to lose those further trials, eventually—for example, in the case of Price.275
A relatively unusual case was the case of Erwin, in which the defendant received an even
harsher penalty than his original sentence after he appealed.276 In this case, the defendant,
Christopher Erwin, voluntarily gave up his right to appeal in plea negotiation to trade for a 5level downgrade on the penalty (151-188 months), and he received a 188-month prison term as
his sentencing. Then Erwin appealed for the reason that district court should count penalty
downgrades from level 38 of a convicted crime, instead of going from level 39.277
The appellate court’s decision was to reverse the case, and it allowed prosecutors to issue a
harsher conviction.278 The appellate court contended that Erwin violated the principle of contract
(good faith),279 despite that plea bargaining is a product of criminal justice. The court claimed,
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“A classic rule of contract law is that a party should be prevented from benefitting from its own
breach.”280 Thus, Erwin violated the “contract” (plea agreement) at first, so the prosecutors no
longer fell under the restriction of the agreed-upon conviction. The appellant court considered it
necessary to punish the breach of “contracts.” If they do not, the plea agreement turns into “legal
fiction.”281
There was a similar case in China in which the defendant received a harsher sentence after
they appealed.282 In 2019, the defendant, Jiang—having been convicted of drug dealing—
applied Plea Leniency and received a 9-month prison term as sentence. After the sentence, Jiang
appealed, contending that the penalty was overly harsh. Similar to the Erwin case, the second
sentence for Jiang was 15 months in prison. The reason given by the Chinese court was
different—the procuratorates claimed that Jiang was “trading a lower penalty by pleading, then
appealing by using the principle of no additional penalty on appeal,” which indicated that Jiang’s
intention of pleading was “impure.”283 And this was approved by the judge.
Despite that the cases of Erwin and Jiang had similar outcomes, the reasons that these two
defendants both received harsher penalties are quite different. The American court considered
that one should follow the principle of contract (law) as he had already reached a plea agreement.
But the Chinese procurator considered that one should sincerely plea before applying Plea
Leniency, regardless of any “contracts.”
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I am putting question marks on both these two verdicts.
Let us discuss the Chinese situation first. In China’s criminal justice system, Plea Leniency
is not quite an individual procedure, just like plea bargaining in America, but a part within
criminal procedure. In China we evaluate defendants’ behavior of pleading and applying Plea
Leniency as an advanced (a higher level of) confession.284 This means that in China, the
defendant is required to tell the truth to procurators/police to constitute the behavior of
confession, which further pushes procurators to apply Plea Leniency.
However, a confession does not take the defendant’s pleading attitude into consideration, as
the defendant voluntarily tells the truth (also, voluntary is already a type of pleading attitude).
Meanwhile, in Jiang’s case, procurators raised the range sentencing recommendations, which did
not specify the precise prison term in the plea agreement. This means the procuratorate should
be responsible for creating the difference between the defendant’s expectation of penalty and the
penalty with which the defendant is actually sentenced.285 More than that, no article exists under
Chinese criminal law/criminal procedure that prevents the principle of no additional penalty on
appeal from being enacted. This means the procuratorate’s counterappeal and the second trial
court’s judgement both lack a legal and legitimate basis. The sentencing in Jiang’s case’s second
trial should be ruled as a violation of the law.
Of course, no extant law supports the defendant, Jiang’s appeal. The sentence given in the
first trial—9 months in prison—was legal and appropriate. Thus, the legitimate measure that the
So far China has not updated its criminal law to precisely evaluate defendants’ behavior in plea leniency.
It is beneficial that the Supreme People’s Procuratorate is now encouraging procurators to raise specific
sentencing recommendations, because specific recommendations can avoid creating the difference in penalty
expectations. However, specific recommendations strengthen procurators’ voices in penalty measuring.
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higher court (appellant court) should have taken in Jiang’s case was just to reject Jiang’s appeal.
The issue of the American case (Erwin case) is that we need to decide if we should fully
consider plea bargaining to be something similar to contracts under open markets and capitalism,
just like the bolded sentence above?
Though the harsher second sentence in the Erwin case was quite rare, completely treating
plea agreements as contracts is definitely not unique to American plea bargaining cases. Whether
we should accept this kind of expression is actually no longer just a discussion of the defendants’
right to appeal, but a question that leads to another, even more important topic - plea
bargaining’s position in criminal procedure.

5.6 Plea Procedures’ Positioning
In fact, opposing opinions have been expressed in the Supreme Court while arguing about
this issue ever since plea bargaining’s creation.286 A drastic debate that is fairly recent occurred
in the Frye’s case.287 The majority of the Supreme Court (in 2012) claimed that plea bargaining
is the major method employed in the US to deal with criminal cases—97% of federal guilty
sentences and 94% of state guilty sentences originated from guilty pleas.288 The majority
referred to this word: “To a large extent, this kind of horse trading determines who goes to jail
and for how long. That is what plea bargaining is. It is not some adjunct to the criminal justice
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system; it is the criminal justice system.”289 And the court also stated: “… criminal justice today
is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials.”290 It looks like the majority of
federal courts were trying to express such an idea that plea bargaining was a reasonable product
of judicial nature, has the characteristic of a free market, and should be executed under similar
rules as contract law.
The majority of the Supreme Court (2012) was actually using empirical facts to retrodict
criminal justice theories, with which I hardly agree. They put the consequence upside down.
First of all, based on a historical perspective, plea bargaining was a product of the US
environment (the 1970s) in which the traditional criminal justice system could no longer handle
the pressure from more criminal offenses, overwhelmed jails, the lack of professionals, etc. But
many countries are still not applying any plea systems, which helps to indicate that plea
bargaining is not a natural product of the world’s criminal justice systems, but the product of the
American judicial environment.
Once plea bargaining started to be recognized legally, and began to spread through the states,
more prosecutors, and some defendants and judges, realized the benefits that plea bargaining
could bring to them. Meanwhile, the side effect does not harm them. Prosecutors receive no
punishment by offering lots of plea agreements. Guilty defendants will benefit from pleading in
most situations. Judges feel much less pressured. The most harmful side effect is that victims’
rights and interests can be violated during plea bargaining. It also harms defendants who were
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made to plead against their free will. But this side effect does not harm criminal justice
professionals.
We must appreciate the benefits that plea bargaining brings to the American criminal justice
system; however, the potential harm to some of (criminal procedure) individuals may be beyond
expectation. The spread of plea bargaining in America is like drug addiction— “you know this
could bring side effects, but this does cure some of your sickness and brings you satisfaction, so
you are asking for more.”
In any case, plea bargaining (or Plea Leniency and other plea systems in the world) was
born as a compromise between traditional judicial spirits and the reality—a child of pragmatism,
almost completely disconnected from traditional justice.291
In my opinion, those arguments that were supporting plea bargaining in the 1980s292 partly
aimed to promote the “sales” of plea bargaining, for plea bargaining was far from as popular as
it is currently, and many more prosecutors and judges were pursuing the traditional type of
criminal justice.
But this “remote” approach was already no longer necessary in the 2010s, because more
than 94% of criminal sentences originated from plea bargaining. Plea bargaining is
monopolizing “the market of criminal justice.” The product “plea agreements” manufactured by
“the brand of prosecutors,” occupies 95% of all products.293
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As the Supreme Court (in Frye’s case)294 and 3d Circuit (in Erwin’s case)295 emphasized
how similar plea bargaining and the free market are, as well as plea agreement and contracts, we
should also take a look at this monopoly’s disadvantages in plea bargaining.
Let us try to express plea bargaining in marketing words. As the selling party, prosecutors
can control the price of their products by their unilateral will. As the purchasing party,
defendants have almost no other options, and the only other choice left is to buy a better quality,
but far more expensive product made by courts (court trials). Therefore, more than 94% of
American consumers (defendants) that cannot afford courts’ products are forced to buy the
prosecutors’ products.
Of course, some consumers (guilty defendants seeking a lower penalty) aim to buy
procurators’ products, because this kind of product is much cheaper but matches these
consumers’ lowest needs. This is a win-win condition for these buyers and sellers, but it
potentially damages a third party (victims), because this kind of cheaper product pollutes the air
(traditional criminal justice) more heavily than the court’s product. Some third-party members
then catch respiratory diseases (rights being violated) and tried to seek a remedy (petition), but
the seller refuses to compensate. On some occasions the standard setter (courts, as the traditional
leader of this business, but selling a product that only occupies about 5 percent of the market)
becomes involved to arbitrate (administer a judicial remedy).
For the rest of consumers, some of them were just walking past the shop (innocent
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defendants), but they were dragged in and forced to spend money. Or some of them were
looking for the better brand, but were forced to buy the cheaper item. That is the so-called “hard
sell.”
The most important problem in this market is that for the monopolizing behavior, an
arbitration and standardization system does exist, but no effective supervision mechanism exists
to actively take precautions against the monopoly. The arbitration system becomes passively
involved, and some staff members in this system endorse the seller’s party when marketing
disputes happen.
In some disputes, the selling party is following the contract law and stands on the side of
justice. But we have already proven that the selling party sometimes stands on the other side by
proving the seller’s harm to the third party (subsection 1), irrelevant people (innocent defendants)
dragged into a hard sell, etc.
As we are finished using marketing words to describe plea bargaining, we can see that it is
dangerous for justice departments to treat plea bargaining in a way that is completely
analogous to marketing and contracts. This kind of thought will harm a number of individuals
outside of justice departments but involved in plea bargaining procedures. Individual cases’
injustice296 brings minimal effect to prosecutors and courts. But individual cases’ injustice may
destroy individuals in procedures.
At the same time, in the Frye case’s trial, the Supreme Court minority raised dissenting

296

“Justice” here refers to the traditional ideas of substantive justice and procedural rights.
132

opinions.297 I tend to support Scalia’s opinion that plea bargaining is a reflection of a “necessary
evil.”298 After all, plea bargaining exists with apparent defects and huge arguments, and it is not
appropriate to raise plea bargaining to a high level as a “constitutional entitlement.”
We have to recognize that plea bargaining shares common characteristics with contracts.
Briefly stated, it is the process of completing an interest swap, reaching a consensus, and turning
hostile parties into cooperative ones. However, many differences remain. We cannot treat plea
bargaining as an example of “sport-chance theory.”299
In fact, the majority of Chinese legislators support a similar theory to what was advanced in
the minority’s opinion in Frye and Cooper’s case. Despite that in China, Plea Leniency is not
being publicized as containing anything “evil,” the majority of legal professionals are quite
aware of plea systems’ side effects. That is the reason China was not legislating Plea Leniency as
a whole new, individual criminal procedure, but as a category of sub-procedure under criminal
procedure. Also, Plea Leniency’s penalty measuring method is an additional part of the current
criminal law, not a new, relatively independent penalty measuring system.
Meanwhile, in addition to basically keeping the defendants’ right to appeal in Plea Leniency,
China is trying to build a “free will examination” mechanism for judges to apply. It is still in
progress to make this concept into reality, and it will help to ensure and confirm Plea Leniency
defendants’ legal rights and free will. However, I do not think it is likely that the US will
institute a similar mechanism in a short period. This system will apparently increase the courts’
297
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working burden, but American judges have to spend most of their energy on complicated crimes
and felonies. This “free will examination” system conflicts with American plea bargaining’s
extreme pursuit of judicial efficiency.300
Defendants are always the unfavorable party in procedural law, and this is even more
apparent in plea bargaining (Plea Leniency). Therefore, I suggest adopting a tolerant attitude, to
a reasonable extent, when defendants are trying to apply their rights or striving for their interests.
This also helps to achieve justice, because innocent defendants and those defendants whose
rights are violated (free will violation, ineffective legal assistance) are gaining better
opportunities for judicial remedy.
Let us return to the original topic for a conclusion—the right attitude about defendants’ right
to appeal.
Based on my conservative and prudent attitude toward plea bargaining (Plea Leniency), I
will continue emphasizing the importance of supervising prosecutors (procurators) and judicial
remedy mechanisms for defendants (also including victims). Appealing is a relatively effective
method to restrict and counter the violation of defendants’ rights and free will. Spontaneously,
the right to appeal, as a method of judicial remedy, should be kept and protected, as plea
bargaining does not decrease the violations of defendants’ free will.
At the bottom of this subsection, I would like to clarify two points:
First, my recognition of plea bargaining (Plea Leniency) does not mean I am against widely

A specific discussion of “free will examination” mechanism will be covered in the next chapter, in the section on
procedure construction.
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applying plea bargaining. On the contrary, I support plea bargaining’s effect on most minor
offenses and appreciate plea bargaining’s benefit in judicial efficiency—justice in a timely
manner is definitely a form of justice, and it also saves judicial resources needed to deal with
relatively important criminal cases. What I am against is considering plea bargaining to be a
perfect or righteous procedure, one that refuses to recognize and admit plea bargaining’s
disadvantages and harm to parts of procedures for individuals. Trading justice for something else
is a “necessary evil.”301
Second, my support of the dissenting opinions in Frye’s case and Cooper’s case only
reflects my consideration of plea bargaining’s appropriate status in American criminal justice,
not reflecting anything more than this topic or showing any political tendencies.
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Chapter VI Comparative Research – Victims

6.1 Introduction
The victims’ issue in pleading systems is quite complicated. In the past, no matter what
modes of criminal justice different countries applied, victims were never a subject of criminal
procedure, as prosecutors/procurators and defendants were.302 However, the establishment of
pleading systems has raised victims’ procedural situation a great deal compared to traditional
criminal justice. Chinese Plea Leniency even regulated defendants’ compensation to victims and
victims’ forgiveness, together as one of two main considering factors of Plea Leniency’s penalty
reduction method.
The more prominent position of victims in pleading procedures pushes countries to form
new criminal evaluation systems for defendants. This is a challenge for legislators, especially for
China, that almost places victims in the highest position in pleading procedures worldwide.
Traditional Civil Law countries’ criminal justice strictly follows the principle of legality,303
which means the evaluation process of criminal behaviors is quite predictable and is regimented
through statutory regulations. Defendants’ compensation does affect the final sentence to an
extent, but much less than in pleading systems. Not only does this happen in Civil Law countries,
but this difference also applies in the US.

302

Take China as an example. Criminal Procedure Law of China regulates those subjects of criminal justice, which
are police departments, people’s procuratorates, people’s courts, criminal self-complainants, defendants, selfcomplainants and defendants of incidental civil procedure.
303
Actually, there are different understandings of the legality principle in Civil Law. The direct matchup in Civil
Law is the principle of prescribed punishment. Theoretically, we can find many differences between these two
principles, but here we use the substantialism perspective to describe the methods to regulate penalty measuring.
136

For example, if there exists an American offense with no application of plea bargaining, and
the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, his potential penalty could be the death
penalty or life imprisonment.304 If the defendant compensates the victim, showing great
repentance, and gains the victim’s family’s formal forgiveness, he may still receive a death
sentence, possibly because the jury considers that he killed multiple people, and his
compensation is not enough to help him escape from a death sentence. From life imprisonment
to a death sentence, that is the predictable range of penalties that the criminal will receive.
However, if the suspect is able to choose whether to apply plea bargaining, the potential
penalty’s range varies much more. If the criminal refuses to apply plea bargaining and insists on
undergoing a jury trial, the maximum penalty he may receive is still the death penalty; but if he
chooses to reach a plea agreement with the prosecutor, he has a great chance to lower the
accusation to second-degree murder, especially if the evidence is insufficient. The defendant
also compensates the victim’s family. As a result of plea bargaining, the defendant may receive a
penalty of 20 years in prison. From 20 years to the death penalty, that is much more space to
strive for when comparing the distance from life imprisonment to the death penalty.
The better penalty discount that defendants and their attorneys are seeking can be also
regarded as “better criminal law evaluation.” In plea bargaining, every factor that affects
criminal evaluation is amplified. The saving of judicial resources that pleading procedure allows
is one obvious factor. But also, the compensation (including criminal reconciliation) occupies a
more important status in pleading procedures. Quantitative change will lead to qualitative
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change, and victims are never an issue that brings direct qualitative change in criminal law, but
the quantitative change of defendants’ evaluation leads to different (qualitative) results, like
penalty discounts, under the pleading process.

6.2 American Acts of Victims’ Rights in Plea Bargaining
If we discuss American plea bargaining, the US mainly has two acts for federal plea
bargaining cases, which are the CVRA and VRRA, to regulate victims’ rights.305 Under these
two acts, American federal criminal cases’ victims mainly have three rights: the right to be
informed; the right of conferral; and the right of judicial remedy.
Despite that federal plea bargaining cases occupy a small proportion among all American
plea bargaining cases—there are many more “bargains” happening in the 50 states’ own criminal
justice systems—these two federal acts are still representative, as most of the American states
have similar acts to ensure victims’ rights and legal interests. At the same time, those three legal
rights of victims play out similarly in American states’ plea bargaining cases.
The entitlement of the right to be informed changes the victims’ position. Victims are no
longer only a “source of evidence” in traditional criminal procedure. In plea bargains, victims
are an individual party of the procedure, which is still not a subject of criminal procedure.306
Additionally, the right of conferral is considered the most practical substantial right that
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empowers victims in plea bargaining, theoretically.307 If we look at regulations, we can say that
despite that victims’ opinions are not taking over any discretion from prosecutors, at least, their
interests and petitions can be heard.
One piece of US Department of Justice (DOJ) guidance—Attorney General Guidelines for
Victims and Witness Assistance (AGGVWA)—states that federal prosecutors should negotiate
with victims about issues of dismissals, releasing defendants for non-investigation purposes,
plea negotiations, pretrial diversion (PTD), and other crucial circumstances. AGGVWA also
states that prosecutors need to have the due diligence to inform victims before plea agreement
has been reached. Victims should gain substantial opportunities to negotiate and prosecutors
should offer reasonable consultations, before substantiating charges to the court.308 This is the
regulation after 2011, when the DOJ revised the AGGVWA. This happened six years after the
British Petroleum case, nearly the same time as the 5th Federal Circuit overturned the old version
of the regulation. This overturn made the right of conferral occur before the prosecutors would
file charges.309
Scholars that insist on traditional perspectives bring up the point that the victims’ right of
conferral damages other criminal justice subjects’ positions.310 Another opinion argues that the
function of prosecution is not appropriate to bind together with victims’ interests, and that this
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mixes up personal interests with prosecution authority.311
These voices do have their reasonable starting points, but they have all neglected the
characteristics of plea bargaining. Plea bargaining is a product of pragmatism, the (formal)
advent of plea bargaining was mainly based on the idea that traditional criminal justice theories
could not handle the increasing burden of case solving.
The foundation of plea bargaining is a compromise to pragmatism (limited resources),
which cannot be appropriately measured using purely theoretical angles. Thus, personally, I do
not focus very much on the academic definition of victims’ role in the mode of plea systems, but
more on how victims function and how the judicial system should regard victims in plea
procedures.
The right of remedy activates under the condition if any of the victims’ first two rights are
infringed upon.312
These three rights constitute American victims’ rights in plea bargaining, which also stands
for victims’ additional rights, compared to traditional criminal procedures. But the difficulty is to
bring about these rights into judicial practice. Actually, a number of plea bargaining cases have
taken place in which American prosecutors have failed to ensure/intruded victims’ rights, and
sometimes judges have shared responsibility for these.
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6.3 Prosecutors’ Violation of Victims’ Rights
A. The BP Case
One classic example in which justice departments ignored victims’ rights is the
aforementioned 2005 British Petroleum case.313 Judge Lee H. Rosenthal of the South Texas
Federal District Court signed an order by the prosecutor’s office’s application that allowed
prosecutors to inform victims of the details about the plea agreement after the agreement had
been reached. The reason of doing so was that if the prosecutor’s office had informed victims
earlier about the process of plea negotiation, it would be difficult, since there are hundreds of
victims’ or decedents’ families.314 More than that, prosecutors thought that the potential social
influence may cause extensive media circulation and public prejudice that could affect the
process of plea negotiation or even damage the plea agreement.
The South Texas Federal District Court granted that application, based on the (old version)
CVRA (d) (2)’s regulation of reasonable procedure. Later, the prosecutor’s office and the
defendant reached a plea agreement to lower the accusation to a violation of the Clean Air
Act,315 without informing or conferring with any explosion victims.
As the South Texas Federal District Court rejected twelve victims’ claims that they wished
to deny that plea agreement, the case was appealed to the 5th Circuit, at which point victims
demanded the 5th Circuit to sign a writ of mandamus to overturn the district court’s decision,
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quash that plea agreement, and restart plea negotiation.316
The 5th Circuit pointed out that the right of conferral to which the CVRA entitles victims
does not disappear under the condition of multiple victims. The district court’s permission of the
prosecutor’s motion violated the CVRA’s regulations of the right to be informed and the right of
conferral. The 5th Circuit concluded that the district circuit’s granting constituted a CVRA
violation. But at the same time, the 5th Circuit refused to sign a writ of mandamus, because not
all three conditions necessary to sign the writ of mandamus were met at the same time.317
As a summary, the prosecutor’s office was ruled to have violated the CVRA, and the district
court was ruled a wrong application of the CVRA. The writ of mandamus was rejected for
signing by the 5th Circuit and victims received a legitimate basis for further remedy. This case
reflects that federal circuits are quite prudent of signing writs of mandamus, and the 5th Circuit
took the way of indirect remedy as a result.
Chinese scholars concluded two reasons for the 5th Circuit to be prudent: showing respect to
subordinate federal courts and avoiding extra procedural burdens.318 My personal view is that
the 5th Circuit’s action is reasonable. The circuit’s evaluation of prosecutors’ behavior, the
district court’s permission, and whether to sign the writ of mandamus were all appropriate
questions.
But I also regard that the district court was being connivant of the prosecutors’ CVRA
violations that infringed on the victims’ rights to be informed and conferral. An explosion that
316
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killed 15 people and injured 170 was already a cause of huge social influence, and it is natural to
see public fury arise from that. The reasoning of “avoiding media spreading and public
prejudice,” was a pretext. It is not possible for me to assume whether prosecutors were lazy or
had an interest connection (with the company), but the disregard for victims’ rights is obvious.
B. The Stevens Case
Prosecutors’ violation of victims’ rights is not rarely seen. In another case, the district circuit
directly overturned the plea agreement.319 The defendant, C. Stevens, sold drugs (heroin) that
contained a fatal component (fentanyl) to the victim that caused the victim’s death.320 After a
plea negotiation with Stevens’ attorney, prosecutors agreed to propose an accusation of
distributing small amount of heroin, instead of a Drug Delivery Resulting in Death (DDRD)
charge, which is harsher and easier to prove.321 For the first accusation, the proposed penalty
was 21 to 27 months. For the crime of DDRD, the penalty is at least 20 years.322 Prosecutors
intentionally concealed the expected plea agreement from the victim’s family. After the plea
agreement has been proposed, prosecutors informed the victim’s family through a victimwitness coordinator via phone call.
During the hearing at the Connecticut District Court, Judge Jeffrey A. Meyer questioned the
prosecutor to ask if the victim’s family had argued about that plea agreement, as the victim’s
family was absent from that hearing. The prosecutor’s answer was no, but actually, the victim’s
family was against that plea agreement. Prosecutors did not take the fact of the victim’s death
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into consideration, ignored the victim’s right of conferral, and tried to deceive the judge.
Judge Jeffrey Meyer did not believe the prosecutor’s words. He stated that he would reject
the plea agreement unless he received the victim’s family’s direct opinion. Judge Meyer also
requested that the prosecutors submit a written statement to explain how prosecutors followed
the CVRA to ensure the victim’s rights and how the victim’s family reacted. Prosecutors
reported the truth that the victim’s mother was dissatisfied when she was informed that her son’s
death was not taken into consideration. The victim’s mother also claimed to refuse to take part in
the plea bargaining hearing, and she planned to make a victim impact statement at the
sentencing hearing
Judge Meyer declared that despite the fact that victims have no right to deny plea
agreements, as the person most affected by the crime behavior, victims (or their families) should
be informed by prosecutors (in plea bargaining). Thus, Judge Meyer ruled to reject that plea
agreement, then ordered the procedure parties to start a new plea negotiation, under the premise
of paying sufficient respect to the victim’s family.
Here is how Chinese scholars evaluated Judge Meyer’s act: “…Judge Jeffrey Meyer
rejected that plea agreement, and firmly ensured the victims’ right to be informed and right of
conferral during plea bargaining, which made the victim’s helpless family receive judicial
remedy in a timely and forceful manner.”323
C. The Does Case
If we pay more attention to a previously well-known person in the US —Jeffrey Epstein—
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prosecutors offended victims’ legal rights, as well, in Epstein’s criminal case.324 Quite similarly,
federal prosecutors in South Florida did not inform victims until the plea agreement had been
reached, which was a non-prosecution plea agreement. The prosecutors and Epstein were trying
to conceal that non-prosecution agreement to the victims from the beginning of the plea
negotiation.325 Epstein was sentenced to 18 months of jail; he did not even spend one day inside.
Unlike the previous two cases, the Epstein (Does) case’s victims spent a long period seeking
a judicial remedy, from 2008 to 2019. The victims petitioned three times326 until a partial
summary judgement was made on Feb. 21, 2019.327 Judge Kenneth A. Marra of the South
Florida Federal District Court ruled that prosecutors violated the CVRA, which regulates the
victims’ right of conferral; the cross-motion from prosecutors was overruled; and the parties
shall restart plea negotiation within 15 days after judgement, finally, after 3 rounds of petition,328
and this occurred 12 years after the case.329
Despite that the plea bargain process was sentenced illegal at last as judicial remedy,
however, based on the angle of substantive justice, the whole case still cannot be positively
evaluated even after that. Because the judgement arrived too late, and had a limited effect, the
plea agreement had already been executed. Though victims received that summary judgement as
a judicial remedy, they can only expect other forms of substantial compensation (and the
defendant died soon after that judgement).
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D. Analysis
Of course, we can find many more cases to analyze, but we can derive some important
information already.
These three cases vary significantly. They contain different types of crimes: explosion,
corporate crime, close to 200 victims, property loss caused; drug distribution (which led to
death), single victim; sex offense and high society crime, and crimes of at least 2 victims. The
crimes occurred in different times and states: Texas 2005; Connecticut 2017; and Florida 2008.
In the BP case and Does case,330 defendants had different complicated interest connections,331
and Stevens had no social influence.332
But in these cases, prosecutors from different federal district courts all ignored/violated
victims’ rights to be informed and right of conferral, as well as set up obstacles that impeded
realizing the victim’s right of receiving appropriate judicial remedy. In the BP case, district court
connived prosecutors’ behavior, the 5th Circuit rejected the plea agreement;333 in the Stevens
case, Judge Meyer of the district court rejected the plea agreement before trial;334 and in the
Does case, after three rounds of petition, Judge Marra of the district court finally decided to
declare the plea agreement legally invalid, but the remedy seems to have no effect in terms of
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substantial interests.335
By briefly summarizing these three cases, we are able to draw this conclusion: in American
plea bargaining, no matter the criminal behavior’s category, no matter the crime’s particular year
and state, no matter whether the defendant has social influence or not, and no matter the number
of victims—it could happen that prosecutors ignore or violate victims’ CVRA right to be
informed and right of conferral. The process of judicial remedy for the victims is tough and
lengthy, and it also relies on the judge’s personal discretion and judgement to a great extent.
Readers may even form a misconception that prosecutors are standing on the opposite side of
victims (in plea bargaining), as well as cooperating with defendants, if they only watched these
three cases!
I certainly intend to say that most prosecutors are ignoring/violating victims’ rights in plea
bargaining, but I also believe that most prosecutors and judges have righteous professional
spirits. However, the problem of rights violations truly exists to a certain degree, and that needs
attention and improvement. Some judicial professionals may argue that prosecutors of the three
aforementioned cases, and the district court’s judge of the BP case, had their own legal mindsets
and judgements, or they had certain operating habits in plea negotiating.336 But it is irrefutable
that these judicial professionals harmed victims’ legal rights.
We have to accept the existence of plea systems in criminal justice and the impact it brings
to traditional criminal justice modes. We also have to appreciate the original intention to enact
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acts like the CVRA to ensure and improve victims’ rights. But we also have to admit that victims
can be treated much better in plea bargaining practice. Actually, in Chinese Plea Leniency
practice, there exist similar problems—ignoring victims—and it was officially admitted. A
district people’s procuratorate of Beijing had this expression: “…the practice has shown a
circumstance of ‘taking defendants’ rights seriously, but despising victims' interests.’”337

6.4 Reasons for Victims’ Rights Violations
To devise countermeasures (for the ignorance and violation), the discussion should focus on
two issues: the reason that prosecutors ignore/violate victims’ CVRA rights and the necessity to
pay more consideration toward victims in plea bargaining (Plea Leniency).
One factor that is involved in both issues is judicial efficiency and costs, which I have
mentioned several times, but I will take a different angle this time—not based on the
construction of pleading procedures, but on the relationship between prosecutors and victims.
If we need to find a word that best describes the transformation that plea bargaining (Plea
Leniency) has brought to the traditional criminal justice system, it can be “efficient.”
Prosecutors (procurators) have inner motivation to pursue better judicial efficiency. Taking
China as an example, base people’s procuratorates always have the burden of cases— “more
cases than people,” in the Chinese way of speaking. The heavy workload forces procurators to
stress the principal contradiction—to make defendants plea and seal cases over any other issues.
See Research Project Group of People’s Procuratorate of Men’tou’gou District, Beijing: The Research of
Securing Mechanism of Victims’ Rights under Plea Leniency, 1 JOURNAL OF BEIJING COLLEGE OF POLITICS AND
LAW 9 (2021).
337
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Not the subjects of criminal procedure nor principal contradiction of procuration (prosecution),
victims are automatically put in second place by procurators. The situation in the US is
essentially the same.
More than that, prosecutors (procurators) and victims have different goals in plea bargaining
(Plea Leniency) practice. As mentioned, prosecutors are trying to seal cases in a timely manner.
But victims do not care about overall efficiency. Victims care the most about substantive justice
in individual cases. The substantive justice that victims are seeking not only includes the
appropriate punishment for suspects, but also being informed, being apologized to (respected),
compensation (reconciliation), emotional rebuilding, etc.338 Each of these processes requires
time (we can put money aside temporarily), the biggest expense prosecutors have.
Actually, timeliness can be a part of substantive justice as well—justice delayed is justice
denied.339 But that is second to the result of a case itself for victims. And if prosecutors execute
plea bargaining, time sometimes turns into an enemy of substantive justice, because substantive
justice usually requires a certain period of time to finish evidence collecting and completing the
chain of evidence. Plea bargaining usually leaves no time to ensure the collection of evidence,
let alone the rest of the processes.
Except the reality that time and other judicial resources are scarce for prosecutors to take
better care of victims, there is another reasonable doubt, that American prosecutors may be
reluctant to allow victims to get better involved in plea bargaining cases, despite that the CVRA
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states that the right of conferral for victims cannot affect the discretion of prosecutors.
The reason of doubt is that even informing or conferring with victims can be part of a
restriction on prosecutors’ behavior. Nobody likes extra restriction, naturally. Just like the old
version of the CVRA (before the BP case’s sentencing in 2008),340 regulated that the victims’
right of conferral only activates after prosecution has been submitted to the court. More than this,
the CVRA itself was designed to control the effect of prosecutors ignoring victims’ rights.341
In traditional criminal procedure, the relationship is much less cooperative between
prosecutors (procurators) and defendants. Prosecutors share a similar goal with victims on
pursuing substantive justice. But in plea bargaining (Plea Leniency), prosecutors tend to pursue
reaching plea agreements as rapidly as possible; additionally, “winning cases” can improve their
fame and case-winning rates. At the same time, defendants want to gain lesser penalties. But
what, in reality, can victims offer to/benefit prosecutors in plea bargaining?
Thus, if we put these “righteous things” like the spirit of law, judicial professionalism,
natural sense of justice, etc. aside, we can say that cooperating with defendants benefits
prosecutors much more than completely fulfilling victims’ legal rights under natural conditions.
As the other side of the righteous spirit, there also exists injustice behind these overturned plea
agreements—for example, the judicial power rent-seeking in the Does case.342
On the victims’ side, their rights in plea bargaining are passive. The right to be informed and
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the right of conferral can only be realized by prosecutors’ initiative behavior. Additionally, the
right of judicial remedy is a secondary right that depends on the realization of the first two rights.
The passive nature of victims’ rights leads to the fact that the protection of victims’ rights and
interests (in plea bargaining) heavily relies on prosecutors’ quality, individually. From the results
perspective, this “quality” has space to improve, otherwise we are not able to find cases such as
the BP case, Stevens case and Does case.343
As a conclusion, we have to admit that prosecutors are not always embodiments of justice.
In a number of plea bargaining cases, intentional or not, they neglected or violated victim’s legal
rights. The main reasons are a lack of time to better consider victims; attempting to cooperate
with defendants and violating victims’ rights at the same time; reluctance to accept the
involvement of victims; and complicated interest connection and power rent-seeking.
The discussion above attempts to explain the fact that prosecutors (procurators) share
common intentions for ignoring or violating victims’ legal rights. Furthermore, the analysis of
cases demonstrates that the situation of ignoring/violating victims’ rights is absolutely not only
occurring in minor, individual plea bargaining cases. However, uncovering these intentions, or
excuses, does not mean it is appropriate for prosecutors to neglect or violate victims’ legal rights.
After we have found problems, the next step is finding solutions.

6.5 Measures to Ensure Victims’ Rights and Interests
In my opinion, there are several methods to ensure/improve the situation of victims’ rights
343

Supra note 306. 309. 319, 324.
151

in pleading procedures. The first issue is legislation/regulation, and the US is particularly
important for China as an example. The United States has already enacted such legislation—
reflecting in the CVRA, VRRA and AGGVWA—but China has not, so far. In Chinese criminal
justice practice, victims occupy only part of criminal procedure’s subject status, and the
Supreme People’s Procuratorate recently emphasized ensuring victims’ rights in Plea
Leniency.344 However, it is still devoid of legislations that cover victims’ legal rights in Chinese
criminal procedure.
Despite that China has no specially appointed act/law similar to the CVRA or VRRA that
legally ensure victims’ rights in Plea Leniency, the CVRA and other relevant acts are being
appreciated by Chinese scholars.345 Additionally, some Chinese procurators have realized that
there needs to be a balance point between efficiency and justice, and we can expect a similar act
(possibly a practical guide) to be enacted in China sometime in the future.
One thing that needs to be mentioned here is the penalty measurement of Chinese Plea
Leniency.346 Unlike American plea bargaining, in China’s criminal law, the penalty measuring of
Plea Leniency still needs to follow existing articles of “circumstance for liberal punishment.”
Defendants are not able to lower the level of their charged crimes, and their potential penalty
will not surpass the minimum penalty regulated in current criminal law.347
344
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This leads to the fact that Chinese procurators are offering lesser benefits to defendants in
Plea Leniency compared to American plea bargaining. We also have to take another fact, the fact
that trials are still mandatory in Plea Leniency procedure, into consideration. Thus, we can say
that the impact that Plea Leniency brings to Chinese criminal justice is lesser than what plea
bargaining brings to American criminal justice. This makes it not very necessary in China to
enact a special act or to revise criminal law.348 An operation guide to ensuring victims’ rights
from the Supreme People’s Procuratorate would be the most appropriate. Referring the CVRA,
this guide should clearly specify the victims’ right to be informed, right of conferral, and also
methods for victims to seek judicial remedy.
After China has finished its legal update of victims’ rights, the next step is to ensure victims’
right to be informed and right of conferral in Plea Leniency practice. Therefore, a special
practice guide is necessary to make further efforts to restrict procurators from
neglecting/violating victims’ rights.
The second issue is that in addition to regulating procurators’ (prosecutors’) behavior, there
needs to be an external supervision mechanism for procurators/prosecutors in pleading
procedures. It could be on the courts to apply additional regulations, or it could be a whole new
department created to execute the job of supervision.
Enhancing procurators’ (prosecutors’) power is what plea systems naturally bring to the
criminal justice system. At the same time, without sufficient restriction, procurators (prosecutors)
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could possibly neglect or violate victims’ rights and interests.
In traditional Chinese criminal procedure modes, people’s procuratorates shoulder the
responsibility of “trial supervision.” Trial supervision means that procuratorates are responsible
for instituting a complaint to the upper-level court if procurators regard that the same level
court’s trial has engaged in illegal behavior during trial or the court’s penalty measurement is
notably inappropriate. However, the introduction of Plea Leniency has basically transferred the
authority of penalty measuring from judges to procurators.
The discussion about penalty measurement will be undertaken in subsection C. My point
here is that there appears a blank space: in Plea Leniency, who is in charge of supervising
penalty measurement? As we know, in regular Chinese criminal procedure, procurators
supervise judges’ penalty measuring. But since procurators are now responsible for penalty
measuring in Plea Leniency, the responsibility of supervision has suddenly disappeared. It is
apparently infeasible for procuratorates to supervise procurators’ penalty measuring.
Thus, despite that China’s criminal law does not need to be substantially revised for Plea
Leniency, the mode of procuration in China is changing notably, and that requires a systematic
update.
One of the American methods to supervise prosecutors’ plea processes is extremely valuable
for China to reference. Taking another look at the Stevens case, Judge Jeffrey Meyer demanded
that prosecutors provide a written report, which needed to include how prosecutors ensured the
victim’s CVRA rights during plea negotiation and the attitudes of the victim’s family member
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(Stevens’ mother) when she was informed.349 This can be considered one of the best ways judges
can use to prevent prosecutors reaching plea agreements that jump over victims.
Some American states, such as Arizona, Alabama and Indiana, have requirements that
prosecutors should submit a similar written report to the court. Some other states have softer
regulations, including Illinois, Rhode Island and Minnesota.350 There are 29 American states, in
total, that have court requirements to provide reports of the victim’s opinion towards plea
agreements, whether soft or strict. I personally consider it 100 percent necessary to have strict
rules (requirements) on written victim’s opinion reports, just like what Judge Jeffrey Meyer did,
and what the states of Arizona, Alabama and Indiana require.
Returning to the topic of China, at least Chinese judges are duty-bound to first take the
responsibility of Plea Leniency supervision. Judges need to require procurators to provide
reports of the victim’s opinion, examine the whole plea negotiation process thoroughly, and
firmly reject inappropriate plea agreements. The October 2020 Report351 states that the
acceptance rate for people’s courts on Plea Leniency agreements, from Jan. 2019 to Aug. 2020,
was 87.7%, in terms of China’s average. That means 12.3% of submitted plea agreements are
revised or rejected. This number indicates that Chinese judges are executing their duty of
revision to a certain extent.
But numbers do not explain everything at the same time. Two things are suspicious: I am
not able to count how many plea agreements are rejected, and how many are revised, within this
349
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12.3% of Plea Leniency cases. A slight adjustment of sentencing can be considered “revision,”
but slight adjustment does not mean very much. Also, China has the tradition of forging
cooperative relationships between procuratorates and courts.352 Therefore, in China the system
promotes a similar risk of encouraging people to trust judges 100 percent, just like what we see
in the BP case of South Texas.353
Base on the reasonable suspicion on people’s courts’ effects of Plea Leniency supervision,
we may also set up another department to additionally supervise Plea Leniency processes, as
Plea Leniency is already occupying a significant percentage (85.6%, Jan. 2020 - Aug. 2020) of
all Chinese criminal cases. The courts could set up an office called the “Petition Office of Plea
Leniency,”354 operated by prefecture-level cities’355 people’s congress. The office could be
responsible to receive victims’ petitions. The petition office’s next job would be to examine
these petitions and transfer petitions considered (possibly) reasonable to the upper-level courts.
For example, a victim may feel his rights were violated by a base people’s procuratorate, and
after sentencing he can raise a petition to the prefecture-level city’s petition office. The office
would then transfer this petition to the intermediate people’s court for reviewing. Victims have
no legal authority to start a second trial, and that is why the aforementioned method is
necessary.356
The third issue is that there must exist better ways to assist victims that are seeking
352
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remedy after the first trial Plea Leniency trial (after the court decision on plea bargaining).
The petition office system that I mentioned above could also be an appropriate method to
assist victims if the victim has a reasonable claim for remedy. If the lower-level court adopts a
plea agreement that violates victims’ rights, it will be difficult for victims to seek a judicial
remedy on their own. Administrative force can become involved in a timely way to assist these
victims who have a reasonable case for judicial remedies.
We can also bring in lawyers’ professional abilities to assist victims. The duty lawyer
system of China is growing quickly. And this system may not only assist defendants to ensure
defendants’ legal rights, but victims that have reasonable needs as well.
I noticed that procurators from Beijing have raised the same opinion. They suggest revising
Article 36 of Criminal Procedure Law of China to clarify that duty lawyers are responsible to
provide legal advice for victims by requirement;357 submit victims’ petitions to the court; and
assist victims with lawful remedy seeking. Procurators have also suggested that, just like
moving the activation time for defendants’ right of legal assistance to advance to the
investigation stage, victims’ right of legal assistance can be activated using the same timing.
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Chapter VII Comparative Research - Penalty Measuring

7.1 Appropriate Penalty Measuring Mechanism
A. The Problem
Under the context of Plea Leniency and plea bargaining, “sentencing differential” and “trial
penalty” actually reflect the same thing, but on two opposite sides. A sentencing differential
mainly means that defendants are getting penalty discounts after pleading procedures; a trial
penalty mainly means that the rest of the defendants refusing to plead, will likely receive harsher
sentences after regular trials.
This happens similarly in Chinese Plea Leniency and the United States’ plea bargaining. The
saving of judicial expenses is the main factor that attracts prosecutors/procurators to promote
applying pleading procedures. On the other hand, the sentencing differential is what attracts
defendants to plead.
Plea bargaining’s supporters and dissenters are also arguing over the discussion of
sentencing differential/trial penalty.358 Take a dissenting opinion as an example: in his work in
the mid-1980s, Professor Alschuler noted that plea bargaining’s much better penalty reduction
forces all defendants (including innocent defendants) to plead.359
It is not possible to precisely calculate how much of a sentencing differential could emerge
from plea bargaining. But there is no maximum limit—it could go as far as the maximum
sentence under the relevant crime statute, or the maximum range of permitted departure under
358
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sentencing guidelines.360 The NACDL report comments: “While a two- or three-level reduction
may not seem signiﬁcant enough to coerce someone to plead guilty, it can have a substantial
impact on a defendant’s ultimate sentence. For instance, a defendant with an offense level of 33
ordinarily would face a sentence between 11 and 14 years. But if he timely notiﬁes authorities of
his intention to plead guilty and ensures a government motion in support of the full three-level
reduction, he can reduce his sentence by almost 4 years. Even at the low end of the sentencing
table, where only the two-level reduction is available, there is still a signiﬁcant inducement to
plead guilty because it may mean the difference between having to serve jail time or being
permitted to serve the sentence in home detention or on probation.”361
It is fair to say that on some occasions American criminal justice can be extremely tolerant
to those pleading defendants, especially for substantial assistance. And this could be unfair
sometimes—for example, when a defendant’s recognition of his/her offense becomes a
fundamental reason for him/her to choose not to plead.362
Nowadays it is relatively pointless to discuss whether to support the application of plea
bargaining. No matter whether the case is being tried in the US or China, pleading procedures
are widely applied and have already covered the majority of criminal cases in both countries.
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But we have to realize that there are some inappropriate penalty measurement mechanisms
within pleading procedures, for example, in the lack of legislation and in over-generous or
intersecting sentencing rules. These defective penalty measuring methods will amplify plea
bargaining’s threat to traditional criminal justice.363 This is why I suggest that American criminal
justice could consider some adjustments to the penalty measuring methods of plea bargaining
after considering my comparative research.364,365
B. Comparison
In his classic work on plea bargaining, Mr. Stephanos Bibas raised the State of New York as
an example to discuss the penalty measuring of plea bargaining: Degree 1 Burglary will result in
a 5 to 25 years imprisonment; Degree 2 will be 3.5 to 15 years; and Degree 3 will result from no
prison term to 7 years.366 We can find out that these penalty terms intersect with each other, have
wide ranges, and contain no “penalty gradients” as well. This is quite common in many
American states’ penal/criminal laws, and if there are no downgrades on the degrees of
conviction, defendants usually get a maximum 25% to 35% discount from the original prison
term, which varies among the different states.367 Bibas claimed that statutory sentencing systems
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cause such “cliffs” on penalties that have failed to produce gentle sentencing differentials.368
I personally support parts of Mr. Bibas’ opinion. I do support that all pleading procedures
need their penalty measuring mechanisms to have gentle and continuous penalty gradients. And
certain kinds of statutory penal law—taking New York State as an example—are not helping to
create such sentencing differentials, which Mr. Bibas suggested.
However, I do not think the problem that Mr. Bibas pointed out should be blamed on the
mode of statutory penal/criminal laws. The real problem is the legislation of different penalty
degrees. Civil Law countries all apply statutory criminal laws without criticizing penalty “cliffs.”
The key point is that for civil law countries’ criminal law penalty regulations, the minimum
sentence of a higher degree crime correlates precisely with the maximum sentence of the lower
degree conviction. There is no penalty gap between two adjacent degrees of convictions.
Taking the crime of Intentional Assault in China as an example, Article 234 of Criminal
Law of China regulates 3 levels (degrees) of conviction.369 Referring to the American penal code
mode, we can briefly describe Article 234 as follows: “First degree Intentional Assault may lead
to a penalty of more than 10 years of prison term, life imprisonment or death sentence; Second
degree will be 3 years to 10 years in prison; Third degree will be no more than 3 years.”370,371
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Comparing Article 234 with New York Penal Law §140, there are two main differences in
the modes of statutory law articles: the Chinese article is much simpler, without over-detailed
specifications; penalties of adjacent conviction levels in China are continuous and without any
intersection, and as in Article 234, the connecting points are from 3 years to 10 years. A Level 3
conviction of Intentional Assault (or any other categories of crimes) will never have a
punishment of more than 3 years in prison, which intrudes into the Level 2 conviction.
Connecting with the next one and without intersection is the strict rule of Criminal Law of
China’s penalty regulation on those crime categories that contain several (usually not more than
3) degrees. This mode of regulation does not cause any large gaps, or as we say, “cliffs” among
different penalty degrees, neither causing discontinuous penalty gradients.
If we do not compare American and Chinese penal statutes’ specific explanations on each
crime, but only look at different regulated prison terms for different degrees of offenses, through
numbers we can see that Chinese (civil law) penalty term regulations better help defendants and
their attorneys to draw better predictions of potential penalties.

only one charged offense, but not under the situation of combined punishment.
371
For combined punishment, the maximum penalty in China is 25 years. See Criminal Law of China Article 69,
after Criminal Law 8th Supplement of 2011: (1) If a person commits several crimes before a judgement is
pronounced, his/her term of punishment shall, as the case may be, be decided in such a way that it is not longer than
the total of the terms for all the crimes and is not shorter than the longest of all the terms for the crimes, unless
he/she is sentenced to death penalty of life imprisonment.
(2) At the same time, judicial surveillance may not exceed a total term of three years; criminal detention may not
exceed one year; and fixed-term imprisonment may not exceed 20 years, if the total of all terms is less than 35 years.
It may not exceed 25 years if the total is more than 35 years.
(3) If supplementary punishments are imposed on any of the several crimes, the supplement punishment shall still
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categories shall be executed separately.
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The most appropriate criminal rules that suit pleading procedures can be described similarly
as gradual/linear functions, which are gradual or (close to) linear, are continuous, contain
reasonable gradients, and make it relatively easy to draw predictions.
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We need to realize that the type of criminal code legislation, as the former one, has its own
advantages compared to the latter one. For example, the New York State mode that contains
much detailed description on specific behaviors gives more respect to judges’ discretion and
juries’ judgement.
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crime degrees, not representing specific contents.
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Also, the American mode of legislation better respects the individuality of each criminal
case. On the opposite side, the Chinese mode sometimes causes inflexible judgements.
Sometimes the individuality of different criminal cases gets ignored in Chinese criminal justice.
However, we need to realize that in the current situation, the substantial process of penalty
measuring has already been transferred from court trials to pleading negotiations. The American
mode has lost more of its advantages in the environment of plea bargaining (compared to
Chinese Plea Leniency). The Chinese mode better allows defendants and their attorneys to draw
clearer predictions of potential penalties prior to court trials. It makes the mathematics simpler.
Especially for misdemeanor cases, no matter whether they happen in China or America, no
procurators/prosecutors will pay much attention to “individuality,” nor will judges. Judges are
not receiving “first-hand” information from each individual case, but they are spending their
scarce time perusing materials and agreements that procurators/prosecutors have submitted.
Therefore, a simpler penalty regulation system appears more convenient for American plea
bargaining, especially in misdemeanor cases.
C. Felonies
As we are mentioning misdemeanors, we should ask what an appropriate penalty discount
system would look like for felonies? During the tryout stage of Plea Leniency in China (2016), it
was regulated that Plea Leniency can only be applied for crimes having potential penalties under
3 years. After Plea Leniency’s formal legislation (2018), no specific regulations about felonies
have been drafted until now.
First of all, we need to clarify the definition of “misdemeanor” and “felony” within the
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Chinese penal context, because Criminal Law of China has no precise definition of
“misdemeanor.” The method of Criminal Law of China is to enumerate all these “heavy offenses”
in separate articles, but not specifically define “felonies.”374
In China, the three most important points that separate adjacent crime degrees are 3 years, 7
years and 10 years of imprisonment. Taking the crime of Intentional Assault as an example,375
when setting up a separate point of 10 years imprisonment in China, it usually means that the
maximum penalty of this category surpasses fixed-term imprisonment (life imprisonment and
the death penalty). For those crime categories that could be heavy offenses, but do not
potentially lead to life imprisonment or the death penalty (which means a maximum of 15 years
imprisonment), the highest separating point is usually 7 years, for example, for the crime of
Causing a Traffic Accident, which is also one of the four crime categories that has resulted in the
greatest number of Plea Leniency cases.376
Comparing Article 133 and 234 of Criminal Law of China, I contend (above) that 7 years of
imprisonment better unites the concept of “felony” in China with other criminal cases, rather
than 10 years of imprisonment, if we can only pick one separate point between these two. My
reason is that, based on the aspect of malice, an offense that leads to more than 7 years in prison,

In Criminal Law of China, 8 categories of crimes are treated as “heavy offenses,” which are: Intentional Assault
(causing seriously injury or death), Intentional Homicide, Rape, Robbery, Arson, Drug Trafficking, Dangerous
Substances Releasing (including poisoning), and Causing Explosion.
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376
Criminal Law of China Article 133: (1) Whoever violates traffic and transportation laws and regulations thereby
giving rise to major accidents involving severe injuries, deaths, or great losses of public and private properties are to
be sentenced to not more than three years of fixed-term imprisonment;
(2) when fleeing the scene after a traffic and transportation accident or under other particularly odious
circumstances, to not less than three years and not more than seven years of fixed-term imprisonment;
(3) when running away causes a person's death, to not less than seven years of fixed-term imprisonment.
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no matter whether it resides in the maximum death penalty categories (8 heavy offenses) or
those maximum 15 years’ imprisonment categories, must have already caused great
social/personal damage and reflected strong malice. On the contrary, for Intentional Homicide
(Article 234), or the crime of Negligent Homicide (Article 233), the maximum penalty is 7 years
of imprisonment.377 Negligent Homicide is a category of crime that does not involve severe
malice, but has caused serious personal physical damage.
Therefore, if we use a dual-track system to measure an appropriate penalty—malice and
consequence—crimes that warrant over 7 years of imprisonment usually reflect both severe
subjective malice and serious social/personal damage. Crimes between 3 to 7 years usually
reflect one of the two seriousness degrees above,378 or both the elements to an intermediate
extent.
Based on the above, if we use the length of prison terms in China to separate misdemeanor
and felony offenses instead of crime categories, it will be under 3 years of imprisonment for
misdemeanors and above 7 years for felonies.
Moving on to discuss the relationship between felony and pleading procedures, if we firstly
take another civil law country, Italy, as a reference, we find that Italy strictly forbids plea
bargaining on crimes whose prison terms potentially exceed 7.5 years.379 7.5 years of
377

Criminal Law of China Article 233: (1) Whoever negligently causes the death of another is to be sentenced to not
less than three years and not more than seven years of fixed-term imprisonment;
(2) When the circumstances are relatively minor, he is to be sentenced to not more than three years of fixed-term
imprisonment.
(3) Where this Law has other stipulations, matters are to be handled in accordance with such stipulations.
378
Severe subjective malice or serious social/personal damage, while the other one is not, to a great extent.
379
Supra note 8, at 114. Supra note 128. Italy rules that plea bargaining only applies to crimes below 5 years of
imprisonment, after a maximum 1/3 penalty discount has been calculated, which means the maximum potential
application of plea bargaining in Italy is 7.5 years.
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imprisonment is very close to the 7-years line in China to separate felonies from other criminal
cases. More than that, Italy excludes some crime categories whose potential penalties are under
7.5 years from the applicable range of plea bargaining, including juvenile defendant cases,
Mafia cases (the maximum application limit drops to 3 years of imprisonment instead of 7.5
years), etc.380
Another major civil law country, France, has an even more conservative application limit
for plea bargaining—a maximum of 5 years of imprisonment, corresponding to Italy’s 7.5
years.381 France also has several exclusion rules to forbid plea bargaining from being applied in
several crime categories with penalties under 5 years, including juvenile cases as well. The other
types include False Information (des informations fausses), Negligent Homicide, etc.382
What about America’s situation? The US has 50 states and a federal penal system, and
generally speaking, three types of crimes are ineligible for plea bargaining for all these penal
systems: juvenile cases, minimal offenses (that merit no prison term, only fines or community
service, etc.), and special categories of felony—mainly treason and espionage.383 However, in
the US there are almost no limits on plea bargaining being applied on felonies, except for those
very few special categories.
Thus, it can be seen that there is a clear difference in attitudes on applying plea bargaining
to felonies between civil law countries and America. Civil law countries’ prudence and
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See Shi Pengpeng, supra note 8, at 115. See also Code de Procedure Penale (French Code of Penal Procedure),
Clause 495-7.
382
See Code de Procedure Penale, Clause 495-16.
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Supra note 8, at 114.
381

167

conservation are not difficult to understand, since they see merit in being more protective on
traditional justice and respecting the ex-officio doctrine in heavy offenses.
Some scholars in China have voiced their opinions on Plea Leniency’s potential application
to heavy offense cases.384 Professor Chen Ruihua raised 3 arguments to restrict Plea Leniency’s
process when applying it to heavy crimes. The most crucial point is that, based on the Chinese
criminal procedure principle of legality and the principle of suiting responsibility and
punishment to crime, procurators should not downgrade the degree of conviction from heavy
offense to low offense (felony to misdemeanor), neither should they alter the number of charged
crimes. China’s laws, as well as other civil law countries’ traditional criminal law theories,
contend that once defendants’ behaviors match the certain conditions to constitute certain
convictions, nobody is authorized to adjust/downgrade these convictions.
To explain this in another way, traditional civil law theories do not allow for trading rapid
pleading with penalty discounts; however, for efficiency considerations, traditional criminal
justice has partly compromised to open a market for negotiation. Felony is the most important
“battlefield” of traditional criminal justice, in which any characteristic adjustment on
convictions should be forbidden.
In other words, to conclude, compared to misdemeanor cases that have no concept of “lower
degree convictions,” civil law criminal theories are even more opposed to downgrading the
degrees of conviction, nor do they permit reducing the number of charged crimes in heavy

See Chen Ruihua, Theoretical Rethink of the Revolution of “Plea Leniency” – Based on the Examination of
Criminal Expedite Procedure’s Operation, 4 CONTEMPORARY LAW REVIEW 3 (2016), at 8.
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offense cases.
Theoretical support in China is lacking on the issue of trading penalty reduction with rapid
pleading for heavy offenses. On Professor Chen’s assumption, my personal opinion is that China
could temporarily abandon the attempt of applying Plea Leniency to heavy offenses/felonies. At
the same time, the maximum potential penalty to apply Plea Leniency can be raised from 3 years
to 7 years of imprisonment. A 7-year prison term is the ideal border over which to build the
concept of “felony” in China, and it also sits precisely between Italy’s 7.5 years and France’s 5
years.
Of course, pleading procedures are products of pragmatism, so we cannot only evaluate
them from theoretical perspective. However, for the angle of judicial efficiency and popular will,
support for applying Plea Leniency to felonies is also lacking.
The Supreme People’s Procuratorate’s 2020 report showed that crimes resulting in more
than 3 years of imprisonment had a percentage of 21.3%, for the year 2019, among all criminal
crimes.385 The number for 2020 was 22.7%, having been reported during the “two sessions”—
the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference—in
March 2021.386 Referring to similar reports for the past several years, the percentage of
misdemeanors (that call for under 3 years of imprisonment) is floating around 80%.387
Based on this number we have, 80%, if we take a look back at the Supreme People’s
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Supra note 141, and https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1694029559450223539&wfr=spider&for=pc This number
also indicated the percentage for misdemeanors was 78.7%, for the year of 2019.
386
This number indicated that the percentage of misdemeanors was 77.3% for the year 2020.
387
The highest percentage of misdemeanors recorded in China was the year 2014, during which the number was
82.7%.
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Procuratorate’s expectation—a 80% to 85% Plea Leniency application rate among all criminal
cases—we can reasonably conclude that the Supreme People’s Procuratorate contends that
applying Plea Leniency on most misdemeanors, and some of the rest (higher offenses, more than
3 years of imprisonment), will basically solve the current problem of criminal justice efficiency
in China. It is quite certain that this 80%–85% expectation was raised based on the statistics of
Chinese criminal judicial practice. Therefore, raising the application limit for Plea Leniency to
offenses with a 7-year prison term will cover more than 80% of Chinese criminal cases, which
matches the Supreme People’s Procuratorate’s expectation and reaches the balance point
between judicial efficiency and substantive justice.
The fact in Chinese society is that most Chinese people carry the “simple view of justice,”
or in other words, when evaluating criminal cases (mainly for those felonies that are widely
reported and caused influential damage to the society/victims), Chinese people consider
substantive justice to hold a superior status. Briefly stated in a theoretical way, one of the most
typical reflections of substantive justice on criminal law is the principle of suiting responsibility
and punishment to crime, which stands against the application of pleading procedure on felonies
under the context of civil law, as mentioned before.
To draw a conclusion for this part, for the current situation in China, it is temporarily
inappropriate and unnecessary to apply Plea Leniency on felonies. Support is lacking from all
aspects of legal theory, judicial practice, and public influence.
As a supplement—leaving Plea Leniency aside, Criminal Law of China still has traditional
legal benefits for those felony defendants who are willing to plead, confess the truth,
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compensate the society/victims, etc. Current Criminal Law of China rules using 15 articles, with
29 specific clauses, to enumerate the situations of “may be given a lesser punishment or a
mitigated punishment” or “shall be given a mitigated punishment,” in its General Provision.
Some of these clauses specially apply for certain categories of defendants, such as juveniles
(under 18 years old), elders (above 75 years old), or blind/deaf defendants. Also, some clauses
rule on special situations, like containing discontinued offenses, crime preparations, justifiable
defenses, etc. These specially targeted clauses usually do not relate to felonies. For the rest of
the leniency clauses, there is no limit on these clauses’ application for felony defendants in
China. In other words, when ineligible for Plea Leniency, felony defendants still have traditional
Criminal Law support to earn penalty reductions.
In fact, these “lenient clauses” also contain and represent traditional Criminal Law of
China’s evaluation of those behaviors that may/shall earn legal leniency. As Plea Leniency is not
an individual system of Chinese criminal procedure, but a sub-procedure of criminal procedure,
Criminal Law of China is not likely to advent a whole new penalty measuring system that is
essentially different from the traditional mode, but more likely, it will usher in a criminal law
revision that contains a series of supplementary articles/clauses. Based on traditional leniency
behaviors’ evaluation rules, these new articles/clauses can be described as an “additional floor
constructed on the original building,” to legally evaluate Plea Leniency in light of substantive
law. This will also correspond to the 2018 revision of Criminal Procedure Law of China as a
procedural law update.
This brings us to the next discussion. Based on traditional articles/clauses, how do we
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evaluate Plea Leniency in Chinese criminal justice?

7.2 Criminal Law Evaluation of Plea Leniency
The first part mainly discussed two questions: the appropriate penalty regulating method for
pleading procedures and whether to apply Plea Leniency on felonies. Two issues need to be
considered to answer the questions posed in this part as well: to evaluate Plea Leniency in
Criminal Law of China and to design an appropriate penalty reduction calculating system for
Plea Leniency.
In the first chapter, I introduced arguments about whether Plea Leniency is an individual
criminal justice system’s product to evaluate or a higher level of confession based on the current
Criminal Law of China. Apparently, after the analysis above, we can exclude the former.
Continuing on with the discussion of Criminal Law of China’s general “leniency clauses,”
they are mainly concentrated in Article 67, 68 and 78,388 under the General Provision part.

For Article 67 and 68, supra note 133. 134. Criminal Law of China Article 78: “A criminal element who is
sentenced to control, criminal detention, fixed-term imprisonment or life imprisonment may have his sentence
reduced if, during the period his punishment is being executed, he earnestly observes prison regulations, accepts
reform through education, truly repents, or performs meritorious service. The sentence shall be reduced if any of the
following meritorious services are performed:
(1) preventing someone from engaging in major criminal activities;
(2) informing on major criminal activities in or outside the prison that can be verified;
(3) making inventions or major technological renovations;
(4) risking his life to save others in day-to-day production activities and life;
(5) performing outstanding service in combating natural disaster or preventing major accidents;
(6) making other major contributions to the state or society.
After commutation, the actually executed term of the criminal penalty shall not be:
(1) less than 1/2 of the original term of criminal penalty, if control, criminal detention or fixed-term imprisonment is
imposed;
(2) less than 13 years, if life imprisonment is imposed; or
(3) less than 25 years if the death penalty with a reprieve imposed on a convict is legally commuted to life
imprisonment upon expiration of the reprieve period, or less than 20 years if it is commuted to imprisonment of 25
years upon expiration of the reprieve period, where the people's court has put restrictions on commutation of the
death penalty with a reprieve according to paragraph 2, Article 50 of this Law.”
388
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Article 78 rules on defendants’ meritorious service during prison, irrelevant to Plea Leniency.
We can specifically split Article 67 and 68 into three aspects: voluntary surrender (article 67,
clause 1389), confession (article 67, clause 1, 2, 3390), and meritorious service (article 68391).
Through the description difference between voluntary surrender and confession—Article 67
Clause 1 defines “The act of voluntarily giving oneself up to the police and giving a true account
of one's crime after committing it is an act of voluntary surrender”392—this indicates that a
confession (giving a true account of crime) is a necessary condition of voluntary surrender. In
other words, voluntary surrender equals confession plus the defendant giving him/herself up to
the police.
Plea Leniency certainly requires defendants to confess, but it does not require “giving
oneself up to the police” as a necessary condition. Despite defendants who undertake voluntary
surrender (not in felonies) will usually get Plea Leniency applied, voluntary surrender and Plea
Leniency do not form a relationship of containment.
So, what is Plea Leniency’s additional part compared to the traditional behavior of
confession? To find the answer, we should return to Plea Leniency’s original Chinese expression.
Plea Leniency’s original name is “认 ren 罪 zui 认 ren 罚 fa 从 cong 宽 kuan,” which
contains three words, 认罪, 认罚, and 从宽.
“认罪” means pleading, which represents one’s confession or acknowledgement of his/her
criminal offense. This is similar to the concept of confession. A rapid, prompt “认罪” is similar
389
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to American plea bargaining’s requirement of pleading.
However, “认罚” means much more beyond the traditional criminal justice context of
confession. “认罚” literally means “to accept his/her legal responsibility and his/her punishment.”
Under the context of Plea Leniency, “认罚” can be understood as one’s recognition of his legally
charged crime(s), plus the idea that he/she accepts the punishment, which has multiple forms,
including prison terms, fines, compensation to the victim(s), etc.
“从宽” means leniency, as a result of “认罪” plus “认罚.”
This indicates that Plea Leniency cares relatively more about defendants’ “认罚”
circumstances, compared to traditional leniency regulations that focus more on basic confessions.
Briefly stated, the requirements that are additional in Plea Leniency for defendants are
rapid/prompt pleading and the behavior of sincerely “认罚” (penalty acceptance + paying fine
or compensation, briefly described as ‘punishment acceptance’).
This indicates that the penalty reduction method for Plea Leniency shall contain two parts: it
should be based on the traditional penalty discount method of confession, plus it should involve
an extra discount, depending on the extent of “punishment acceptance.” The requirement of
pleading is a strict and qualitative standard, while the requirement of punishment acceptance is a
flexible and quantitative standard, relevant to the defendant’s attitude and compensation amount.
For the behavior of “voluntary surrender” in Plea Leniency, it should be considered as the
maximum type of “认罪,” since voluntary surrender is the most rapid pleading among all plea
types, but irrelevant to “认罚”’s evaluation of compensation.
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7.3 Designation of Penalty Reduction Calculation Methods
The numerical regulation of penalty discounts in China does not appear in the Criminal Law
of China, but in a sentencing guideline—Guiding Opinions on Sentencing of Common Criminal
Cases. This Guiding Opinions document was published by the Supreme People’s Court (2017),
which rules that the maximum penalty discount of a normal confession is 20% of the basic
prison term.393 As Plea Leniency contains rapid/timely pleas as a basic part, the penalty discount
percentage of “认罪” shall be more than 20%, since it provides more judicial efficiency than a
normal confession.
Some countries are setting a fixed number for the pleading procedure, similar to the part of
“认罪” (pleading) of Plea Leniency. For example, Italy’s maximum penalty discount for all plea
bargaining defendants is 1/3 (33%) of the benchmark penalty.394 This helps to confirm that a 30%
or 35% maximum penalty discount for Plea Leniency’s pleading part is appropriate.
The US has a different situation. As mentioned previously, for different states, the penalty
discounts within a certain degree of a single conviction—with no conviction downgrade
involved—usually have maximum discounts that vary between 25% and 35%.395 However,
considering that conviction downgrades and reductions in the number of charges are frequently
happening, such numbers are not very practical to use as a reference. I mentioned the case of
Fastow in the previous subsection. Apparently, it is impossible to create a 95% penalty discount

Guiding Opinions on Sentencing of Common Criminal Cases, the Supreme People’s Court (2014), Provision 1,
Clause 1: “For those defendants who give a true account of their crimes, he or she may be given a lesser
punishment of not more than 20% from the benchmark penalty.”
394
Supra note 8, 114, 379.
395
See Bibas, supra note 48.
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for Plea Leniency.396 Still, 25% to 35% for a penalty discount seems a reasonable number as the
leniency pleading part granted for having pleaded.
Referring to the fact that Italy has a 33% maximum penalty discount, and the US has a 25%
to 35% maximum, we can preset a maximum penalty discount of 30% or 35% for the pleading
part in Chinese Plea Leniency.
Then, if we move forward to the part of “认罚” (punishment acceptance), China is one of
the countries that is more forward-looking in its efforts to regulate defendants’ compensation to
victims as a (second) major considering factor for legal leniency. The Guiding Opinions of
Sentencing of 2014 state that if the defendant compensates 100% of the victim’s loss of that
offense, gains the victim’s forgiveness, and has committed a crime whose benchmark penalty is
under 3 years of imprisonment (misdemeanor), the maximum penalty discount is 40% of the
benchmark penalty. For the maximum discount for crimes whose benchmark penalty is between
3 to 10 years of imprisonment, the maximum penalty discount is 25% of the benchmark penalty.
For the situation of more than 10 years of imprisonment, the maximum penalty discount
percentage is 15%. If the defendant has compensated, but has failed to gain the victim’s
forgiveness, the maximum penalty discount percentages drop to 30%, 20%, and 10%.397 In other
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See U.S. v. Fastow, supra note 240.
Supra note 393, Guiding Opinions, Provision V: “For those defendants who actively compensate the victims’
loss, and gain the victims’ forgiveness, the range of sentencing measuring shall be overall considered, including
factors of: the nature of crime, the amount of compensation, the capability to compensate, and the situation of
pleading, repentance. An exception is if the parties reached criminal reconciliation agreements, according to Article
277 of Criminal Procedure Law of China:
(1) For a defendant who actively compensates the total loss of the victim and gains the victim’s forgiveness, while
the benchmark penalty is under 3 years of fixed-term imprisonment, he or she may be given a lesser punishment of
not exceeding a 40% reduction of the benchmark penalty;
For a defendant whose benchmark penalty is between 3 years and 10 years of fixed-term imprisonment, he or she
may be given a lesser punishment of not exceeding a 25% reduction of the benchmark penalty;
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words, the victims’ forgiveness has a value of 5% to 10% of the penalty reduction (of the
benchmark penalty), while the defendants’ compensation mainly occupies the rest.
Taking that first number—40% of penalty discount for misdemeanors (under 3 years of
imprisonment)—we can see that its additional part (mainly compensation and victim’s
forgiveness) beyond pleading is worth 20% of the penalty reduction, which equals the value of
pleading. Does that mean that if we raise the penalty reduction modulus of pleading from 20% to
30% in Plea Leniency, the modulus of punishment acceptance should increase to the same value
as well?
There are pros and cons for this assumption. For the pros—an overall maximum 60% (30%
+ 30%) penalty discount (for misdemeanors) is ideal for Chinese legislators, which matches
their expectation for Plea Leniency practice. The department head of the First Procuration
Department of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate (of China), Miao Shengming, raised this
For a defendant whose benchmark penalty is above 10 years of fixed-term imprisonment, he or she may be given a
lesser punishment of not exceeding a 15% reduction of the benchmark penalty.
(2) For a defendant who actively compensates parts of the victim’s loss and gains the victim’s forgiveness, he or she
may be given a lesser punishment, based on the proportion of the defendant’s compensation of the victim’s total
loss.
(3) For a defendant who has limited capability to compensate, but has the behaviors of multiparty fundraising or
loaning to compensate for the victim’s loss, and gains the victim’s forgiveness, the reduction of his/her penalty may
be given close to the maximum limit, within the penalty reduction range of his/her corresponding benchmark
penalty.
(4) For a defendant who has actively compensated, but not gained the victim’s forgiveness, while the benchmark
penalty is under 3 years of fixed-term imprisonment, he or she may be given a lesser punishment of not exceeding a
30% reduction of the benchmark penalty;
For a defendant whose benchmark penalty is between 3 years to 10 years of fixed-term imprisonment, he or she
may be given a lesser punishment of not exceeding a 20% reduction of the benchmark penalty;
For a defendant whose benchmark penalty is above 10 years of fixed-term imprisonment, he or she may be given a
lesser punishment of not exceeding a 10% reduction of the benchmark penalty.
(5) For a defendant who has not made any compensation, but gains the victim’s forgiveness, he or she may be given
a lesser punishment of not exceeding a 20% reduction of the benchmark penalty;
For a defendant whose charges include heavy offense(s), he or she may be given a lesser punishment of not
exceeding a 10% of the benchmark penalty;
Crimes related to ganglands are an exception.
(6) For a defendant who is capable of compensating, but refuses to, he or she may be given a harsher penalty not
exceeding a 30% addition to his/her benchmark penalty.”
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opinion: “Considering the Guiding Opinions on Sentencing (2014) ruled that the maximum
penalty reduction percentage of leniency does not exceed 50%, we consider that 60% of the
benchmark penalty may be the maximum limit of Plea Leniency’s penalty discount.”398
However, I do not think that the punishment acceptance part (compensation + victims’
forgiveness) should carry equal weight to the pleading part under Plea Leniency. I have three
reasons:
First, the pleading part is fundamental in all pleading procedures around the world. No
matter if it takes place in China, the US or other countries (Italy, France, etc.), defendants’ pleas
are the only condition that pleading procedures cannot leave. However, very few countries
(mainly China) are integrating the factor of punishment acceptance into criminal laws’
consideration/calculation of penalty measuring. Pleas are fundamental, and the rest
(compensation, victims’ forgiveness) are secondary.
Second, “fundamental” not only indicates that defendants’ pleas activate and determine all
the remaining processes of pleading procedures, but also, punishment acceptance is placed
sequentially behind pleading. Pleading is a qualitative factor that decides whether to apply Plea
Leniency process, and only with Plea Leniency application can defendants and procurators
negotiate with the punishment acceptance part, which is quantitative, to decide how much of an
additional discount defendants can gain after compensation.
Third, limiting the reward of the “punishment acceptance” part from being too generous will
help prevent such situations in which rich defendants (partly) escape from appropriate legal
398
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punishment and poor defendants receive harsher sentences. Despite requiring defendants to
provide compensation to victims or the society is beneficial to help comfort victims’ (or their
family members’) feelings, help remedy victims’ losses, or help reduce the public’s damage,
pleading procedures’ final penalties should not deviate too far from traditional justice, or as we
say in terms of civil laws’ criminal justice, the principles of legality and suiting responsibility
and punishment to crime.
Therefore, it would be more appropriate to differentiate the percentages of penalty discount
(of the benchmark penalty) in Plea Leniency between the pleading part and punishment
acceptance. While keeping the expectation of a 60% total reduction percentage (for
misdemeanors) unchanged, we may remove 5% from the punishment acceptance part to add it
on the pleading part, to make the pleading part weigh, maximum, 35% of the total penalty
discount.
The Chinese Plea Leniency penalty discount’s 0.35 maximum modulus of the pleading part
is close to Italy’s 1/3 (0.33), and the US’s similar modulus without a conviction downgrade (0.25
to 0.35). As Plea Leniency’s penalty reduction percentage should drop, since its penalty
measuring method should be considered as an extension of the Guiding Opinions of
Sentencing’s numerical regulations of legal leniency,399 the reduction percentages of the
pleading part and the punishment acceptance part may drop by 10 and 5 percent per degree up,
depending on the levels of the defendants’ offenses.

399

Supra note 393, 397.
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If a defendant in China potentially receives a penalty of over 15 years of imprisonment, that
must constitute the situation of a combined punishment for multiple offenses.400 Additionally, at
least one of these charges must be a felony. Thus, for the situations involving potential penalties
of more than 15 years’ imprisonment, they are not appropriate places in which to apply Plea
Leniency in China for additional penalty reduction, compared to the current Criminal Law’s
leniency regulations.
A gradual, continuous and distinct penalty measuring system will benefit defendants and
their attorneys to form more precise predictions of potential penalties, which helps defendants
400

Chinese regulations for single offense and multiple offenses, supra note 370, 371, 373, 375.
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and their attorneys negotiate with prosecutors/procurators in a more effective way. This will help
to ensure the defendants’ right to “effective assistance of counsel,”401 and also reduce the
situations in which defendants are unsatisfied and raise appeals after pleading procedures.
Meanwhile, a differentiated penalty discount calculation system of pleading procedures, in
which the maximum modulus of the penalty discount varies with offense levels, better reflects
the difference between misdemeanors and felonies, in terms of traditional criminal justice
contexts. Light offense defendants will receive quite ideal penalty reductions, as they promptly
plead and actively compensate.
Meanwhile, heavy offense (felony) defendants will still receive considerable penalty
discounts. However, the consideration of traditional criminal justice has been increased in the
penalty measuring of felonies, which drops the maximum modulus of the penalty discount for
felony defendants.

401

Supra note 174.
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Chapter VIII Summary

8.1 What is Plea Leniency, again?
The 2018 Criminal Procedure Law of China’s official definition of Plea Leniency is:
“Defendants/suspects truthfully plea their offenses under the manner of free will, have no
arguments with convictions, agree with procurators’ sentencing recommendations, and sign plea
affidavits. Under the situation that all previous conditions matched, defendants may be dealt
with legal leniency.”402
This definition precisely defines the part of “pleading”, which is fundamental to apply Plea
Leniency procedure. However, the official definition of Plea Leniency, is not sufficiently
reflecting the other important factor - “punishment acceptance”, that consists of defendants’
compensation to victims, victims’ formal forgiveness, criminal reconciliation (if exists). The
factor of punishment acceptance directly determines how much additional penalty discount
could a defendant earn, after his/her timely pleading.
Therefore, to adequately reflect the factor of “punishment acceptance” in Plea Leniency, my
two-step definition of Plea Leniency will be:
“Plea Leniency is a sub-procedure under Criminal Procedure Law of China, that the
fundamental basis is defendants timely and fully plead their guilt with free will. Peoples’
procurators have the authority to determine whether to apply Plea Leniency procedure, and
raise appropriate sentencing recommendations, with adequate consideration of defendants’
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punishment acceptance, to people’s courts for final review.”
To match the basic requirements of applying Plea Leniency, defendants must timely and
truthfully plea their offenses under the manner of free will, accept procurators’ sentencing
recommendations, and sign plea affidavits;
To earn better penalty reduction in Plea Leniency, defendants should compensate to
victims/governments as possible, gain victims’ forgiveness, or reach criminal reconciliation with
victims.
No matter whenever defendants plead, during the stage of interrogation or detention,
procurators possess the discretion, to decide activating Plea Leniency procedure. Police
departments can send notification to procuratorates to get procurators involved in advance,
procurators do not have to wait for police interrogations to be completely finished. The
activation of Plea Leniency does not consider whether defendants plead positively or after
persuasion, however, the process of penalty reduction considers defendants’ pleading attitudes.
Once procurators get involved, the plea negotiation starts. Defendants have the right to
require defense lawyers for legal assistance. If the defendant is not financially capable to hire an
attorney, procuratorates should appoint a legal aid lawyer or duty lawyer for legal assistance. A
defense lawyer is also responsible to supervise procurators’ behaviors, during plea negotiation.
After a plea agreement has been reached, the indictment, sentencing recommendation and
plea affidavit shall be submitted to the court.
Procurators should also suggest trial modes to apply within their indictments. There are
three types of trial: regular trial, summary trial and expedite trial. Expedite trials are only
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applicable for misdemeanor cases (benchmark penalties under 3 years) that defendants match
the conditions of Plea Leniency.
In Plea Leniency, procurators are encouraged to submit sentencing recommendations with
specific sentencing recommendations with narrow-range or precise recommended penalties.
Trials are still mandatory in Plea Leniency, while judges are responsible to review case materials,
examine case facts, test defendants’ free will, inquire victims’ opinions, and make final
judgments.
After examination, the judge may correct recommended penalty, or overturn the plea
agreement, if the judge considers a Plea Leniency process illegal. Illegal situations include, but
not limited: defendants’ free will violation, victims’ legal rights’ violation, ineffective legal
assistance. Defendants keep the right to appeal after first trials.

8.2 Conclusive Comparison
A. Positioning
The first thing that needs to be pointed out again here, is the difference of legislative
positioning, of two pleading procedures. As discussed in Chapter III,403 China is not placing Plea
Leniency as same importance as American plea bargaining, in the whole Chinese criminal
justice.
The Frye case’s retrial in 2012,404 was a classic example, that two opposing opinions were
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arguing about the attitude of plea bargaining in American criminal justice. It is obvious that
China’s attitude on pleading procedures share more similar things with dissenting (conservative)
opinions in the Frye case, leaded by Judge Antonio Scalia and Judge Samuel Alito.405
These dissenting opinions from some of American Supreme Court Justices, were focusing
more on those side effects that plea bargaining has brought to American criminal justice, and
plea bargaining’s impact towards traditional American criminal justice, that originated from the
Constitution.
Most of those side effects in American plea bargaining have cousins in Chinese Plea
Leniency as well. One additional issue in China, is the difference of legal systems. Several basic
principles in traditional Civil Law criminal justice are also forming resistance on the developing
of pleading procedure.
There also exists a practical difference. American plea bargaining, as we all know, was a
product of pragmatism and realism, which has already turned into a type of conventional
criminal procedure. The core contradiction that this product originally wanted to solve, was the
contradiction between the finite American judicial system’s capability and the continuously
increasing demand of judicial resources brought by more and more criminal offenses.
Therefore, we may say the application rate of plea bargaining - around 95% (94%-97% in
recent years) is quite close to a balance point that naturally determined by the ratio of judicial
capacity and case demands, in America. Considering the relatively aggressive tendency of plea
bargaining’s application in America, I recommend a roughly 90% application rate seems to be an
405
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appropriate balance point for the United States.
Continue with such inference, the real application rates of Plea Leniency in China – 85.6%
for the year of 2020, and 77.0 for the year of 2019, are close to the balance point in China. The
difference on Chinese and American rates (around 80% versus around 95%) indicates that
Chinese criminal justice is facing the pressure of judicial efficiency as well as America, but not
as much pressured.
Further speaking, America may need to invest more budgets on improving American
judicial system’s capacity, including the number of judges and prosecutors, or, try to decrease
crime cates, by reverse thinking.
We all know this could be difficult. Let us do some simple math – to decrease the
application rate of plea bargaining by 5 percent, from 95% to 90%, means regular trial cases will
increase from 5% to 10%, which means 100% more judicial resources to be spent (roughly in
reality). If China wants to drop the application rate of Plea Leniency by 5 percent as well, from
85% to 80%, means normal trials will increase from 15% to 20%, which means 33% more
judicial resources. 100% versus 33%, this is a 3-times difficult task!
Discussing the issue of judicial efficiency, is representing that I am trying to better
understand America’s problem in reality. However, that does not mean it is appropriate to be
aggressive on applying too much plea bargaining procedures. Overall speaking, I tend to support
China’s attitude on Plea Leniency’s positioning of criminal justice, as well as supporting
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conservative opinions that were expressed in Frye’s and Lafler’s case.406 A not over-aggressive
attitude may better help, to balance multiple values in criminal justice, and also, to maintain the
whole criminal justice operating in a healthier condition.
B. Defendants
In both Chinese and American pleading procedures, there seems lack of really effective
mechanism inside of justice systems, to supervise procurators/prosecutors’ behaviors, and help
to prevent violations of defendants’ legal rights. Therefore, under such premise, it must be
seriously regarded to secure and enhance defendants’ capability. in both Chinese and American
criminal procedure.
To evaluate and compare defendants’ situation in Chinese Plea Leniency and American plea
bargaining, the comparison mainly contains three dimensions – legal rights; free will protection
and examination; effective assistance. These three factors are the most important factors, for us
to observe defendants’ “treatments” in pleading procedures.
The main difference between Chinese Plea Leniency and American plea bargaining, on the
aspect of defendants’ legal rights, is different restriction extents on appealing. Despite in the
United States there are several conditions that allow defendants to appeal, most plea bargaining
defendants were unable to appeal even if they wanted, for three reasons: legal restrictions;
defendants stated to give up their right to appeal in plea agreements, which made it not easy for
judges to support defendants’ claims; defendants did not match any of those legal circumstances
to appeal.
406
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Despite none of countries’ criminal justice are “encouraging” defendants to appeal, Chinese
Plea Leniency has much lesser restrictions (no additional restriction) on defendants’ appealing,
than American plea bargaining.407 However, the better respect on defendants’ appealing is not
the entire reason of the Chinese method. The fact that Chinese Plea Leniency still follows some
of traditional Civil Law criminal justice requirements - trials are still mandatory, makes Chinese
procurators less possible to persuade defendants to give up their rights to appeal.
Therefore, even though there exists wrong sentencing(s) in Chinese Plea Leniency,408 I still
regard it better for justice systems, to be more tolerant on defendants’ appealing. Simply to reject
appeals is not going to create much consumption on judicial resources.
The next dimension is defendants’ free will. As also introduced in Chapter III, there were
discussions in America arguing whether plea bargaining - the procedure itself, will increase the
risk that some of innocent defendants are forced to plea. And, there exists another risk that
prosecutors actively force defendants to accept plea agreements, no matter those defendants are
innocent or not, their free will are violated.
Some of opinions argued, that those innocent defendants are not going to accept plea
agreements.409 However, I strongly support Prof. Dervan and Prof. Edkins’ conclusion,410 that
plea bargaining is not only not effectively reducing innocent defendants’ tendency to reject plea
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agreements, but also may even increase such tendency.411
If American plea bargaining have two kinds of risks that: the mechanism itself pushes more
innocent defendants to plea; prosecutors violate defendants’ free will. Then, Chinese Plea
Leniency may face the same risks as well. Unfortunately, there lacks of data to analyze Chinese
defendants’ free will violation situation on the aspect of empirical research. And, for those plea
bargaining/Plea Leniency cases that existed violations, their common nature is, they are even
more difficult than regular trialed wrong conviction cases, to be discovered and exonerated.412
Pointing out that it is necessary to set up a free will examination mechanism under Plea
Leniency, indicates that Supreme People’s Procuratorate of China, is better aware of pleading
procedures’ systematic deficiency of defendants’ free will violation. It is still unsure, that how
this free will examination mechanism will form, and how this mechanism performs in the future.
The last dimension is defendants’ effective legal assistance. Legislated as a constitutional
right, we can say that American legislators are regarding lawyers’ effects seriously, and
considering the right of “effective assistance of counsel” crucially, in American criminal
justice.413 At the same time, based on historical research,414 China was not paying enough
attention on lawyers’ importance in criminal procedure, and also on securing defendants’ legal
rights through securing “effective assistance of counsel”.
After 2018, China’s two main efforts on improving such defection above were: keep
enlarging the number of duty lawyers/legal aid lawyers; to advance lawyers’ position in criminal
411
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procedure, by offering lawyers earlier, timely involvements in cases, and easier access to case
materials.415
Overall speaking, despite the starting point was below the standard of America, lawyers’
position in Chinese criminal procedure is keep improving in recent years, and it is worth
anticipating, to see Chinese lawyers provide “more effective assistance of counsel” in the future.
C. Victims
Both Chinese Plea Leniency and American plea bargaining (federal, and most of states) are
regulating victims’ attitude to be appropriately considered by procurators/prosecutors and judges,
during pleading processes.
In Chinese Plea Leniency system, defendants’ compensation to victims has become a
legalized considering factor of Plea Leniency’s penalty reduction, which is relatively advanced
around the world.
However, this regulation appears in sentencing guidelines,416 not in either Criminal Law or
Criminal Procedure Law. And this Sentencing Guidelines was published in 2017, before Plea
Leniency’s legislation in 2018. This situation makes it lacks of legal basis for case-relevant
victims, to acquire effective legal approach for judicial remedies, in real Plea Leniency cases.
The advantage of American plea bargaining is, there are special acts to specifically regulate
defendants’ legal rights in plea bargaining,417 that victims relevant to plea bargaining cases are
able to gain effective legal support. However, victims’ claims will only succeed, under the
415
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premise that prosecutors are not ignoring/violating victims’ legal rights, or judges are capable to
overturn those plea bargaining cases that violated victims’ rights. Through several typical plea
bargaining cases, it is proven that prosecutors and judges are not always dependable.418
To conclude this part comparison - American plea bargaining has better specified
regulations to clarify victims’ rights, while China’s advantage is mainly reflecting on the aspect
of substantive results. On average, victims in Plea Leniency cases have a greater opportunity to
gain certain extents of compensation.
Through formal regulation of defendants’ compensation in Chinese Plea Leniency, most of
victims are more likely to receive certain extents of compensation. Even under the situation that
defendants are uncapable of compensation, the developing legal-aid mechanism will involve and
provide financial assistance for those victims.
D. Penalty Measuring
China and America are in different legal systems, and have much different paths of
legislative history. Therefore, there are very different intentions/legal origins, to form current
Chinese and American criminal justice legislation.
This means that it is difficult to use “practice results” as a dimension, to compare and
evaluate Chinese and American pleading systems’ effect in reality. However, one conclusion that
we are able to make, is that traditional American penal theory is not providing sufficient
convenience for plea bargaining’s penalty measuring, while the Criminal Law of China is easier
for criminal judges to confirm the appropriate penalties.
418

Supra note 309, 319, 324.
191

We may also sum this up in another way. Generally speaking, American criminal justice
used to focus more on criminal cases’ individualities, while the Chinese system is more
“inductive” on criminal offenses’ universalities. Focus more on individualities will be helpful to
secure individual cases’ righteousness, however, pleading procedure can be similarly described,
as an “assembly line” to produce fast penal evaluations, which the pursue of judicial efficiency
demands criminal justice professionals to conform to offenses’ universalities to form timely
verdicts. The Chinese criminal justice has natural advantage on this aspect.
Still, Chinese Plea Leniency is not complete, in terms of penalty measuring theory. China is
still working on the legislation of a targeted sentencing guidelines, exclusively for Plea
Leniency.419 I am being optimistic, regarding that being a Civil Law country that has kept
applying statutory laws for decades, China has the criminal law foundation, to form a more
concise sentencing guidelines that will help procurators easier to access specified legal basis, in
terms of penalty reduction measuring.420
E. Overall Comparison
In general, American plea bargaining has more refined legislation than current Chinese Plea
Leniency. American plea bargaining system better regulates defendants’ rights, defense lawyers’
effective assistance of counsel, and victims’ rights.
Defendants’ legal rights are better secured in China nowadays than the past, but Plea
Leniency is still a “one-sided” offer, that determines defendants in Chinese Plea Leniency, have
419
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relatively weaker procedural capabilities than in American plea bargaining. Also, the nature of
inquisitional criminal justice is, defendants in this mode are never able to possess similar
procedural capabilities as in adversarial criminal justice.
So far, China still lacks of legislation on specified legal rights for victims in Plea Leniency,
and it needs time for China to further optimize its defense lawyer/legal aid network.
The advantage of Chinese Plea Leniency, mainly reflects on the aspects of authority
distribution and penalty measuring. Despite Plea Leniency is more likely a “one-sided offer”,
rather than real “bargaining”, procurators in China are less powerful than American prosecutors,
that reduced the possibility of defendants’ free will violation, victims’ rights violation, and other
forms of prosecution abuses, to happen.
And, it is likely for China, to form a Plea Leniency exclusive set of penalty measuring
regulations, which will be more concise, easy-to-use for procurators and judges, than American
plea bargaining’s penalty measuring.
Two further generalized conclusions can be formed.
The first point is, these two pleading procedures – Chinese Plea Leniency and American
plea bargaining, share same historical backgrounds, that pushed both two countries to form new,
similar modes of criminal procedure. It is quite obvious, that China’s legislation of Plea
Leniency was referencing other countries’ experiences in a certain extent, not only America, but
also some European Civil Law countries.
Going further, we may say that no matter whether Civil Law or Common Law, different
countries may face same issues of criminal justice – judicial cost, judicial efficiency, effective
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legal assistance, legal rights (defendants & victims), etc. And the answers for these countries are
similar – forming pleading procedures. At the same time, these countries’ pleading procedures
are reflecting countries’ own, different characteristics of criminal justice.
The other point is, China is taking the latecomer advantage on the legislation of pleading
procedure. Based on my legislative research and empirical research, I would like to comment:
through researching on other countries’ pleading procedures and their experiences of practice,
Chinese legislators appear to be relatively aware of some of pleading procedures’ defections.
Therefore, we can see that some of American plea bargaining’s disadvantages are not
occurring on Chinese Plea Leniency’s practice.
The most typical example is, to prevent procurators to be over-powerful in Plea Leniency,
which potentially leads to a lot of problems. including but not limited: defendants’ free will
violation, defendants/victims’ legal rights ignorance/violation, procuration authority’s rentseeking, etc., China maintains trials mandatory, and mostly keeps defendants’ right to appeal.
This enhances judges and victims’ capability, to better balance and restrict the expanding
procuration power, in Plea Leniency.
Another example is, Plea Leniency is regarding the factor of compensation seriously, that
compensation has become a considering factor of penalty reduction. This helps to prevent the
circumstance, that some of defendants timely plead, but only for penalty reduction, without
substantive compensation to victims’ loss.
However, despite China has done refinements on some of pleading procedures’ defections,
Chinese Plea Leniency still has plenty of space to improve.
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First of all, I am keep emphasizing procurators/prosecutors’ importance in pleading
procedures. Procurators’ fault, no matter intentional or unintentional, is the most possible
circumstance that may happen in criminal practice, to damage Plea Leniency cases’ qualities.
Chinese criminal justice should always keep eyes open on such potential risk.
Meanwhile, the historical left-over problems of effective legal assistance and defendants’
rights have been remained to the current stage of Chinese criminal procedure (Plea Leniency).
Defense lawyers’ well-functioning and defendants’ effective execution of legal rights, are
two of main symbols to represent a country’s criminal justice’s civilization. It is fortunate, that
since 2018, Supreme People’s Procuratorate is devoting on improving defense lawyers’ scale
and their legal assistance qualities, the same time as improving on securing defendants’ legal
rights and trying to build a free will examination mechanism. It needs time for Chinese criminal
procedure to match a higher standard, on the aspect of effective legal assistance and defendants’
legal rights. And it is worth to anticipate.

8.3 Suggestions for Improvement
A. Legislation
Plea bargaining is a part of American criminal procedure that has been formally recognized
for almost 50 years, and has existed even much longer. Thus, despite continuing problems,
American judicial professionals are quite accustomed to current operating methods.
However, Chinese Plea Leniency is only a recent development, lasting 33 months so far (in
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the formal sense).421 Therefore, Chinese Plea Leniency retains more flexibility for adjustments
and refinements, because Plea Leniency lacks a solidified experience in practice; moreover,
some parts of the relevant legislation are temporarily absent and can be filled in with better
researched solutions. This subsection will be mainly aimed at providing suggestions for Chinese
Plea Leniency’s current problems.
There are three main omissions in the law regulating Plea Leniency, that urgently require
new legislation.
First, there needs to be a new, specified set of sentencing guidelines to regulate the penalty
reduction calculation method. As I have heard, such guiding opinions of sentencing will be
formulated very soon, in late 2021. I have also suggested a feasible, specific penalty reduction
calculation method and relevant proportion/modulus.422
Second, I consider it necessary for China to regulate victims’ legal rights in Plea Leniency.
American federal acts, like CVRA and VRRA, are good references.
Some may say that: We understand victims’ importance. But China has already legislated
defendants’ compensation of victims (victims’ formal forgiveness, criminal reconciliation) as a
major referencing factor of Plea Leniency’s penalty reduction. What is the real benefit of legally
regulating victims’ rights?
It is, of course, beneficial for victims in Plea Leniency to regulate compensation’s
importance. Also, the constructing legal aid system will help victims with their interests as well.
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However, these are considerations focusing on the aspect of substantive justice, whereas victims
have no improvement in their procedural position. That is why, as stated previously, victims in
Plea Leniency can hardly find a legal basis to support their own petitions, being classified only
as witnesses, and must passively wait for case results and incoming compensation.
If Plea Leniency cases’ victims are able to raise their own claims, based on their legally
recognized rights, they can actively express their petitions during pleading negotiation, or during
court trials, instead of being a procedural outsider.
The legislation of victims’ rights in Plea Leniency, will help reduce the circumstance to
happen, that procurators ignore/violate victims’ deserved rights and interests. Also, different
parties may reach (overall) more satisfying plea agreements, and reduce unnecessary late efforts,
by advancing victims’ timing to get involved in pleading procedure.
Third, it is necessary to better legally authorize defense lawyers, in Plea Leniency (also for
the whole Chinese criminal procedure). For the purpose of providing better “effective assistance
of counsel” for defendants, defense lawyers should be legally allowed to take part in plea
negotiation, as soon as defendants require, or as soon as defendants show their willing to plea,
that are possible to reach plea agreements.
Also, criminal defense lawyers should have full access to case materials, for the same
purpose. Besides, I agree with the suggestion that victims should be qualified, to receive duty
lawyers’ legal support, if victims have their independent claims. In Plea Leniency, victims can
be considered as “The Third Party” (with or without independent claim), just like in Civil
Procedure.
197

B. Relative Mechanisms
Beyond these three legislative focuses, there are also three mechanisms relevant to Plea
Leniency that need to be structured, under Chinese procuration system or Chinese courts system.
The first, and the most difficult task is, to build an appropriate mechanism to supervise
procurators. The core question which has not been discussed yet is, which department should be
the best option, to shoulder the responsibility of supervision (and exoneration)? For common
Chinese political structure, police, procuratorates, courts and govern office are all following
local Communist Party Committees’ leadership. This makes judicial professionals hesitate when
executing supervision and exoneration, considering potential political negative effects.
In my opinion, the relatively most appropriate department to supervise procurators’
behaviors during Plea Leniency processes, should be a specially assigned office in people’s
courts. This office’s judges and assistant judges are directly communicating with defense
lawyers, if lawyers consider/discovered/suspect procurators are violating defendants’ legal rights
or free will. Defendants can also actively report illegal circumstance to “Pleading Supervision
Office(s)”, through defense lawyers’ convey.
Occupying a more than 80% application rate among all Chinese criminal cases,423 Plea
Leniency truly deserves for setting up a specialized office to examine Plea Leniency processes’
legality. For those judges and assistant judges working in “Pleading Supervision Offices”.
Having specialized work to review those claims from defendants and defense lawyers, but not
involved in other elements of criminal justice, will reduce their political connection with other
423
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judicial departments/professionals, that will improve these offices’ qualities of Plea Leniency
supervision.
The second mechanism is the free will examination mechanism, which Supreme People’s
Procuratorate is already paying attention on such mechanism’s importance.424
As I have argued, if the “Pleading Supervision Office” are authorized to get involved, as
early as the stage of pleading negotiation, it may be also authorized to examine defendants’ free
will, and report to benches, during trials. This will partly save repetitive, redundant supervision
work, as two mechanisms are combined into one office. It will also restrict procurators from
violating defendants’ legal rights or free will.
In summary, the “Pleading Supervision Office” could be enabled to assume multiple
functions, including: receiving defendants or their attorneys’ claims, if they believe that
procurators violated defendants’ legal rights or free will; directly testing defendants’ free will,
between plea agreements’ submission and beginning of trials, then recording and reporting to the
bench; and supervising other relevant procuration issues, such as plea agreements’ legality,
defendants’ legal rights, and defendants’ free will.
The third mechanism is the “Petition Office of Wrongful Conviction” system, that offers
Plea Leniency cases’ victims a legal approach of judicial remedy.425 I define the petition office
system as a post-trial judicial remedy mechanism, operating by local Politics and Law
Committee of local government.
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On the aspect of procedure, Pleading Supervision Office and Petition Office will form a
double-track system for Plea Leniency’s supervision, exoneration and judicial remedies.
Pleading Supervision Offices work in ex-trial stages, Petition Offices work together with second
trials (by appeal), for the post-trial stage.426
On the aspect of substantive effects, Plea Leniency will be executed by procuratorates,
finally determined by courts, and supervised by Supervision Offices and Petition Offices,
positioned under people’s courts and local governments. This actually forms a triangle
relationship, between people’s procuratorates, people’s courts and governments. A triangle mode
of supervising appears much effective than a “waterfall mode” of supervising – uniformly
administrated by local Communist Party Committees, different branches are parallel with each
other, lacks of effective administrative/legal deterrent.
Certainly, building these three mechanisms, two office systems, will reduce Plea Leniency’s
improvement on judicial efficiency and costs, because more mechanisms are taking part in the
Plea Leniency procedure. However, such negative effect can be completely neutralized by
gradually releasing restrictions on Plea Leniency’s application on offenses that benchmark
penalties are above 3 years of imprisonment. On the good aspect, these two office systems for
Plea Leniency’s supervision, exoneration and judicial remedies, will strongly guarantee Plea
Leniency’s security of defendants’ legal rights and free will, also victims’ legal rights and
substantive interests.
Therefore, under the current premise, that the issue of judicial efficiency and costs, is
426
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temporarily not an urgent problem of Chinese criminal justice, as the application rate of Plea
Leniency has already surpassed the set objective of 80% (85.6%),427 forming these two office
systems’ advantages are much outweighing disadvantages.
As stated above, these three legislative focuses and two Plea Leniency related office
systems (with three mechanisms contained therein), are the main and necessary improving
directions of Chinese Plea Leniency system, in my consideration.
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